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Abstract 
 
The need for orientation is shared by human beings everywhere. People need to learn about 
their conditions of existence in order to exercise some degree of control over them as a 
fundamental requirement for their survival both as individuals and as societies. This thesis is 
about the challenges that human global interdependence raises to the fulfilment of this 
task. It argues that the globe-spanning webs of interdependent humankind produce a 
collective problem of orientation characterised by the requirement for a more cosmopolitan 
perspective on the human condition while recognising the difficulty in achieving just that, 
given how all theorising is necessarily embedded in particular social, cultural and historical 
contexts. Through a reinterpretation of the works of Immanuel Kant, Karl Marx, Jürgen 
Habermas and Norbert Elias the thesis asks how critical international theory might provide a 
more adequate answer to the problem of orientation. Its main argument is that this answer 
implies a recovery of grand narratives on the long-term process of human development 
which avoid a reproduction of the shortcomings with which they have been historically 
associated; namely, serving as a channel for the projection of parochial and ethnocentric 
points of view which, under the cover of cosmopolitanism, legitimize practices of exclusion 
and domination. The conclusion to this thesis is that a synthesis between critical theory and 
process sociology would enable the production of grand narratives that promote a more 
cosmopolitan perspective on the conditions of existence of globalised humanity while 
recognising and protecting the plurality of forms of human self-expression. In this manner, 
the thesis opens the way towards the development of more adequate means of orientation 
on the basis of which people might better find their bearings in the world and understand 
how they might come to make more of their history under conditions of their own choosing.   
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Strange that in the cold light of the stars, in which even the 
dearest love is frostily assessed, and even the possible 
defeat of our half-waking world is contemplated without 
remission or praise, the human condition does not lose 
but gains significance. Strange, that it seems more, 
not less, urgent to play some part in this struggle, 
this brief effort of animalcules striving to win 
some increase of lucidity before the ultimate darkness. 
(Olaf Stapledon, Star Maker) 
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Introduction 
 
The need for orientation is a fundamental aspect of human existence. Both individually and 
collectively, human beings have always depended on their capacity to orientate themselves 
in the world in order to survive. Individually, to become full adult members of their species, 
all children need to learn how to control their internal drives and impulses in order to live 
amongst other human beings in accordance with the standards of their societies. 
Collectively, human groups need to learn how to exercise some degree of control over non-
human nature in order to satisfy their needs, as well as how to regulate intra- and inter-
group social relations and conflicts. These learning processes entail the production of 
symbolically-codified stocks of knowledge which function as means of orientation on the 
basis of which people find their bearings in the world, understand their societies, how to live 
in their context, how to relate to outsiders and how to acquire a relative degree of collective 
control over their conditions of existence which is essential for their continued survival.  
 This study is about how critical international theory (CIT) might respond to the 
challenges raised by the need for orientation in the context of a phase of human 
development characterized by high levels of global interdependence. In it, we argue that 
with the global interweaving of humanity, CIT’s fulfilment of an orientating function, by 
helping human beings better understand and control their conditions of existence, 
increasingly depends on its capacity to promote a widening of people’s perspectives from 
more society and time bound points of view to encompass larger human groups – and, 
ultimately, the species as a whole – in their individual and collective assessments of 
adequate behaviour and of the consequences of their actions. In this context, we advance 
the argument that CIT can provide a more adequate answer to the historically emergent 
need for more cosmopolitan – in the sense of species-encompassing – perspectives by 
recovering grand narratives on human development.1 These are understood as very long-
term accounts of the process of development and globalisation of the human species, which 
fulfil an orientating function to the extent that they strive to identify the main social 
processes shaping human development, on the basis of whose knowledge, human beings 
                                                          
1
 The concept of grand narratives, and its particular usage in this study, is explained at greater length in 
Chapter 1, pp. 20-28.  
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might learn how to attain a greater degree of conscious and collective control over their 
conditions of existence and thus – to paraphrase Marx – how to make more of their history 
under conditions of their own choosing.  
 However, we also argue that any attempt at a recovery of grand narratives in CIT is 
necessarily coupled with the critical awareness that all theorising and perspective-taking 
occupies a particular position and point of view in the long chain of human generations. 
Consequently, a critical recovery of grand narratives must necessarily be attuned to the way 
in which previous attempts at long-term accounts of human development fell short of the 
cosmopolitan perspective-taking to which they aspired, and instead frequently reproduced 
more parochial, society and time bound points of view as if these represented a truly 
universal perspective; as is the case with modernist 18th and 19th century grand narratives 
that framed Western colonial and imperial discourse. Such modernist grand narratives – 
themselves attempts to answer the human need for orientation – have frequently assumed 
more the character of modern forms of myth, which serve the particularistic interests of the 
societies in which they originate, rather than adequate frameworks of orientation. For 
example, modernist myths originating in Western European societies have tended to 
identify the historical path of development of the species as a whole with that of the 
countries of Western Europe, which implies an inherent assessment of all those human 
groups who do not follow such a path as being somehow deviant, failed or uncivilised. Such 
an understanding not only ignores the multi-linear and open-ended character of human 
development but has also served as a legitimation device for Western European 
intervention in non-Western contexts, in order to set them on the ‘correct’ historical path, 
and thus for the legitimation of particular relations of power, domination, exploitation and 
exclusion between different sections of humankind.  
 We thus identify a fundamental tension in CIT’s engagement with the problem of 
orientation. On the one hand, the search for more cosmopolitan perspectives on the human 
condition supports an argument in favour of a recovery of grand narratives in critical 
international theory. On the other hand, CIT’s self-reflexive awareness of the 
embeddedness of all human perspective-taking in time and space leads it to remain 
constantly suspicious of grand narratives, and to attempt to expose the underlying parochial 
points of views that might be hidden and legitimized by their supposed cosmopolitanism.  
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 As we argue throughout this study, this tension in CIT’s engagement with the 
problem of orientation is what makes it particularly suited to carry out a recovery of grand 
narratives on human development. This recovery seeks to reinforce grand narratives’ 
orientating function by avoiding a reproduction of the shortcomings with which they are 
usually associated; namely, serving as a channel for the projection of parochial and 
ethnocentric points of view. We are thus interested in understanding how critical 
international theory might provide a more adequate answer to the problem of orientation 
under conditions of global interdependence through the development of theoretical 
frameworks that, by capturing the predominant social processes shaping the long-term 
process of human development, constitute more cosmopolitan means of orientation that 
help human beings better understand themselves, their collective history, and how they 
might exercise political agency envisioning a greater degree of collective and conscious 
control over their future development, in a manner that reduces relations of domination, 
violence and exploitation between people and makes human existence more self-
determined, meaningful and enjoyable. 
 In this context, our study poses two fundamental research questions. First, we 
inquire about the role of grand narratives in critical international theory’s development of 
more adequate answers to the problem of orientation under conditions of human global 
interdependence. And second, we ask whether it is possible to recover grand narratives 
which fulfil an orientating function while guarding against the reproduction of their 
modernist shortcomings.   
 In order to answer these questions, we analyse the way in which previous attempts 
at the production of grand narratives can be understood as engaging with, and answering, 
the problem of orientation. Specifically, we address the grand narratives of the critical 
authors Immanuel Kant, Karl Marx and Jürgen Habermas, and of the process sociologist 
Norbert Elias, in an attempt to understand to what extent – as well as how and why – these 
fulfil an orientating function by providing a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human 
condition, or rather fall into a reproduction of modernist myths. Such an inquiry is 
instructive for our purposes because it both highlights the potential problems that might be 
found in an attempted recovery of grand narratives in critical international theory, and 
provides us with valuable clues regarding how such a recovery might be carried out in a 
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manner that reinforces the orientating character of grand narratives and avoids their 
modernist failings.  
 The choice for these specific authors is justified by the fact that both the critical 
authors and the process sociologist share amongst themselves a fundamental concern with 
achieving a species-encompassing perspective on the human condition, which is not locked 
to a particular time or society, but rather is capable of capturing the whole process of 
human development both in its past and present trajectories, but also regarding its 
potential futures. Furthermore, they share the conviction that grand narratives – by 
contributing to a better understanding of the predominant social processes shaping the 
conditions of human existence and their long-term historical development – play a 
fundamental role in helping people acquire a greater degree of conscious control over their 
future development; even though the manner in which the critical authors conceive of the 
relation between their grand narratives and political agency is markedly different from that 
of Elias’s process sociology. Consequently, these authors’ works are particularly exemplary 
and instructive to a critical theoretical engagement with the question of how grand 
narratives might fulfil an orientating function by helping human beings both understand 
their conditions of globally interwoven existence and how they might collectively come to 
exercise a greater degree of self-determination over them. 
 The originality of this study lies in the way in which it engages with the work of these 
authors through the lenses of the problem of orientation in a manner that both provides a 
novel reading of their texts and that makes a fundamental contribution to the further 
development of contemporary critical international theory by identifying how it can fulfil a 
better orientating function to human beings caught up in global networks of 
interdependence. Furthermore, this study is also novel in its establishment of synergic links 
between critical theory and process sociology. This is done in two ways. First, we use 
Eliasian concepts as a framing device through which we assess the grand narratives of both 
the critical authors and that of Elias himself. And second, in the last two chapters, we carry 
out an analysis of how Elias’s particular engagement with the long-term study of human 
development can be instructive for CIT’s recovery of grand narratives as a means of 
orientation.  
 Our argument is developed throughout seven chapters. In chapter one, we discuss 
the five main themes informing our study. We connect the problematic of ‘orientation’ with 
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the notions of ‘grand narratives’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’, as well as with the Eliasian 
concepts of the ‘involvement–detachment balance’ and the ‘triad of controls’, and show 
how these themes frame the analysis of our chosen authors in the subsequent chapters.  
 In chapter two, we address Kant’s work to reveal the limitations of grand narratives 
based on philosophical history and on dualisms between the transcendental ascertainment 
of the ideal conditions of freedom and the analysis of the historical dynamics of human 
development. These dualisms inherently pose a conception of the long-term history of the 
species which is both linear and teleological and which betrays a more time bound and 
Western-centric conception of human development that fails to achieve the cosmopolitan 
perspective to which Kant aspires.   
 In chapter three, we discuss Marx’s work to argue that it demonstrates how a 
materialist and emergentist approach to human development can overcome the dualisms 
that undermine a Kantian answer to the problem of orientation. In particular, we note how 
Marx’s emphasis on the role of human control over nature in the species’ history opens the 
way for a more detached, non-transcendental orientating framework that captures the 
multi-linear and open-ended character of human development. However, Marx’s work also 
points to the limitations of grand narratives based on the attribution of causal primacy to 
one dimension of the development of the human powers of control. It shows how these 
inherently imply a philosophy of the subject which ignores the fundamental condition of 
plurality of the human species and undermines the potential found in Marx’s critical 
approach for a more adequate means of orientation, substituting it with a linear and 
teleological approach.  
 In chapters four and five we consider Habermas’s work to argue that it points to the 
possibility of a reconstruction of Marx’s critical approach that overcomes its limitations by 
recovering Kantian themes such as the role of linguistic communication, the development of 
social norms, state formation and world politics in the species’ history. In particular, we 
observe how Habermas’s writings provide a more comprehensive understanding of the 
development of the human powers of control in different dimensions of human existence. 
However, we also argue that Habermas’s work once again reveals the limitations of a 
Kantian-type of transcendental engagement with the problem of orientation and that it 
recovers the dualisms and linear conception of human history which undermine Kant’s 
critical approach. 
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 In chapter six, we move to discuss Elias’s approach to the production of grand 
narratives as an alternative to that of the critical authors. In this context, and with reference 
to Elias’s notion of the involvement–detachment balance in human knowledge production, 
we observe that while the critical authors remain fundamentally concerned with 
understanding the conditions under which political agency might occur that expands human 
being’s capacity to self-determine their conditions of existence, and constantly strive to 
connect the explanatory side of their grand narratives with this normative goal, Elias is 
instead focused on providing what he describes as a ‘detached’ approach to grand 
narratives. This approach derives from his argument that the development of critical 
judgements regarding political agency before a more in-depth explanatory understanding is 
achieved of the predominant social processes shaping human development might lead 
social scientists’ grand narratives to be coloured by their personal and communal more 
‘involved’ and parochial political interests, wishes and fears in a manner that, ultimately, 
undermines the orientating character of their grand narratives. Consequently, Elias 
considers that more adequate grand narratives, which avoid the shortcomings of modernist 
myths, require a predominant focus on their explanatory dimension, i.e. on the 
identification, explanation and understanding of the social processes shaping human 
development, rather than on the normative goal of political action envisioning human self-
determination. In fact, he defends that successful orientation towards this normative goal 
by the social sciences depends on the development of more detached and less-politically-
coloured grand narratives on the human condition, rather than the other way around.   
 Our reading of Elias’s argument in this context permits us to reinterpret the 
shortcomings identified in the work of the critical authors in the previous chapters as 
deriving exactly from their ‘over-involvement’. We thus argue that the critical authors’ 
concern with the normative goal of emancipation leads them to constantly combine their 
explanatory account of the long-term process of human development with their normative 
identification of the prospects for contemporary political agency envisioning their privileged 
image of the human future, through grand narratives that see all human development 
leading up to their particular present and its timely role in the definition of the future of the 
species. Such an approach again and again makes the critical authors’ grand narratives 
reproduce modernist forms of teleology and linear progressivism which lock them in their 
particular cultural, spatial and temporal horizons in a manner that effectively blocks their 
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capacity to capture the multi-linear and open-ended character of human development and 
legitimizes their own parochial, Western-centric perspectives as representative of a truly 
cosmopolitan point of view. In this manner, their grand narratives not only fail to achieve 
the cosmopolitan perspective to which they aspire – since they frame their analysis of the 
long-term process of human development in the particular concerns of their own societies 
and time-periods – but they also confirm the Western home-of-thought of these authors as 
the confluence of the human past, the centre of present historical time and the defining 
aspect of the species’ future in a manner that inherently legitimizes Western predominance 
over other forms of human self-expression in other sections of humankind. 
 We then move to demonstrate how Elias’s more detached approach to the 
production of grand narratives can provide a way out of the modernist traps of teleology 
and linear progressivism in which the critical authors under analysis have fallen. In this 
context we argue that, in contrast to the critical authors, Elias delays the engagement with 
the normative implications of his long-term account of human development and their 
associated questions of political agency. Rather, he strives to capture the predominant 
social processes shaping human development without inferring what these mean for the 
prospects of human emancipation or for his personal wishes, fears or political views about 
the human condition. As a consequence, his approach to grand narratives is not focused on 
establishing linear and teleological accounts of the process of human development and of 
how it culminates in the social scientist’s present in a manner that informs political action, 
but rather strives to understand the developmental dynamics of those social processes 
which, while being universal to all human societies, develop in multi-linear, open-ended and 
society-specific ways which have become increasingly interweaved at the global level 
throughout the species’ history. In this way, Elias develops a grand narrative on human 
development that achieves a more cosmopolitan perspective than those of the critical 
authors to the extent that he is better able to uncouple from his own spatial and temporal 
horizon and understand human development not in a linear manner, but as the result of the 
interweaving of several society-specific developmental processes. Elias’s focus on 
identifying what social processes are universal to the human species and how these 
manifest themselves in different ways across space and time, according to developmental 
dynamics which can be traced and understood, constitutes the basis for a grand narrative 
on human development with a greater explanatory and orientating potential. 
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 In chapter seven, however, we note that the capacity of Elias’s detached approach to 
produce more cosmopolitan grand narratives that avoid the shortcomings of modernist 
myths, comes at the cost of their orientating potential being limited to their explanatory 
dimension, i.e. to help human beings better understand their conditions of existence by 
identifying the predominant social processes which have shaped the long-term process of 
human development and the globalisation of the species. Such an approach, we argue, does 
not fulfil critical international theory’s parallel normative interest in understanding how 
grand narratives can orientate human being’s political agency in a manner that helps people 
make more of their history under conditions of their own choosing. Consequently, Elias’s 
process sociology is characterised as only taking us half-way towards a more adequate 
answer to the problem of orientation. 
 This observation leads us to make the argument that such an answer requires a 
higher synthesis between critical theory and process sociology in the context of critical 
international theory. A synthesis which is capable of weaving together the normative 
interest of the critical authors in orientating political agency towards the expansion of 
human self-determination with Elias’s explanatory, multi-linear and open-ended conception 
of human development. This synthesis, we argue, involves the development of research 
projects which, composed of multi-disciplinary teams of social scientists, seek to fulfil two 
interweaved objectives. First, the production of more detailed, detached and explanatory 
analysis of different society-specific developmental processes across the globe and of their 
long-term intertwinement in longer and more complex webs of human interdependence in 
the context of an international society which, ultimately, has come the encompass the 
species as a whole. And second, the assessment of the normative implications of this 
knowledge and how it might orientate human political agency in a manner that makes it 
better able to ensure the expansion of conscious control over the networks of human 
interdependence and avoids a reproduction of relations of violence, domination, 
exploitation and exclusion between different sections of humankind. In this context, we 
argue that, given the current levels of human global interdependence and the still 
inadequate fund of available knowledge about the long-term global interweaving of society-
specific developmental processes, orientation towards political agency has to focus on the 
international society level of analysis. It must explore the immanent potential, and how to 
actualise it, for the further constitution and development of global institutions that enable 
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the collective regulation of the networks of interdependent humankind between the several 
societies into which the species is divided on the basis of the knowledge about processes of 
human development provided by the proposed synthesis between critical theory and 
process sociology. This means that critical international theory would orientate political 
agency regarding the identification and actualisation of the immanent potentials that the 
long-term process of human development has gathered in the contemporary conditions of 
global interdependence of the species for the further development of global institutions – 
such as the human rights regime or the development of global environmental norms – 
through which the patterns of acceptable behaviour and required self-restraint that should 
be observed between people and states can be defined in a manner that enables human 
beings to attain a greater degree of collective and conscious control over their conditions of 
existence, over the global interweaving of the networks of social interdependence which 
they constitute and over their hitherto unplanned developmental dynamics. The focus of 
political agency in the promotion of the development of global institutions is justified 
because, for a species which has become globally interdependent, only through the 
deliberative consensualization, between the several societies into which humankind is 
divided, of the standards of behaviour that they all can accept must be observed, can the 
successful collective management of the global networks of human interdependence occur. 
Only in this way can the regulation of human interdependence be carried out in a manner 
that simultaneously allows these societies, and the human beings who constitute them, to 
have a greater degree of self-determination over their conditions of existence while 
reducing relations of violence, domination and exclusion between them. Critical 
international theory would thus constitute a more adequate means of orientation for 
human beings caught up in global networks of human interdependence; one which avoids 
the shortcomings of the critical authors under analysis by clearly emphasizing the prior role 
of detached social scientific analysis before a more involved assessment of its normative 
implications can be made, and by distributing the different tasks of more detached or more 
involved social scientific research between the different members of the envisioned multi-
disciplinary teams of social scientists engaged in the study of the human condition.  
 Given the magnitude and multi-disciplinary character of such an endeavour, it 
escapes the time and length constraints of the present study to carry out the proposed 
synthesis between these two approaches. As such, in the last section of chapter seven, we 
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limit ourselves to take the first, highly tentative, steps towards the establishment of the 
theoretical basis on which this higher synthesis might be produced in the context of future 
critical international theory research projects by inquiring into the critical implications of 
Elias’s grand narrative on human development.  
 The main argument in this study can thus be described as moving in the form of an 
ascending spiral. We start with the recognition of the need for more cosmopolitan 
perspectives on the human condition as a way to improve the available means of 
orientation to people caught in global networks of interdependence. Then, we make an 
argument about the role of grand narratives in providing such cosmopolitan perspectives 
and make the case for their recovery in critical international theory. This takes us to an 
assessment of previous attempts, both in critical theory and in process sociology, at the 
production of grand narratives in order to identify both their strengths and shortcomings as 
means of orientation capable of providing a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human 
condition. We note that again and again the critical authors have fallen short of this goal 
and reproduced forms of modernist theorising which hide more parochial and Western-
centric perspectives under the cover of their supposed cosmopolitanism. Elias’s process 
sociology helps us understand why this is the case, by noting how these authors’ political 
involvement and commitment to human emancipation blocks their analytical capacity to 
escape the point of view of their place in time and space, and how their more involved 
perspectives colour their analysis of the long-term process of human development. Then, 
we show how Elias’s detached approach to grand narratives offers a way out of the 
modernist trap by providing an analysis of human development in a long-term perspective 
which is both multi-linear and open-ended and thus achieves a more cosmopolitan 
perspective on the human condition. However, we also argue that Elias’s more adequate 
approach to grand narratives also comes at the cost of its orientating function by losing 
touch with the questions of political agency. This observation takes us, finally, to consider 
how, on the basis of process sociology’s more detached approach to human development, a 
form of ‘secondary re-involvement’ can occur which identifies the normative implications of 
the long-term process of human development and assesses how its knowledge might inform 
political agency in different times and places envisioning the expansion of human being’s 
control over their conditions of existence in accordance with the immanent potentials that 
have been historically gathered. The proposes synthesis between critical theory and process 
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sociology, we argue, would allow critical international theory to achieve a more 
cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition, which more adequately orientates 
people not only in understanding their conditions of existence but also in learning how to 
achieve a greater degree of control over them in a manner that helps human survival, that 
makes human life more meaningful and enjoyable and that reduces relations of violence, 
domination and exclusion between people in the next phase of humankind’s global 
development.   
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Chapter One 
Critical theory, orientation and world politics 
 
In this chapter we explore the conceptual apparatus framing our study. In the first section, 
we make the case that, under conditions of global interdependence, the human need for 
orientation requires the development of more cosmopolitan perspectives on the human 
condition and we clarify what we mean by that notion. In the second section, we connect 
the attainment of these more cosmopolitan perspectives with the recovery of grand 
narratives in critical international theory. Then, in the third section, we introduce the 
process sociological concept of involvement-detachment balance and show how it helps us 
understand to what extent the grand narratives of the authors under analysis provide an 
adequate answer to the problem of orientation. Finally, in the fourth section, we 
demonstrate how the process sociological notion of the triad of controls can serve as a 
framing device through which we establish a dialogue between the several authors under 
analysis. This conceptual apparatus then orientates our analysis of Kant, Marx, Habermas 
and Elias’s works in the subsequent chapters.  
 
1. Orientation and cosmopolitan perspectives 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines orientation as the act of aligning or positioning 
something or someone relative to the points of a compass or other specified positions. It 
relates to the idea of finding one’s bearings in relation to unfamiliar surroundings, 
maintaining its etymological meaning of literally finding the ‘orient’, i.e. finding the sunrise 
as a way of locating oneself and one’s direction. Even when referring to non-spatial forms of 
orientation – as when expressing someone’s political or sexual orientation – the concept 
maintains this basic idea of locating a person vis-à-vis something.2 In political thought, the 
notion of orientation has played a central role, especially in the work of authors associated 
with critical theory. It is the core theme in Kant’s essay ‘What is Orientation in Thinking?’ 
where he argues that, similarly to people’s need to orientate themselves spatially, so too 
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they need to find their bearings in thought.3 In the absence of spatial directions, orientation 
in thought depends on ideas that serve as the compass on the basis of which people can 
direct their capacity for judgement. Here, he mentions the ‘rational belief’ in an intelligent 
and limitless creator, who is the source of ultimate morality and good, as one such 
orientating idea to the extent that only on its basis can people orientate their thought, in 
the judgement of everything which is limited, in accordance with the conception of a 
universal and timeless moral law.4  
 According to Kimberly Hutchings, the notion of orientation is not limited to Kant’s 
considerations on speculative thinking but is evident throughout his work and has played a 
central role in the development of critical theory.5 It is the underlying theme in Kant’s 
writings on history and politics, which are fundamentally concerned with understanding 
how human beings can better orientate themselves in the world and in their historical 
process of development. In this context, Kant’s awareness about the growing global 
interdependence of the human species leads him to the view that the future navigation of 
human collective life on the planet demands orientating frameworks which are not bound 
to limited time or spatial horizons, but rather assume the perspective of the species as a 
whole. Only in this manner can a more adequate understanding be attained of the human 
condition which is truly cosmopolitan, i.e. species-encompassing, in the sense of allowing an 
impartial point of view which, by not being locked to the perspective of any particular 
society or period in history, is capable of assessing the totality of the conditions of human 
global existence, which implies not only understanding their contemporary manifestation, 
but also how these have developed throughout history, what future developmental course 
these might assume and how human beings might collectively intervene in, and shape, that 
future development. As such, Kant’s connection between orientation and cosmopolitanism 
can be said to possess, on the one hand, a fundamental explanatory character. The 
identification of a species-encompassing perspective as a requirement for a more adequate 
understanding of the human condition implies a need for explanatory frameworks that 
detach from all particularistic points of view, be they those of particular societies or time 
                                                          
3
 Kant, I. ‘What is Orientation in Thinking?’ in Kant: Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss, (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
4
 Kant, I. ‘What is Orientation in Thinking?’, p. 245. 
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periods. A cosmopolitan perspective thus captures the totality of the human, across space 
and time, in order to place the contemporary conditions of global interdependence of the 
species within the flow of very long-term processes of human development and growing 
global interconnection between human societies, in a manner that recognises that an 
understanding of the human condition cannot privilege some human groups over others, 
whatever their positioning in time and space. On the other hand, as Richard Beardsworth 
notes, such a ‘cosmopolitan disposition’ is not explanatory per se, but possesses also a 
fundamental normative character.6 This normativity, which is understood as inherently 
implied in the privileged species-encompassing perspective of cosmopolitanism, entails at 
least three fundamental traits. First, the attempted distance from spatial and temporal 
particularistic points of view means not only that natural and artificial borders come to be 
understood as contingent, but also that all forms of ethnic, religious, class or gender 
particularities come to be regarded as secondary, in favour of a focus on common humanity. 
Second, the focus on common humanity implies the recognition of the inherent dignity of all 
human individuals, which, third, places human dignity at the centre of considerations about 
the future development of the conditions of existence of globalised humanity through 
global institutional arrangements and global mechanisms of public law.7 As Beardsworth 
notes, cosmopolitanism can thus be said to ‘hover’ between the empirical and the 
normative. On the one hand, a species-encompassing perspective, which is understood as 
required for the explanatory understanding of the human condition, implies the normative 
recognition of the inherent dignity of all human beings, as well as the normative assessment 
of the global arrangements in which people might acquire a greater degree of collective 
control over their conditions of existence in a manner that protects and promotes that 
dignity. On the other hand, this normative vision has ‘effects in the real as an ideational 
guide to human behaviour’, effectively orientating human beings in the establishment of 
global standards, rules and institutions that ensure the dignity of every human individual. 
This connection between the explanatory and the normative aspects of cosmopolitanism is 
perhaps best captured in Marx and Engels’s observation, in The German Ideology, of how, 
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 Beardsworth, R. Cosmopolitanism and International Relations Theory (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011), p. 13. 
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under conditions of human global interdependence, ‘modern universal intercourse cannot 
be controlled by individuals, unless it is controlled by all’.8     
 The connection between orientation and cosmopolitanism can also be identified in 
the ‘critical turn’ in International Relations, which reinforced what Beardsworth 
characterises as the discipline’s focus on ‘future-oriented theorising’ regarding inter-group 
relations in the context of the ‘determinations of the past and the present’.9 Driven by a 
shared criticism of mainstream IR, critical international theory authors adopted concepts 
and perspectives from critical theory – especially with reference to the works of the 
Frankfurt School and Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant or Marx – through which they 
attempted to overcome what they perceived as the shortcomings of the discipline’s 
predominant theoretical paradigms. In particular, they strived to produce theoretical 
approaches to world politics capable of overcoming what later Barry Buzan and Richard 
Little came to characterize as the ‘presentism’ of neorealism and neoliberalism.10 
Presentism refers to the short-term and time bound horizons that mainstream perspectives 
on world politics tended to adopt – usually not exceeding the time frame of a few decades – 
under the assumption that world politics could be explained through an analysis of their 
present characteristics alone.11 These perspectives had the underlying implication of 
dismissing an analysis of what world politics had been in the past, how they came to assume 
their contemporary form, and what they could potentially become in the future. The notion 
of change was thus remarkably absent from mainstream approaches, with the 
contemporary characteristics of world politics – such as the recognition of the state as the 
predominant form of political organisation, or the condition of anarchy in inter-state 
relations – being identified as essential and immutable conditions of human existence, 
emphasising what Buzan and Little characterised as the ‘anarchocentrism’ of these 
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approaches.12 As John Hobson observes, mainstream IR simultaneously failed to recognise 
the ‘uniqueness’ of contemporary world politics and ‘obscured’ their past.13 In this manner, 
it did a ‘disservice’ to the understanding of both the past and the present of the human 
condition.14 In the context of our present concerns, it can be argued that mainstream IR 
failed to constitute an adequate framework of orientation on the basis of which the study of 
world politics could be carried out and a better understanding achieved of the conditions of 
existence of human beings on the planet. Instead, it was a frequent source of disorientation, 
to the extent that its assumptions about the immutability of world politics or of the inherent 
conflictual character of relations between people organised as states, veiled an awareness 
of the possibilities for change in world politics and for the development of forms of political 
organisation which might enable a greater degree of regulation and amelioration of violence 
in inter-group conflicts and encounters.  
 Contrasting with mainstream theoretical perspectives, the critical turn in IR can be 
read as striving to improve the adequacy of the discipline’s frameworks of orientation by 
placing the notion of change at the centre of its approach in a manner that enables it to 
attain a more cosmopolitan perspective on world politics and the conditions of existence of 
globalised humanity. It does not understand contemporary world politics as manifesting a 
set of immutable characteristics that comprise human existence across space and time, but 
rather seeks to understand how the prevailing order came about and has been constituted 
through a long-term process of human development. In Robert Cox’s characterisation, 
critical international theory tries to develop a ‘theory of history’ in the sense of being 
concerned ‘with the continuing process of historical change’.15 Echoing Horkheimer’s 
distinction between traditional and critical theory, Cox observes that the ‘ahistorical’ 
character of mainstream IR theory makes it inherently ‘conservative’, to the extent that its 
assumptions about the immutability of world politics lead it to produce perspectives which, 
even if unintentionally, serve the ‘particular national, sectional, or class interests, which are 
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comfortable within the given order’.16 By recognising that all perspectives are inherently 
circumscribed by the historical conditions in which they are produced, critical IR ‘contains’ 
mainstream approaches within itself and its conception of the long-term process of human 
development.17 Furthermore, it is ‘self-reflexive’ about its own conditions of knowledge 
production, constantly recognising the limited and time bound perspectives which it 
advances. Through such reflexivity, critical international theory strives to achieve a 
‘perspective on perspectives’ that functions as a more adequate framework of orientation 
permitting not only a better understanding of certain aspects or periods of world politics, 
but of how ‘both the parts and the whole’ are involved in a continuous process of change.18   
 As Linklater argues, critical international theory ultimately searches for the 
development of a ‘conceptual system concerned with the affairs of the species in its 
entirety’.19 It aspires for the attainment of a cosmopolitan perspective from the point of 
view of which the whole process of human development – not only in its past and present 
manifestations, but also in its potential futures – can be understood. In Linklater’s 
assessment, such cosmopolitanism is ‘revolutionary’ to the extent that it desires what no 
particularistic perspective can supply; a ‘politics of impartiality’ which takes all humans into 
account irrespective of the society or the time period to which they belong.20  Critical IR thus 
strives to develop a more species-encompassing perspective on world politics that captures 
the predominant social processes shaping the progressive globalisation of the political, 
social, economic, environmental, moral and emotional life of the species, and that might 
function as a more adequate and less particularistic means of orientation. It reproduces 
Kant’s call for a universal history from a cosmopolitan perspective as an orientating 
framework through which people might better find their bearings in the world, better 
attune to each other under conditions of global interdependence, and learn how to more 
consciously navigate the future stages of their collective process of historical development.  
 Common to all critical authors in IR is thus the awareness that the development of a 
more cosmopolitan standpoint of orientation fulfils not only an explanatory role, but also 
carries with it inherent normative implications. First, it necessarily questions the practices of 
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exclusion between self-regarding political communities and how these promote limited 
emotional identification between people belonging to different societies in a manner that 
generates and legitimates forms of violence, exclusion, and domination in their mutual 
relations. And second, by recognising the historically changeable character of human beings, 
it highlights their capacity to transform social relations, and thus to acquire some degree of 
self-determination over their conditions of existence. In this context, critical international 
theory authors observe that as long as people remain estranged from one another through 
their membership of self-regarding political communities, and to direct themselves in the 
world in accordance with orientating frameworks that express particularistic points of view 
and are complicit with dominant relations of power and exclusion, they will remain subject 
to the violent conflicts and mutual injustices that characterize world politics and that 
constantly undermine their common human dignity.21 The overall lack of adequate 
orientation in thinking about world politics thus implies that human beings will continue to 
be unable to ‘enjoy a social and political world subject to their control and responsive to 
their capacity for individual and collective self-determination’.22  
 Critical international theory’s normative thrust thus entails not only a critique of 
particularism inherent in its search for a more cosmopolitan standpoint of orientation but 
also a normative commitment to the expression of the human capacity for self-
determination and the reduction of relations of domination and exclusion between people. 
It implies what Beardsworth refers to as ‘big picture political vision’ that seeks proactive 
intervention in the future by providing a cosmopolitan perspective that promotes change in 
the reciprocal behaviour between nations, international organisations and individuals.23 
Ultimately, critical IR shares the normative commitment expressed in the work of critical 
authors such as Kant and Marx who envision the future possibility of a ‘universal society of 
free individuals’ – co-extensive with humanity itself – which respects and protects each 
person’s natural right to life, dignity and freedom.24  
 Following Benhabib, we can thus argue that the connection operated between the 
notions of orientation and cosmopolitanism in critical international theory possesses two 
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main dimensions.25 First, it has an ‘explanatory-diagnostic’ dimension, which is concerned 
with the production of theoretical frameworks that are capable of capturing the 
predominant social processes shaping the historical development of the human species. 
These frameworks fulfil an orientating function to the extent that they provide people with 
a better understanding of the social forces which have, so far, predominantly shaped the 
human conditions of existence, throughout a long-term and largely unplanned process of 
development, up to the contemporary global interdependence of the species. And second, 
Benhabib identifies the ‘anticipatory-utopian’ dimension, which is engaged with the 
normative identification of the potential gathered by this long-term process for the further 
actualization of people’s capacity for self-determination, as well as with assessing what the 
past reveals about the future potentialities of the species. This identification fulfils an 
orientating function to the extent that it helps people better understand how, and through 
what forms of political agency, they might achieve a greater degree of collective and 
conscious control over their conditions of existence and the future course of their process of 
development. As Benhabib observes, this second dimension is inseparable from the 
explanatory dimension insofar as critical international theory is not pursuing the production 
of a moralistic account of a utopian world, uncoupled from the history of humankind. 
Rather, it is interested in the development of an orientating framework that achieves a 
species-encompassing perspective capable of capturing the actual dynamics of human 
development in all its aspects, and in all its temporal and spatial expressions, on the basis of 
which it can identify the realistic possibilities for human emancipation, as these have been 
gathered in particular historical contexts, as well as orientate political agency towards their 
actualisation. Without this explanatory dimension, ‘critical theory dissolves into mere 
normative philosophy; [while] if it excludes the dimension of anticipatory-utopian critique, it 
cannot be distinguished from other mainstream social theories that attempt to gain value-
free knowledge of the social world’.26 Critical international theory, with its search for a 
cosmopolitan perspective, can thus be said to constantly negotiate between the empirical 
and the normative, between the explanatory assessment of the historical conditions of 
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human existence and the anticipatory projection of the immanent potential for human 
freedom these have gathered in the context of an open future.27  
 As already mentioned, the type of cosmopolitan orientation which we identify as 
required to help human beings find their bearings under conditions of human global 
interdependence strives to overcome all forms of particularistic perspective which are 
locked to particular temporal, spatial or cultural points of view. Consequently, the 
cosmopolitan orientation here defended cannot be found only through an assessment of 
the contemporary conditions of existence of the human species, or through the mutual 
opening up of perspectives between present-day human societies. Rather, it demands the 
capacity to produce theoretical frameworks that encompass the whole course of human 
development and thus can frame the contemporary conditions of human global 
interdependence in the long-term process of global interweaving of human societies. The 
achievement of a more cosmopolitan perspective in critical international theory is thus 
understood as being inherently connected with the recovery of grand narratives in its 
context. A recovery which, as we see in greater detail in the next section, places CIT before a 
fundamental problem.  
 
2. Grand narratives and the problem of orientation 
 
Grand narratives are here understood as very long-term accounts of human development 
which strive to achieve a more cosmopolitan – in the sense of species-encompassing – 
perspective that fulfils both an explanatory and an anticipatory orientating function. The 
concept is borrowed from Jean-François Lyotard who, in The Postmodern Condition, defines 
grand narratives as possessing both a descriptive and a prescriptive character.28 This 
characterisation echoes the two dimension of orientation above identified and, according to 
Lyotard, implies that the explanatory description of the long-term course of human history, 
and of its potential future development, fulfils an orientating function by not only helping 
contemporary human beings interpret their conditions of existence and find their bearings 
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in the world but also by legitimising the normative assessment of what forms of political 
agency can expand human self-determination in the future.  
 In this context, it is important to briefly note that an interest in long-term 
perspectives on human development is shared with several non-critical approaches – both 
within IR, and in other areas of social inquiry – that focus predominantly on their 
explanatory role and which tend to put less emphasis on an assessment of their anticipatory 
dimension. Within International Relations, but outside critical international theory, there 
has been a renewed interest in long-term perspectives in the works of authors striving for a 
higher synthesis between International Relations and Historical Sociology, such as Buzan 
and Little29; John Hobson30; Buzan and George Lawson31; Yale Ferguson and Richard 
Manbach32; Kees van der Pijl33, Ken Dark34 or Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk35. Outside 
International Relations, long-term perspectives have also continued to be pursued within 
different theoretical traditions. Worth mentioning – beyond the now classical works of 
Immanuel Wallenstein36, Charles Tilly37, Michael Mann38 or the Annales School39 – are the 
works in ‘new global history’ developed by Bruce Mazlish40; David Christian’s ‘Big History’ 
project41; or Norbert Elias’s process sociology.42  
 In critical international theory itself, the connection between cosmopolitanism and 
grand narratives is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the work of Andrew Linklater. 
Linklater’s argument is that grand narratives play a fundamental role in critical international 
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theory to the extent that, by providing accounts of the long and collective struggle of the 
species to tame natural forces and create larger civilised social systems, they promote 
‘cosmopolitan dispositions and perspectives’, which might encourage greater mutual 
identification between people and reduce the ‘lethality of inter-group encounters’.43 With 
this observation, Linklater brings together both the explanatory and the anticipatory 
dimensions of grand narratives and can thus be regarded as making a case concerning their 
orientating function by helping people better understand themselves and the social 
processes which they constitute as well as how to more consciously navigate and control 
their future development.  
 Linklater’s position on grand narratives has led him to engage in their attempted 
recovery in the context of critical international theory and to inquire how they might play an 
important role in the further development of critical approaches to world politics. Relying in 
particular on the grand narratives of Kant, Marx and Habermas, Linklater has shown how 
the problem of political community in world politics can be reconceptualised when framed 
in a long-term perspective.44 This reconceptualization is seen to imply the complementarity 
between the explanatory analysis of the changing boundaries of political community 
throughout history, with the normative critique of particularistic, self-regarding and 
exclusionary forms of political community, as well as the assessment of the immanent 
potentials of modernity for the expansion of the boundaries of moral identification between 
people beyond the frontiers of sovereign states. More recently, Linklater has continued his 
engagement with grand narratives on human development through Elias’s process 
sociology. Elias’s studies on the process of civilisation are used to carry out an explanatory 
analysis of the long-term process of development of political community in the Western 
system of states and an anticipatory identification of the immanent potentials gathered in 
contemporary world politics for the further development of a ‘global civilising process’, 
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expressed in the emergence of cosmopolitan sensibilities and the constitution of 
‘cosmopolitan harm conventions’.45  
 However, the recourse to grand narratives in critical international theory has not 
been consensual amongst its authors, with many finding it a highly problematic approach to 
the development of the critical study of world politics. The problematic status of grand 
narratives in CIT is connected with its understanding of human knowledge and perspective-
taking as necessarily influenced by people’s particular positioning in space, time and in the 
social, cultural and material contexts of their societies. As such, critical international theory 
is constantly engaged in locating knowledge statements and perspectives within the flow of 
historical change, identifying the extent to which these represent particularistic points of 
view embedded in specific temporal, spatial, societal and cultural contexts. Consequently, it 
assumes a predominantly sceptical attitude towards all statements pertaining to represent a 
cosmopolitan, species-encompassing, perspective which has uncoupled from particularistic 
society and time bound points of view. Such scepticism has led, for example, to Hutchings’s 
critique of Linklater’s work with the argument that he failed to safeguard against, and 
actually reproduced, some of the problems inherent in the grand narratives of Kant and 
Habermas.46 In particular, Hutchings considers that these grand narratives, on which 
Linklater’s work relies substantially, reproduce forms of theorising that pose the path of 
human development in Western European societies as a universal expression of the 
development of the human species as a whole. Consequently, they advance what is actually 
a highly particularistic, society and time bound perspective on the human condition under 
the cover of their supposed cosmopolitanism. This perspective supports a progressivist, 
linear and teleological understanding of human historical development in which the West is 
seen as leading world-historical time and as assuming a central role in the definition of the 
future of the species. According to Hutchings, such a perspective inherently perceives non-
Western contemporary societies as non-contemporaneous, i.e. as expressions of the past of 
human development. As such, Hutchings argues, the supposed cosmopolitanism of these 
authors’ grand narratives instead serves – even if unintentionally – as a legitimating device 
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of parochial and ethnocentric points of view that underline practices of exclusion and 
support paternalistic and dominating relations between the Western and the non-Western 
parts of humanity, which confirms the particularism of these grand narratives as well as 
their lack of adequacy as a means of orientation.47 Grand narratives are thus frequently 
understood in critical international theory as incurring in the same shortcomings and 
producing the same type of disorientation as mainstream IR theory, insofar as their 
assumption of a supposedly cosmopolitan perspective actually veils society and time bound 
practices of exclusion and domination and hides the interconnection between specific forms 
of knowledge and relations of power.48 Consequently, contemporary critical international 
theory has come to share its post-structuralist counterpart’s ‘incredulity’ towards grand 
narratives.49  
 In this context, two different responses can be identified in CIT’s relation with grand 
narratives. The most predominant response, as a reading of the major journals in 
International Relations in the past few years will demonstrate, consists in dismissing an 
engagement with grand narratives on human development to instead focus on the study of 
contemporary world politics, and in the application of a critical perspective to particular 
issues, highlighting the huge diversity of possible narratives on the human condition. This 
approach has the advantage of avoiding the dangers of grand narratives by constantly 
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recognising the partiality and the societal and temporal embedded character of all 
perspectives. The focus of CIT’s research thus shifts from the attainment of a more 
cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition to instead produce highly specialised 
knowledge on specific aspects of contemporary world politics that recognise, identify and 
express the plurality of perspectives that characterise humankind, as well as show how all of 
these perspectives share the fundamental fact of their partiality and embeddedness in 
specific social and temporal contexts.  
 However, we might ask how such an approach is at all able to fulfil an orientating 
function. The identification of the plurality of existent perspectives on the human condition, 
without being framed in a wider account of their long-term process of development 
throughout the history of the species and the interweaving of human societies, tends itself 
to lead to a reification of these perspectives as immutable, self-enclosed facts of human 
social existence. Critical international theory thus ends up reproducing the shortcomings of 
mainstream IR theory by losing its capacity to understand the flow of human change, and to 
acquire what Cox characterises as a ‘perspective on perspectives’.50 When the goal of social 
scientific research becomes the development of specialised knowledge and the expression 
of a plurality of society-specific perspectives without being coupled by parallel efforts at 
synthesis and at bringing these various perspectives together in a wider account of the 
human condition and of how these perspectives themselves are the product of the long-
term process of human development, its capacity to provide orientation to human beings by 
helping them better understand their conditions of existence and how to exercise greater 
conscious control over them in the future becomes fundamentally undermined. This is 
because it loses the capacity to understand the historical development of these 
perspectives, their role as means of orientation to human behaviour, as well as their 
potentials for change and for mutual opening up in ways that enable the development of 
common frameworks of orientation between human societies that serve as a basis for more 
cooperative, and less violent and dominating relations between human beings. Hence, the 
focus on the plurality of contemporary perspectives becomes a one-sided effort which, 
while preventing against the shortcomings of grand narratives, also compromises CIT’s 
capacity to help human beings understand their conditions of existence, how these have 
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come to be what they are, and what immanent potentials have been gathered by the long-
term process of human historical development for the opening up of society-specific 
perspectives to each other in a manner that enables greater attunement between people 
and their societies and the development of common frameworks of orientation on the basis 
of which human beings might collective bring under greater control their conditions of 
globally interdependent existence.  
 As Kimberly Hutchings notes, under conditions of human global interdependence, 
the orientating function of critical international theory depends not only on the 
identification of the plurality of perspectives on the human condition, but also in their 
mutual opening up, in a manner that enables them not only to recognise their respective 
partiality, but also to identify their similarities, on the basis of which they might develop a 
common, collaborative and more cosmopolitan orientation towards the world.51 This 
observation takes us to the second approach to grand narratives in critical international 
theory, which is most evident in Linklater’s work.52  This approach asks to what extent the 
majority of contemporary CIT, by retreating from the project of developing long-term 
perspectives on human development, has not incurred in a ‘retreat into the present’, similar 
to the one that the process sociologist Norbert Elias identified in the sociology of the later 
twentieth century and that has effectively thrown the ‘baby out with the bathwater’ and 
too quickly dismissed the role that grand narratives might have in the development of 
critical international theory.53 It argues that CIT’s contemporary focus on the recognition 
and expression of a plurality of perspectives on the human condition needs to be 
accompanied by parallel efforts towards synthesis, which inquire how these various 
perspectives can be brought together in a more encompassing ‘perspective on 
perspectives’, on the basis of which they can open up to each other, and come to greater 
agreement – without implying homogeneity – on both their assessment of the constitutive 
features of the human condition and of what forms of political agency are immanent, 
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possible and legitimate – under conditions of human global interdependence – through 
which human beings can attain a greater degree of self-determination over their lives and 
the social processes which they constitute. Grand narratives on human development are 
understood as playing a fundamental role in this process, to the extent that, by framing the 
contemporary conditions of human global interdependence, together with the plurality of 
society-specific perspectives which constitute them, in the long-term process of their 
historical development, they facilitate the mutual opening up of these different 
perspectives, helping them understand each other, their mutual development and identify 
their similarities, differences and points of agreement and disagreement. Grand narratives 
are thus seen as fulfilling a fundamental role in the development of more encompassing 
perspectives on the human condition, which have a reinforced orientating function in both 
its explanatory and anticipatory dimensions. Such an approach, however, is fully aware of 
the dangers inherent in grand narratives and how these might serve as a vehicle for the 
legitimation of more parochial points of view under the cover of cosmopolitanism. 
Consequently, it is focused on understanding how a recovery of grand narratives in the 
context of critical international theory might be possible, without reproducing the 
shortcomings with which they are usually associated.   
 This is clearly expressed in Linklater’s work, when he uses Kant, Marx and 
Habermas’s grand narratives to think through the problem of political community in world 
politics, while avoiding a reproduction of what he sees as the shortcomings of teleology and 
linear progressivism in Kant and Marx’s works by framing them in Habermas’s critical theory 
and principles of discourse ethics. Our approach to grand narratives in this study follows 
Linklater’s approach, while trying to develop upon it by exploring in greater detail the role of 
grand narratives in the development of critical international theory as a means of 
orientation. As such, we can say that this study runs parallel to Linklater’s work in two ways. 
On the one hand, it shares Linklater’s project for the recovery of grand narratives in critical 
international theory. And on the other hand, by framing its discussion of grand narratives in 
the context of the problem of orientation, it moves beyond Linklater’s own work by carrying 
out a more in-depth assessment of exactly to what extent the work of authors such as Kant, 
Marx, Habermas, or even Elias, can be considered to provide important insights for the 
development of more adequate means of orientation in the critical study of world politics, 
or if they actually reflect approaches to human history and world politics that reproduce the 
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shortcomings and the mythological character of modernist grand narratives. Despite the 
fact that Linklater, especially in his earlier work, also addresses how to avoid the teleology 
and linear progressivism of Kant and Marx, his focus has been predominantly on the 
problem of political community in world politics and not so much on understanding how 
and why each of these authors’ grand narratives has contributed, or hindered, the 
attainment of a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition which fulfils an 
orientating function.54 This is particularly clear in Linklater’s later work, in the context of his 
engagement with Elias’s process sociology, which has not assessed in particular depth how 
Elias’s approach relates to that of the critical authors, to what extent it contributes to the 
recovery of grand narratives which avoid their modernist shortcomings, or what are the 
critical implications of Elias’s analysis of human development in a long-term perspective.55   
 These observations take us to the last two sections of this chapter, where we 
addressed how the Eliasian concepts of ‘involvement–detachment balance’ and the ‘triad of 
controls’ constitute important heuristic devices in our reading of our chosen authors, which 
helps us better understand how their work contributes for a recovery of grand narratives in 
critical international theory in a manner that reinforces its role as a means of orientation. 
 
3. Involvement and detachment 
 
The notion of involvement–detachment balance is used by Elias to capture what the process 
sociologist considers to be a fundamental dynamic present in all processes of human 
knowledge production. It highlights how human beings can exhibit more or less involved 
perspectives of the world and their conditions of existence, which means that their 
perspectives can be more or less expressive of their personal or communal temporal, 
spatial, cultural or social positioning, as well as of their associated wishes, fears and 
emotionally coloured views of themselves, their social groups and the world.56 In particular, 
Elias applies the concepts of involvement and detachment to address the extent to which 
social scientists are able step back from their particular social groups’ self-images and 
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conceptions of the world, and develop analysis of social processes which are more detached 
and less time and society bound.57  
 In this context, he notes that the relation between more detached and more 
involved perspectives cannot be conceptualized as an opposition between absolute value-
freedom and total submission to emotional attachments and particularistic points of view.58 
Instead, it is better understood in the form of a balance at the level of people’s personality 
structures which can assume different forms. For example, more involved perspectives to 
knowing the world are predominantly shaped by heteronomous considerations – in the 
form of the immediate interests, fears and wishes of the researchers and their communities 
– while more detached perspectives are predominantly informed by a more autonomous 
and critically-minded attitude concerned with the development of a more adequate 
understanding of the actual processes and dynamics shaping the universe, whether or not 
these clash with the researchers’ prior involvements.59 This greater detachment, however, 
does not entail an abandonment of involvement. As the balance tilts towards a more 
detached perspective, there also occurs a transformation of the researchers’ emotional and 
evaluative involvements in a process Elias calls ‘secondary re-involvement’.60 This means 
that people’s perspectives are no longer shaped only by particularistic personal and 
communal interests and concerns, but increasingly assume a more detached perspective 
which frames their particularistic society and time bound points of view in the context of a 
wider account of interconnected social processes which, tendentially, encompasses the 
human species as a whole. In this context, new types of involvement tend to arise from a 
more detached scientific analysis. On the one hand, the search for the actual dynamics 
shaping the object of inquiry and the development of critical attitudes towards findings now 
appear as values in themselves, about which people can feel extremely involved and 
emotionally invested in. In this context, Elias argues that while the typical questions of a 
predominantly involved approach to knowledge production are essentially ego- and 
community-centred, such as, ‘What does this mean for me or for us?’, the questions 
characterising a more detached perspective are more centred on the object of research 
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itself, such as, ‘What is it?’ or ‘How are these events connected with others?’.61 On the other 
hand, people’s involvements also come to express a more cosmopolitan perspective, which 
arises from their growing awareness of the interconnectedness of social processes and 
human societies, and leads them to become increasingly concerned not only with the 
interests of their particular social groups and political communities, but rather to exhibit 
more encompassing modes of attunement towards the interconnected interests of the 
species as a whole; namely, demonstrating concern regarding the conditions of existence of 
human beings everywhere and how they might come to exercise a greater degree of 
conscious control over their lives.62  
 There are clear parallels between Elias’s analysis of the involvement–detachment 
balance and critical international theory’s engagement with the problem of orientation. 
Both identify a connection between people’s capacity to attain a more detached or 
cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition and the adequacy of their means of 
orientation. And both understand how more involved perspectives, which express the 
particularistic points of view of specific social groups or time periods, frequently hide and 
legitimise relations of power, domination and exclusion between people. In this context, the 
project for the recovery of grand narratives as a means of orientation in critical international 
theory can be understood as an attempt to produce theoretical frameworks that promote a 
new involvement–detachment balance at the level of people’s personality structures. One 
which enables them to step back from the particular self-images of their social groups and 
time periods and to develop a more detached and cosmopolitan perspective on the human 
condition, on the basis of which people can better orientate themselves to the reality of 
their global interdependence and to how they might collectively exercise a greater degree 
of conscious control over the unplanned and frequently harmful social processes that affect 
the species as a whole. 
 Elias’s conception of the involvement–detachment balance thus reveals itself to be 
particularly adequate in the context of our inquiry into the problem of orientation. It helps 
us assess the extent to which each of the authors under analysis exhibits more involved or 
more detached perspectives on the conditions of existence of globalised humanity and 
whether indeed they are able to develop a more cosmopolitan means of orientation 
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without reproducing the modernist shortcomings of grand narratives that legitimize the 
more parochial self-images and points of view of their societies and time periods. In this 
manner, we use the concept of involvement–detachment balance in our reinterpretation of 
the classical texts of Kant, Marx, Habermas and Elias. In particular, this concept can be 
linked to the two dimensions of the problem of orientation to assess whether the authors 
under analysis are able to achieve an involvement–detachment balance in their work which: 
1) enables a more detached answer to the explanatory dimension of orientation by 
developing a more cosmopolitan perspective regarding the predominant dynamics and 
social processes shaping the species’ history; and 2) on the basis of this more cosmopolitan 
perspective, carries out a secondary re-involvement which avoids a reproduction of 
modernist forms of myth and more adequately addresses the anticipatory dimension of 
orientation regarding how human beings might expand their powers of self-determination. 
  Throughout the first five chapters of this study we address how each of critical 
authors’ under analysis can be read as striving to achieve a more adequate involvement–
detachment balance in their grand narratives which, on the one hand, captures the 
predominant social processes shaping human development – and thus helps people 
between understand their conditions of existence – and, on the other hand, informs a more 
involved assessment of the immanent potentials for the expansion of human self-
determination which have been gathered in their particular historical contexts, and what 
forms of political agency are required to actualise them. We note that despite each of the 
critical authors’ striving towards this goal, they constantly fall short of the more 
cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition to which they aspire, with their grand 
narratives remaining locked in more involved points of view by advancing teleological and 
linear progressivist models of the long-term process of human development which place 
their own societies and time periods at the centre of world-historical time.  
 In chapter six, and with reference to Elias’s process sociology, we re-read the failings 
of the critical authors as deriving from the way in which their normative commitments to 
human emancipation, and their focus on providing orientation towards political agency, 
appear in their work as values which have priority over that of detached social scientific 
analysis. As such, Kant, Marx and Habermas tend to analyse the long-term process of human 
development from the perspective of their own, more involved, concerns, wishes and fears, 
in a manner that not only tends to ignore its multi-linear and open-ended character, but 
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also how it might actually possess characteristics that undermine their favoured images of 
an emancipated human future.  
 We then demonstrate how Elias’s emphasis on the need for a prior ‘detour via 
detachment’, before more involved concerns with political agency towards human 
emancipation are pursued, actually enables him to develop a more adequate answer to the 
explanatory dimension of orientation than the critical authors. Elias’s approach to grand 
narratives abandons the critical authors’ linear and teleological models of human 
development, and can actually be said to abandon the narrative form of analysis, which 
underline their grand narratives. Instead, Elias focuses on the identification of ‘universal 
social processes’, and of the dynamics shaping their development in different directions and 
in society-specific ways, throughout the history of the species. This enables Elias to produce 
a multi-linear and open-ended model of human development that more successfully 
detaches from his own particularistic point of view in history and thus permits the 
attainment of a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition with a greater 
orientating potential in what regards helping human beings better understand their 
conditions of existence. 
 However, in chapter seven we note that Elias’s detour via detachment remains 
unable to provide an answer to the anticipatory dimension of orientation unless it is 
followed by his envisioned secondary re-involvement; one which assesses the normative 
implications of Elias’s multi-linear and open-ended grand narrative and how it might inform 
forms of political agency envisioning an expansion of human beings’ conscious control over 
their lives and the networks of global interdependence which they constitute. This 
observation leads us to argue for a higher synthesis between critical theory and process 
sociology in the context of critical international theory, which reinforces the latter’s role as a 
means of orientation. Through this synthesis, critical international theory would be able to 
attain a more detached, cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition which provides, 
on the one hand, an explanatory understanding of long-term term process of human 
development, that captures its multi-linear and open-ended character, and through which 
the contemporary conditions of global interdependence of the species came to be what 
they are and, on the other hand, an involved, anticipatory assessment of the immanent 
potential for an expansion of human self-determination as well as an identification of what 
forms of contemporary political agency are required to actualise it. As argued in chapter 
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seven, this synthesis implies the constitution of multi-disciplinary teams of scholars that 
divide functions between more detached social scientific research and the assessment of its 
involved implications. Furthermore, the magnitude of such an endeavour leads us to focus 
our analysis in chapter seven on a consideration of the normative implications of Elias’s own 
grand narrative on human development in a way that establishes theoretical links between 
critical theory and process sociology that enable carrying out the proposed synthesis 
between these two approaches in future research projects in the context of critical 
international theory.  
  
4. The triad of controls 
 
Another Eliasian concept that informs our study and needs to be addressed before we begin 
our analysis of the chosen authors in earnest is the notion of the ‘triad of controls’. This 
concept is here argued to capture a fundamental aspect of both the explanatory and the 
anticipatory dimensions of orientation, which is the identification of ‘control’ as both a 
constituting feature of the human condition and a goal of critical interventions in the 
process of human development. This is a notion which is common to both critical theory and 
process sociology, and that plays a fundamental role in the attempted recovery of grand 
narratives in critical international theory as a way to reinforce its role as a means of 
orientation.  
 The link between orientation and control lies at the core of critical theory’s 
conception of humans as historical beings with an ability – which distinguishes them from 
other animal species on the planet – to ‘enlarge their freedom through the ever increasing 
rational control over their selves and their environment, [through which they are able to] 
live in a world of their own making’.63 Such conception can be traced back to the works of 
Kant, Marx and Habermas to whom one of the distinguishing features of the human species 
is the greater capacity to control its conditions of existence. In these authors’ assessment 
the long-term process of human development can in part be understood as the history of 
the development of the human powers of control, even though each of them places 
different emphasis on different types of control and their mutual interconnections. Kant 
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highlights in particular the development of human beings’ self-control over their more 
animalic internal drives and impulses and its connection with the conscious and moral 
regulation of the social bounds of human interdependence.64 Marx emphasises control over 
non-human nature and how it connects with the production of the material and social 
conditions of existence of the species.65 And Habermas focuses on the connection between 
intersubjective communication and control over social processes.66 None of these authors 
completely ignores the types of control highlighted by the others, even though their 
emphasis changes regarding to which types of control they attribute greater explanatory 
weight in their accounts of the long-term process of human development. 
 Furthermore, the notion of control serves not only an explanatory role in these 
authors’ grand narratives but also as the normative goal of their anticipatory assessment of 
the immanent potential for the future expansion of human self-determination. Kant, Marx 
and Habermas share an understanding of human historical development as possessing a 
fundamental dialectical character, in which the expansion of human beings’ control over 
their conditions of existence is interwoven with the emergence of new forms of domination 
and exclusion between people. For example, Kant observes how the development of 
people’s rational control over their internal inclinations is accompanied by a greater 
capacity to apply that same rationality to the pursuit of the satisfaction of their more 
animalic and destructive impulses. Hence, he argues that human moral progress throughout 
history is concomitant with the development of greater destructive powers over longer 
distances and new forms of barbaric warfare in inter-group conflicts.67 Marx refers to how 
the growth of the human capacity to control non-human nature is connected with the 
development of highly intricate global networks of production that reinstates new forms of 
oppression and exclusion between people.68 And Habermas notes that the historical 
development of democratic forms of social integration is accompanied by the establishment 
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of new mechanisms of domination based on bureaucratic and technical systems of social 
management.69 As such, all three authors’ grand narratives are attuned to provide, on the 
one hand, an explanatory understanding of the development of the human powers of 
control and how of these have been accompanied by the dialectical development of new 
forms of domination and relations of power between people and, on the other hand, an 
anticipatory assessment of the immanent potential that has been gathered throughout 
history for the further expansion of human beings’ control over their conditions of existence 
in a more conscious and self-reflexive manner that avoids the dialectical emergence of new 
forms of domination.  
 This theme finds resonance in Elias’s process sociology and in his argument about 
how the human capacity for control not only constitutes a defining feature of the species’ 
history but also one of the goals of social scientific research. In this context, Elias introduces 
a concept which makes it possible to address with greater clarity the treatment of this 
theme not only in his own work, but also in that of the critical authors. When considering 
the development of the human powers of control in a very long-term perspective, Elias 
argues that a ‘triad of basic controls’ can be identified as fundamental for human existence 
on the planet.70 These three types of control constitute what Elias classifies as universal 
social processes, insofar as all human groups have to engage, to some extent, in the exercise 
of these three forms of control in order to ensure their continued survival.71 The triad 
entails: 1) control over non-human external nature; in the sense of the capacity to direct 
natural processes to human ends, to tame other animal species, and to labour nature into a 
human-made world of objects for the satisfaction of human needs. 2) control of each 
individual over his or her own internal drives and impulses; in the sense of self-control over 
internal human nature and the more animalic desires and inclinations towards sexuality, 
aggressiveness or domination without which social life would be impossible. And 3) control 
over the networks of social interdependence; in the sense of the production of social 
frameworks and norms that regulate intra- and inter-group relations and define what are 
acceptable and unacceptable forms of behaviour between people.72  
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 These three types of control are understood to constitute unavoidable aspects of the 
specifically human mode of life. Every human child has to learn how to tame his or her 
internal animalic impulses, and to carry on self-controlling his or her drives into adulthood, 
in order to be able to live in society with other human beings. Every human society has to 
continuously engage in productive activity vis-à-vis human nature in order to destroy or 
tame threats from other animal species and natural phenomena, as well as produce the 
products required for the satisfaction of human needs. And every human society needs to 
constantly negotiate rules of social conduct through which it defines social roles and 
relations of power, maintains internal social pacification, and ensures collective defence 
against external enemies and aggressors. As such, whether or not to exercise control in 
these three dimensions of human existence – i.e. over self, over nature and over society – is 
not an option which is opened up to human beings, as the very existence of the human 
mode of life depends on it. If at all, human beings have the possibility to make collective 
decisions regarding how these types of control are exercised, but only in accordance with 
the spectrum of options that might be opened up in particular historical contexts and in 
accordance with the previous development of the human powers of control.73 
Consequently, the triad of controls can be understood as expressing universal social 
processes that serve a framing device for analyses concerning the long-term development of 
the species which intend to function as a means of orientation that help people both 
understand their conditions of existence and control their future development. As Elias 
observes, ‘control of nature, social control and self-control form a kind of chain ring; they 
form a triangle of interconnected functions that can serve as a basic pattern for the 
observation of human affairs’.74 A conception supported by Cas Wouters who argues that 
Elias’s concept of the triad of basic controls offers a wide scope for studying connections 
between technological developments, developments in social organisation, and in self-
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control throughout the history of the species.75 The notion of triad of controls is thus 
applied throughout this study to our reading of the works of Kant, Marx, Habermas and Elias 
as a way to draw out the connections between these three types of control in these authors’ 
analyses of the long-term process of development of the human species. It makes it easier 
to highlight their thoughts regarding the dialectical character of human development and 
how the expansion of some types of control is connected with unplanned contradictions 
and the emergence of new forms of domination associated with other types of control.  
 Furthermore, throughout this study we connect our analysis of the triad of controls 
in each of the chosen authors’ work with the already addressed notion of involvement–
detachment balance. This permits us to trace to what extent each of these authors’ grand 
narratives has been able to provide a more detached, comprehensive and encompassing 
analysis of the interplay between the different dimensions of the triad of controls 
throughout the species’ development and how it has informed their anticipatory 
assessment of the prospects for the future development of human self-determination. For 
example, we note how Marx’s over-involvement with the economic struggles of his own 
time period led him to place human productive activity and control over nature as the main 
cause of the historical development of the species, and to conceive of the socialisation of 
the means of production as the key to human emancipation, to the detriment of an analysis 
of the role of self-control or control over social processes in this process, e.g. in the form of 
the development of social norms. On the other hand, we show how Habermas achieves a 
greater degree of detachment in his grand narrative than Marx, which enables him to 
provide a more comprehensive analysis of the role of the interplay between the different 
dimensions of the triad of controls in human development. However, we also note that, 
when compared with Elias’s grand narrative, Habermas still remains locked in a more 
involved perspective which frames his account of the development of the human powers of 
control in a linear and teleological model of human development and that understands 
Western modernity as the culmination of that process. Elias’s more detached approach 
instead proposes a multi-linear and open-ended model of the species’ history capable of 
tracing the developmental dynamics that influence the development of the human capacity 
for control in different directions throughout history. At the same time, we also argue that 
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Elias’s more detached approach to the study of the triad of controls in the species’ history 
comes at the cost of a postponement of an anticipatory assessment of how the human 
powers of control might be developed in a more conscious manner, which informs political 
agency envisioning an expansion of human beings’ self-determination over their conditions 
of existence. This observations leads us, in chapter seven, to consider what types of 
secondary re-involvement are implied in Elias’s more detached grand narrative and what 
these tell us about the immanent potential gathered by the long-term history of the species 
for the more self-reflexive development of the human powers of control in a manner that 
both expands human self-determination and avoids the dialectical emergence of new forms 
of domination.   
 As we argue throughout our study, the connection between the notion of control 
and more involved or detached approaches to grand narratives on human development in 
these authors’ works is particularly evident in their respective uses of the concept of 
‘civilisation’. All of the authors under analysis link their respective conceptions of civilisation 
with the development of the human powers of control and, in particular, with those types of 
control that their more involved or detached perspectives on human development consider 
predominant in the constitution of the conditions of human existence. As such, to recover 
the example given above, while Marx more involved approach identifies civilisation with the 
historical development of human technological control over non-human nature76, Habermas 
links the notion of civilisation with the establishment of democratic forms of control over 
the state’s monopoly of the technological and social means of violence.77 Different 
conceptions of civilisation are thus mentioned throughout this study, but only insofar as 
these assume a role in our reading of these authors’ grand narratives as different answer to 
the problem of orientation. 
 By engaging in a discussion of civilisation, we also participate in the renewed interest 
in this topic in International Relations where, especially since the publication of Samuel 
Huntington’s thesis about the ‘clash of civilisations’, several authors addressed the meaning 
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of civilisation and the importance of the concept for the study of world politics.78 Amongst 
them, particular highlight can be made of the works of Peter Katzenstein79, Cox80, Brett 
Bowden81, Linklater82 and Hobson and Patrick Jackson.83 In critical international theory, Cox 
since the mid-1990s, and Linklater since the early 2000s, have been the major contributors 
for the recovery of the study of civilisation.84 In Cox’s assessment, civilisation is a fluid and 
imprecise concept.85 When used in the singular, it usually acquires an ‘exclusive and 
hierarchical meaning’ based on the distinction between the ‘civilised’ and the ‘uncivilised’ or 
‘barbaric’.86 On the other hand, when used in the plural, it possesses a pluralistic and 
inclusive meaning, implying that ‘there are different ways of becoming civilised’.87 
Furthermore, one can think about civilisation as either representing a ‘fixed essence’ shared 
by a group of people, and which permits to characterise them as belonging to the same 
civilisation – e.g. Western, Islamic or Chinese – or as representing a process which implies a 
continually changing combination of social forces and ideas.88 This later perspective 
corresponds to a discussion of the concept in the plural, where the emphasis is in identifying 
and characterising ongoing civilising processes taking place within and between different 
human groups.89 Such has been the perspective which has become predominant in IR 
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studies on civilisation, many of which have developed significant efforts to escape the non-
processual, fixed and essentialist understanding of the concept.  
 Linklater shares Cox’s emphasis on a plurality of civilising processes, although he 
highlights to a greater extent than Cox the connection between civilisation and the human 
capacity for control which is established by the critical authors and Elias’s process sociology 
and which will be the focus of our treatment of the concept throughout this study. In 
particular, Linklater defends what in chapter six we identify as the more detached Eliasian 
conception of civilisation, which understands the concept as expressing a universal social 
process that all human beings have to undergo, and which consists in their learning how to 
control their animalic needs and biological impulses, as a condition for the sustainability and 
the continued survival of their societies.90 As Linklater notes, according to Elias, human 
social existence depends on people’s capacity to ‘internalize’, from an early age, ‘modes of 
self-regulation’ regarding basic drives such as anger, aggressive behaviour and violence, 
which make life amongst others possible.91 As such, to Elias’s detached conception of 
civilisation – which links it with the dimension of the triad of basic controls concerning 
people’s self-control over their drives and impulses – there is no ‘zero point’ in civilisation, 
no society that exists in a pure state of barbarism and then initiates a civilising process, since 
all human beings have to learn, since early childhood, patterns of civilised self-control in 
order to be able to live in society. Hence, there can be no human society which does not 
undergo a civilising process and that does not define some form of pattern of civilised self-
control at the level of its members’ personality structures.92 Civilisation cannot thus be 
understood as a fixed characteristic of some human groups but instead must always be 
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perceived as an ‘unfinished product of very long-term patterns of change that are constantly 
evolving, and which never escape the possibility of sudden reversal’.93  
 To Elias, civilisation is a social process which is universal to the human species – 
insofar as all human groups need to constantly develop and negotiate historically 
changeable social patterns of individual self-control in order to maintain themselves as 
viable societies. At the same time, Elias argues that there are traceable developmental 
dynamics that influence the development of civilisation in different, society-specific, ways 
throughout the history of the species.94 As such, Elias’s more detached linkage between 
civilisation and the development of the human powers of self-control shows how the 
concept can be approached in a manner that, simultaneously, recognises it as a universal 
feature of human existence and identifies the immense variety of ways of being ‘civilised’. 
Underlying such conception is a denial of evaluative and essentialist conceptions of 
civilisation that consider some human groups to be ‘civilised’ while other lack civilisation 
altogether. This approach is combined with the defence of the possibility of developing non-
evaluative and comparative studies of different civilising processes and their expression in 
different ways of life in the context of a multi-linear and open-ended grand narrative on 
human development that traces the development and the global interweaving of society-
specific civilising processes throughout the species’ history.95 As we argue in chapter six, this 
constitutes a more detached approach to grand narratives on human development which 
permits their recovery as more adequate means of orientation that help human beings 
better understand their long-term history and the constitution of their conditions of 
existence. Furthermore, it safeguards against the shortcomings of more involved and 
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particularistic grand narratives on human development which differentiate human groups 
according to a developmental ladder that inherently characterises some as more ‘civilised’ 
than others in a manner that serves predominantly to fulfil self-congratulatory feelings of 
superiority of the self-defined ‘civilised’. These more involved approaches are recognised in 
this study as inadequate means of orientation to the extent that they undermine the 
capacity of human beings caught up in global networks of interdependence – constituted by 
the global interweaving of different society-specific civilising and developmental processes – 
to either understand the plurality of the human condition or to devise modes of political 
agency that mediate between this plurality and that enable the collaborative development – 
between the different sections of humankind – of global institutions envisioning the 
collective expansion of human being’s more conscious and self-reflexive control over their 
conditions of existence.  
  
Conclusion 
 
The five concepts ‘orientation’, ‘cosmopolitanism’, ‘grand narratives’, ‘involvement–
detachment balance’ and ‘triad of controls’ frame our inquiry into the problem of 
orientation through a reinterpretation of the classical works of the critical authors Kant, 
Marx and Habermas, and of the process sociologist Elias. In particular, we are concerned 
with addressing the possibility of recovering very long-term perspectives on human 
development in critical international theory as a way to develop more cosmopolitan means 
of orientation regarding the conditions of global interdependence of the human species. In 
this context, it is important to notice that, when addressing the problem of orientation and 
the role of grand narratives in its context, this study does not intend to consider the works 
of these different authors in isolation. Rather, it tries to trace the development of their 
respective approaches in a manner that highlights their interconnections and how each of 
these authors can be considered part of a long inter-generational chain of knowledge 
production throughout which they try to wrestle with the problem of orientation.  
 The following chapters reflect this idea of an inter-generational dialogue and 
highlight how the relation between the works of each of these authors cannot be 
understood as establishing a linear process of knowledge accumulation. Rather, it is better 
characterized as a dialectical movement that is itself full of contradictions and tragic losses. 
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Hence, while each of these authors strives to preserve and integrate in his own theoretical 
framework the main insights of his predecessors and overcome what he perceives as their 
respective shortcomings, each of them also loses sight of some of their predecessors most 
important insights, while advancing positions and perspectives which, from an even later 
perspective, come to be found problematic and less representative of a cosmopolitan 
perspective than they intended. With this dialectical movement in mind, we can begin our 
study in earnest.  
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Chapter Two 
Immanuel Kant 
History and Idea 
 
In this chapter we interpret the work of Immanuel Kant from the perspective of our 
engagement with the problem of orientation as an attempt to provide an answer to both its 
explanatory and anticipatory dimensions. Our main argument is that Kant’s work highlights 
the need for a more comprehensive understanding of the connection between the 
dimensions of the triad of controls related to self-control and control over social processes, 
as well as the orientating role of grand narratives which provide a more cosmopolitan 
perspective on the conditions of existence of globalised humanity. However, we also argue 
that Kant’s critical approach exhibits some of the main difficulties that can be found in the 
development of more adequate means of orientation. In particular, it shows how grand 
narratives which rely on a linear and teleological conception of human development and on 
a transcendental ascertainment of the ideal conditions of human freedom are inadequate as 
orientating frameworks to the extent that they inherently reproduce forms of modernist 
myth regarding the history of the species which legitimize practices of exclusion and 
domination between different parts of humanity.   
 The chapter is organized in five main sections. In the first two sections we read 
Kant’s work as providing a transcendental answer to the anticipatory dimension of the 
problem of orientation. First, we discuss Kant’s conception of human beings’ fundamental 
and defining capacity for self-determination and his transcendental argument regarding the 
a priori preconditions of human freedom. And second, we interpret Kant’s assessment of 
those preconditions as a transcendental normative standpoint of orientation, which helps 
people understand the ideal social conditions which the patterns of human global 
interdependence need to reproduce in order to enable the full expression of their capacity 
for self-determination.  
 Then, in the third section, we move to an interpretation of Kant’s work that 
addresses the explanatory dimension of the problem of orientation. We consider Kant’s 
philosophy of history as an abstraction from the actual course of human events which 
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intends to capture the structure of human historical development and provide a more 
adequate understanding of the main dynamics and social processes shaping the history of 
the species.  
 In fourth section, we address how Kant can be seen to connect these two 
dimensions of the problem of orientation through his proposal for perpetual peace and the 
triple constitutionalization of world politics, which orientates human beings as to how, on 
the basis of the immanent potential gathered by the long-term process of human 
development, they might come to exercise a greater degree of conscious and collective 
control over their conditions of existence and thus approximate the ideal transcendental 
conditions of freedom. 
 Finally, in section five, we discuss how Kant’s work points to the limitations of means 
of orientation based on a transcendental, linear and teleological conception of human 
development. Here, we argue that Kant’s critical approach produces a form of modernist 
theorising about the human condition which, under the cover of its supposed 
cosmopolitanism, blocks the awareness, and compromises the legitimacy, of alternative 
paths of human development which do not follow its linear model. Consequently, Kant’s 
critical approach is unable to achieve the degree of detachment which is required for a 
more adequate answer to the problem of orientation.  
 
1. Rational natural beings 
 
In this section, we discuss Kant’s conception of human beings as a species with a unique and 
defining capacity for freedom as the basis of a Kantian engagement with the anticipatory 
dimension of the problem of orientation. In ‘Critique of Practical Reason’, Kant observes 
that human beings have a capacity for reason and for the self-determination of their will 
which, however, is accompanied by the constant lure of their more animalic internal 
inclinations, which draw people to the satisfaction of their impulses and desires frequently 
against their own rational will.96 In Kant’s view, freedom is not to be found in the 
satisfaction of these internal inclinations since individuals driven in their behaviour purely by 
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their desires express ‘nothing but the heteronomy of the will’.97 It makes no sense to talk of 
freedom if the human subject is determined by empirical inclinations and his or her 
behaviour is a product of these desires and wants.98 Instead, the very possibility of freedom 
has to be grounded in a conception of the will abstracted from empirical and animalic 
inclinations. An action must be considered free according not to the purpose which it seeks 
to attain, but by the maxim which determines it. Therefore, freedom ‘does not depend on 
the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which 
the action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire’.99 
 According to Kant, a totally free will is thus that which is wholly abstracted from 
empirical considerations, i.e. which is driven purely by a form of volition absolutely 
disconnected from any particular wants, desires or inclinations.100 Such abstraction can only 
be attained by the operation of reason, the faculty through which subjects distance 
themselves from their immediate empirical circumstances and their contextually or 
internally driven inclinations, and will their behaviour according to self-determined and 
conscious volition. However, Kant also notes that such condition of absolute rationality is 
outside the grasp of human beings; an argument he reinforces by posing the theoretical 
existence of completely pure rational beings, a category from which humans are 
excluded.101 According to Kant, the will of pure rational beings is shaped exclusively by the 
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operation of reason, without receiving any ‘bias from any other quarter with respect to its 
judgements’.102 Humans, on the other hand, are also natural beings and, as a consequence, 
such pure abstraction from their more animalic inclinations lies beyond their grasp.  
However, the fact that within human animals also lurks the spark of rationality, which can 
be developed throughout the lives of individuals and across different generations if the 
social and natural conditions conducive to the use of reason are gathered means that, unlike 
other animals, human beings are not condemned to be simply the slaves of their 
inclinations. Hence, a fundamental and defining feature of humanity, in Kant’s view, is the 
capacity for the development of the use of reason, and for the attainment of a greater 
degree of self-determination in relation to their animalic impulses, a characteristic that lies 
at the core of the distinction between humans and other animals. In this context, Kant 
observes that when choice is ‘determined by pure reason it is called free choice; [while] that 
which is determined only by inclination (…) is animal choice’.103 In the case of human beings, 
their capacity for choice can be ‘affected but not determined by impulses, and is therefore 
of itself not pure but can still be determined to actions by pure will’.104  
 Kant’s observations regarding the human capacity for rational self-determination on 
the one hand, and the constant lure of animalic inclinations on the other, can be interpreted 
as providing the basis for an attempted answer to the anticipatory dimension of the 
problem of orientation. They point to the possibility of human beings attaining a greater 
degree of conscious control over their conditions of existence by exercising a more self-
determined and rational will which detaches itself from individual internal desires and 
inclinations and thus diminishes their determining power over people’s behaviour. From this 
perspective, Kant’s conception of freedom can also be understood to entail the argument 
that a free and rational will must also be one which expresses a cosmopolitan perspective 
on the human condition, given how it cannot suffer from any distortion whatsoever by 
particular inclinations.105 Kant’s categorical imperative, by stating that the will of a rational 
subject is only free if he or she can also will that his or her maxim of action should become a 
universal law, can thus be read as establishing a normative standpoint of orientation 
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regarding the preconditions of human freedom; it points to the fact that a free will is one 
that expresses a universal perspective that does not receive any empirical or particularistic 
bias.106 In this manner, Kant highlights the inherent connection between individual freedom 
and the attainment of a more detached and cosmopolitan perspective which allows people 
to orientate themselves to each other and to the idea of humanity and thus overcome the 
particularistic points of views associated with their personal and more immediate 
inclinations and desires, as well as their more parochial and ethnocentric attachments to 
self-regarding political communities.107  
 Furthermore, Kant’s work also underlines how a more cosmopolitan perspective not 
only constitutes a condition for the freedom of the will but also implies a set of moral 
principles that must regulate human social relations if human beings are to bring their 
conditions of existence under greater conscious control. It is Kant’s argument that, if a free 
will is not to be subject to particularistic inclinations, no being with a capacity for freedom 
can ever become merely the means, i.e. the object, for the fulfilment of the ends of another 
being. If it were otherwise, then not only the one which is used as a means would not be 
free – because he or she would be subject to the particular ends of another – but also the 
one which makes the use would act under the compulsion of particularistic interests and 
inclinations. The freedom of the will thus requires, as a precondition for its existence, that 
every being with a capacity for reason be treated always as an end and never merely as a 
means.108 Kant classifies this maxim as a fundamental moral law that must orientate human 
behaviour and which implies that all human beings share an equal and inherent dignity, 
which ‘raises them above all other beings in the world’.109 To Kant ‘a free will and a will 
subject to moral laws are one and the same’.110 Morality is understood as the relation of 
actions to the autonomy of the will and a matter of freedom rather than good or bad.111  
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 In this context, Kant’s idea of the kingdom of ends, which establishes the set of ideal 
social conditions in which the moral law inherent in the human capacity for freedom could 
be actualised, can be interpreted as establishing a transcendental standpoint of normative 
orientation that serves as an orientating device to human beings regarding how they might 
further expand their capacity for self-determination and exercise a greater degree of 
conscious control over their empirical and historical conditions of existence. As we argue in 
the next section, Kant’s idea of the kingdom of ends embodies an ideal and transcendental – 
in the sense of a priori – model of how human beings can attain a truly cosmopolitan 
condition which enables them to achieve a higher degree of detachment from their 
particular inclinations and thus ameliorate the determining and frequently destructive 
effects that these have on their social relations.  
 
2. The kingdom of ends 
 
In the previous section, we addressed how Kant’s conception of human beings as rational 
natural beings can be interpreted as the basis of a Kantian answer to the anticipatory 
dimension of the problem of orientation. In this section, we further develop this argument 
by considering how Kant’s analysis of the transcendental preconditions of freedom leads 
him to the idea of the kingdom of ends, which expresses the organising principles that the 
patterns of human interdependence and social relations need to respect in order to achieve 
a truly cosmopolitan condition and fully actualise the human powers of self-determination.  
The transcendental idea of the kingdom of ends can thus be understood to fulfil an 
orientating function helping people find their bearings when inquiring about how they 
might achieve a greater degree of control over their shared existence on the planet.  
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 In ‘Critique of Practical Reason’, Kant describes the idea of the kingdom of ends  as 
an ideal union of rational beings under a common system of laws that ensures that each of 
its members treats itself and all the others never merely as means, but always also as ends 
in themselves.112 Under this common law the autonomy of each individual rational being is 
guaranteed by the fact that each is both a sovereign and a subject of the law. Although 
subject to the law, this law is the same as that which the subject would rationally give to 
him or herself as the inherent law of freedom; consequently, they are subject to the will of 
no other but their own, and subject only to the very law which is constitutive of their 
freedom. Kant’s ideal constitution is thus a universally accepted law because it embodies 
the preconditions of free will.113 
 In Kant’s assessment, in order for such a universal system of law to be effective and 
promote the freedom, reason and morality of every human being on the planet, it must 
encompass the whole species and be embodied in a truly cosmopolitan form of political and 
social organisation.114 As he observes in ‘Perpetual Peace’ although a state organized 
according to a moral civil constitution may gather the internal conditions for the attainment 
of freedom, when considered in its external relations with other states, each state appears 
in the same condition ‘as individual men living in a state of nature, independent of external 
laws’.115 The lack of legal regulation of world politics is thus a constant threat to freedom, 
given the uncontrolled dynamics of the states-system and its perpetual condition of 
potential war that might drag people into patterns of interdependence and mutual 
interaction that are not controlled or intended by any of them and which undermine their 
capacity to live autonomously, behave according to a rational, free and moral will, and treat 
each other as ends and not only as means. All the more so when, because of the historical 
lengthening and increased interconnection of the webs of human interdependence, events 
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and decisions in one place or country, have come to reverberate throughout the whole 
Earth, affecting countless individuals in unplanned ways. As Kant observes ‘the peoples of 
the Earth have entered in varying degrees into a universal community, (…) to the point 
where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere’.116 This condition of 
global interdependence of the species has to be matched by a cosmopolitan political 
organisation which not only enables the regulation of human interdependence on the basis 
of common laws but also promotes, at the individual level, a greater detachment of people’s 
perspectives in a manner that overcomes their parochial and particularistic points of view 
and orientates them to the reality of their shared existence on the planet.117 
 In this context, Kant argues that if one attains a more cosmopolitan perspective on 
the conditions of existence of human beings it becomes obvious that human freedom and 
morality require that all individuals and societies ‘who can at all influence one another must 
adhere to some kind of constitution’.118 The discussion of this argument in ‘Perpetual Peace’ 
leads to Kant conceiving of the necessity of three levels of common law amongst 
interdependent societies: first, a constitution based on the ‘civil right’ of individuals within a 
nation (ius civitatis); second, a constitution based on the ‘international right’ of states in 
their relations with one another (ius gentium); and third, a constitution based on 
‘cosmopolitan right’, which, structured around the idea of world citizenship, regulates the 
relations between individuals and states on the basis of inalienable rights common to all 
beings capable of reason, freedom and morality (ius cosmopoliticum).119 All three levels of 
constitutionalization are required because ‘if the principle of outer freedom limited by law is 
lacking in any one of these three possible forms of rightful condition, the framework of all 
the others is unavoidably undermined and must finally collapse’.120 As such, not only every 
being with a capacity for reason must be a member of a state under common laws but also 
each of these states ‘can and ought to demand of the others that they should enter along 
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with it into a constitution, similar to the civil one, within which the rights of each could be 
secured’.121  
 Kant’s idea of the kingdom of ends thus implies the rational need for a cosmopolitan 
federation of free states, which integrates all human societies on the planet and regulates 
world politics, since only in a universal association of states can rights come to hold 
‘conclusively’ and a ‘true condition of peace’ come about.122 The transcendental model of a 
cosmopolitan federation ‘in which every state, even the smallest, could expect to derive its 
security and rights not from its own power and its own legal judgement, but solely from this 
great federation, from a united power and the law-governed decisions of a united will’ is 
thus a rationally necessary conclusion to the investigation of the preconditions of human 
freedom.123  
 However, Kant’s conception of human beings as rational natural beings also leads 
him to recognise that human have not yet achieved the degree of detachment from their 
more parochial points of view and particular inclinations and desires which enables them to 
attain a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition and recognise the rational 
need for a world federation. As Kant observes, the ideal of a cosmopolitan polity is not yet 
‘the will of the nations, according to their present conception of international right, so that 
they reject in hypothesi what is true in thesi’.124 From the perspective of our inquiry, Kant’s 
idea of a kingdom of ends and its embodiment in the transcendental model of a 
cosmopolitan federation can be interpreted as a transcendental answer to the anticipatory 
dimension of the problem of orientation. It establishes a transcendental normative 
standpoint of orientation which guides human beings as to under what conditions they can 
bring the social processes in which they are enmeshed under greater control and thus 
further expand their defining capacity for freedom. Furthermore, as we see in the next 
section, Kant’s writings on the long-term process of human development can also be 
interpreted as posing an answer to the explanatory dimension of the problem of 
orientation. In particular, they can be read as not only tracing the predominant dynamics 
and social processes shaping the long-term history of the species – and thus providing 
orientation to human beings regarding how they might better understand themselves and 
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their conditions of existence – but they also trace the immanent potential which has been 
gathered for the further approximation of the condition of existence of globalised humanity 
to the kingdom of ends. This reading of Kant’s work leads us to address, in section four, how 
Kant’s proposal for a League of Nations brings these two dimensions of the problem of 
orientation together.  
 
3. History as a rational process 
 
In this section, we read Kant’s writings on human historical development as an answer to 
the explanatory dimension of the problem of orientation. We show how this answer comes 
in the form not of an analysis of empirical world history, but rather of a philosophy of 
history which tries to ascertain the universal structure of the long-term development of the 
species. With this approach, Kant can be said to seek for a more detached engagement with 
human historical development which provides a better understanding of the rational 
meaning underlying the apparently irrational course of human history and traces, 
underneath the chaos of historical events, the structured development of humanity’s 
capacity for reason. As such, Kant’s philosophy of history is here understood as an approach 
to the explanatory dimension of orientation which consists in the production of a 
theoretical interpretation of human development as if it manifests a structured 
development which permits a more cosmopolitan perspective on the universal dynamics 
and social processes conditioning human existence across space and time. 
 In works such as ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’, 
‘Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History’ or ‘Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of 
View’ Kant observes that the human capacity for reason and for the ascertainment of the 
transcendental preconditions of freedom changes historically.125 In this context, he 
proposes that throughout human development, people progressively become more 
rational, better able to tame their more animalic impulses, and of developing more 
cosmopolitan and less involved perspectives which recognise the moral law inherent in their 
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own capacity for freedom. Kant develops this position by building a philosophical account of 
the species’ history which can be interpreted as striving to capture the dynamics shaping the 
human transition from a past condition of animality – in which humans were predominantly 
determined by their inclinations – to a potential future of rationality in which they will 
orientate their behaviour and principles of volition predominantly in a self-determined 
manner. The Kantian understanding of human historical development is thus teleological, in 
the sense that it follows an ordered pattern of development with a specific direction and 
towards a pre-determined outcome.   
 However, Kant also notes that it is not possible to prove this teleological movement 
through an analysis of empirical history. The teleological character of his historical account 
thus should not be taken literally, as describing the actual process of world history, but must 
instead be understood as serving two main purposes. On the one hand, it constitutes a way 
of navigating through the apparently chaotic history of the species, so that it can be 
intelligibly organized in a way that highlights the ordered character of the progressive 
improvement of human reason. On the other hand, Kant argues that his teleological account 
of the species’ history serves a moral purpose. It does so to the extent that it helps human 
beings achieve a more cosmopolitan perspective on their conditions of existence, guided by 
the belief that, despite human failings and historical mistakes, the species as a whole moves 
inexorably towards a future condition of freedom, morality and universal expansion of 
human sympathy across borders and all forms of particularistic interests and conflicts.126 
Such belief can, in Kant’s view, support decision-makers and people in a position to 
influence history to adopt a more universal perspective and never give up, despite the odds, 
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from striving to achieve the future constitution of the kingdom of ends. In this manner, Kant 
teleological account can be seen as fulfilling a fundamental orientating function regarding 
the approximation of human history to the transcendental preconditions of freedom.127  
 Reading Kant’s philosophy of history as an answer to the explanatory dimension of 
orientation, we can highlight the role that he attributes to humanity’s ‘unsocial sociability’ 
as one of the main structuring forces pushing human beings from a condition of animality 
towards one of rationality.128 With this concept Kant refers to the apparent contradiction 
between people always striving for their independence and yet also being constantly drawn 
to each other’s company, not only in the context of the fulfilment of their survival and 
emotional needs but also because their more unsocial inclinations towards domination and 
narcissism can only find satisfaction in other human beings. To Kant, the influence of these 
inclinations in human behaviour constitutes one the fundamental driving forces for the 
historical development of the human faculties for reason. On the one hand, people’s 
unsocial character creates relations of conflict between individuals and groups which 
promote the development of reason and the capacity to exercise rational self-control over 
their inclinations in order to plan and invent ways of outsmarting and dominating each 
other. On the other hand, the development of reason itself, driven by unsocial inclinations, 
leads to a progressive increase in people's capacity to inflict injury and destruction upon 
each other and across longer distances, as their technological and social capacity for 
violence develops. Hence, Kant argues, a point is necessarily reached in the species’ history 
in which not only the costs of mutual violence in conflict become too high to sustain, but 
war causes increasingly more damaging disruptions to the networks of human commerce 
which have come to cover the whole globe and on which all human beings and nations 
depend.129 Consequently, different human groups locked together in violent relations of 
mutual competition and interdependence come to be obliged, by the compulsion of those 
very relations, to constitute higher forms of political organization capable of bringing their 
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mutual conflicts under collective control and of managing them in a more peaceful 
manner.130 
 In this context, Kant refers to the historical emergence of the sovereign state as a 
partial solution to the dilemma posed by human beings’ unsocial sociability. It is a form of 
political organization which, through an ideally posed social contract between individuals, 
enables people to collectively submit themselves to common laws that, made effective by 
the sovereign authority, pacify and regulate their social life and mutually interdependent 
competition. Such a social contract, Kant argues, only becomes historically possible because 
of the rational development that human beings have undergone driven by their unsocial 
character; but it becomes historically necessary because that same development has made 
the prevalence of unsocial inclinations ultimately unsustainable.131   
 From the perspective of our engagement with Kant’s work as an answer to the 
problem of orientation, his philosophy of history can thus be read as not only orientating 
people in regards to the predominant dynamics and social processes which have shaped 
their conditions of existence, but also in understanding the choices that have been made 
available to them given the particular patterns that their mutual relations of 
interdependence have come to assume as an unplanned outcome of their intended and 
frequently mutually opposing actions. According to Kant, at a certain stage of human 
development, the prevalence of natural inclinations as the main determinants of human 
behaviour becomes a hindrance to the further development of the species and, on the basis 
of the rational capacity they themselves helped form, need to give way to reason and 
morality as the predominant forces shaping human history.132 History, to Kant, thus 
constitutes a teleological process that, structured by the interplay of human unsocial 
sociability, moves inexorably from a condition of animality and predominance of 
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inclinations, to one of true humanity, reason and freedom.133 In Kant’s words, it is ‘nothing 
other than the transition from a rude and purely animal existence to a state of humanity; 
from the leading-strings of instinct to the guidance of reason, in a word, from the 
guardianship of nature to the state of freedom’.134 
 However, it is important to note that Kant does not see the long-term development 
of human reason as a wholly emancipatory process. Although it expresses a coherent and 
linear growth of the human capacity for freedom it also poses all manner of new 
entanglements in which human beings find themselves and that undermine their conscious 
self-determination. For example, Kant notes that as more animalic inclinations are brought 
under rational control, the pressing requirement for their immediate satisfaction can be 
delayed in order to attain a greater benefit in the long run. This ability has allowed humanity 
‘not just to enjoy the present moment of life but also to visualise what is yet to come, often 
in the distant future, [and it] is the most decisive proof of man’s advantage’.135 However, 
Kant also notes how this capacity does not come without cost. As humans develop greater 
rational self-control over their inclinations and are capable of managing them according to 
their foresight, so too they become open to ‘the most inexhaustible source of cares and 
worries which an uncertain future evokes, and from which all animals are exempt’.136 As 
such, while the historically developing capacity to use the rational dimension of their selves 
enables people to progressively become more self-determined, at the same time, it also 
constitutes a great source of anguish and internal strife, not only because of the awareness 
of an uncertain future, but also as a result of the constant struggle that humans have to 
engage with between their rational dimension and the constant lure of their inclinations.137 
 In this context, we can address Kant’s conception of civilisation to note his argument 
that despite the progress achieved by human beings living in national sovereign states 
regarding their capacity to exercise some degree of conscious control over their inclinations 
and the networks of their mutual competitive interdependence, their ‘civilised’ condition is 
also constantly undermined by a displacement of human unsocial behaviour – and all the 
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conflict and strife associated with it – to the level of international politics.138 Although 
essential for the survival of the human race as an animal species, people’s more animalic 
inclinations thus necessarily come into conflict with their ‘civilised state, a conflict which 
only a perfect civil constitution (...) can resolve’.139 In the intervening period, ‘between the 
state of nature and the state of perfection [human existence is] filled as a rule with vices and 
their consequences i.e. with human misery in its various forms’.140 In light of the conceptual 
framework framing this study, we can argue that Kant’s approach to the concept of 
civilisation throughout his writings expresses both a more involved and a more detached 
perspective. On the one hand, Kant refers to civilisation as a specific stage of human 
development, achieved with the historical formation of sovereign states and the degree of 
self-control over individual natural inclinations that human beings are capable of attaining in 
their context. This conception reveals a more involved perspective of civilisation, on the 
basis of which Kant makes a distinction between the ‘civilised’ Western European societies 
to which he belongs and the ‘uncivilised’ or ‘savage’ peoples which have not yet submitted 
themselves under a common system of law structured by a sovereign state. On the other 
hand, Kant’s usage of the concept also frequently reveals an attempt to achieve a more 
detached perspective which understands civilisation as a slow and long-term historical 
process that affects the human species as a whole and is connected with the progressive 
development of human beings’ capacity to use reason and learn how to self-control their 
natural inclinations. This more detached conception of civilisation is directly connected with 
Kant’s attempt to attain a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition and, as 
such, fulfils an important role in our analysis of Kant’s work as an answer to the problem of 
orientation.  
 In particular, it can be read as a conceptual bridge uniting the two dimensions of 
orientation in Kant’s writings. In the next section, we thus interpret Kant’s characterisation 
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of civilisation as species-wide process which is simultaneously individual and social – 
entailing both the creation of the social conditions conducive to the use of reason and 
individual learning in taming natural inclinations – in a manner that fills the theoretical gap 
between his philosophy of history and his transcendental ascertainment of the kingdom of 
ends and the ideal conditions of freedom. In this manner, we discuss how Kant’s critical 
approach constitutes an attempt at answering the problem of orientation through a grand 
narrative of the species’ history which achieves a more cosmopolitan perspectives on the 
conditions of existence of globalised humanity and orientates people in understanding how 
they might come to exercise a greater degree of conscious and collective control over them. 
  
4. The triple constitutionalization of world politics 
 
In this section, we use Kant’s more detached conception of civilisation in order to show how 
it can be read as connecting the two dimensions of the problem of orientation in his work, 
i.e. his answer to the explanatory dimension in the form of a philosophy of history and his 
answer to the anticipatory dimension in the form of the transcendental ascertainment of 
the preconditions of freedom. On this basis, Kant’s work is interpreted as a means of 
orientation that provides, on the one hand, an understanding of the predominant dynamics 
and social processes shaping the species’ history and, on the other hand, an analysis of the 
potential these have gathered, and how this potential might be actualised, for the further 
development of human beings’ powers of control over their internal inclinations and the 
social processes in which they are enmeshed.  
 As we saw above, Kant argues that the global networks of interdependence brought 
about by trade and the expansion of human destructive capacity have effectively united the 
whole species through common social bonds that no one group is capable of controlling.141 
Under these conditions, humanity’s unsocial character can no longer continue to be the 
predominant force shaping human history. Although important for survival in the earlier 
stages of human development, humanity’s more animalic inclinations have come to be 
increasingly in contradiction with the development of civilisation and people’s capacity for 
rational self-determination. In this context, Kant observes that the manifestation of these 
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animalic impulses in inter-state conflict not only undermines the achievements of 
civilisation within sovereign states but also exhibits the extent to which the global character 
of human interdependence is not matched by a truly cosmopolitan form of political 
organisation on the basis of which people might bring these inclinations and their violent 
international expression under a greater degree of conscious control and thus approximate 
a condition which enables the more full expression of their powers of self-determination.142  
 His proposal for perpetual peace and the triple constitutionalization of world politics 
found in writings such as ‘Perpetual Peace’ or the ‘Metaphysics of Morals’ can thus be read 
in this context as providing orientation regarding how such a cosmopolitan condition can be 
at least approximated in history on the basis of the potential for rationality and civilisation 
that the long-term process of human development has gathered. Kant’s argument is that all 
possible levels of human interdependence and interaction must be brought under a 
universal system of law whose content is an expression of the moral law inherent in the 
preconditions for freedom. As we discussed in section two, Kant proposes three levels of 
law: civil, international and cosmopolitan, respectively regulating relations between citizens 
inside a sovereign state, international relations between states, and cosmopolitan relations 
between states and world citizens.  
 In Kant’s view, civil constitutions should confirm the republican character of 
sovereign states.143 This means that each civil law should ideally be compliant with the 
moral principle that it could be expected to gather the free acceptability of all those who 
stand to be affected by it if they assessed the law they are given in accordance with its 
compatibility with the transcendental preconditions of freedom, i.e. if they assumed a truly 
universal perspective, detached from their particular interests, inclinations and points of 
view, in their assessment of the acceptability of the law. Such a test would ensure that laws 
are framed ‘in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of the 
whole nation, and regard each subject, in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had 
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consented within the general will’.144 However, Kant also argues that this test can only be 
applied as such in a realm of pure rational beings, capable of spontaneously acquiring 
knowledge of the moral law in light of which they can assess the existing laws. Humans, as 
rational natural beings, cannot inherently attain this type of more universal perspective 
given the constant lure of their particular inclinations; as such, it cannot be expected that an 
entire society of people will reach unanimity. Rather, it will only show a majority of votes.145 
Consequently, the constitutions of republican states must rest on ‘majority decisions 
[which] must be accepted unanimously and embodied in a contract; and this itself must be 
the ultimate basis on which a civil constitution is established’.146 The ultimate test of 
universality thus cannot be carried out by human beings, and the enactment of laws must 
instead rely on majority rule to secure their legitimacy.147 Such a mode of government, 
however, no longer ensures that these laws are compatible with the moral law and thus 
embody the preconditions of freedom. Instead, they become the outcome of the 
aggregation of more parochial points of view, driven by particular inclinations as these are 
expressed by the majority of the population of a state at a particular historical juncture.  
 In this context, Kant’s observations regarding the universalising effect in people’s 
perspectives of rational debate in the context of an open public sphere can be understood 
as providing orientation regarding how republican states can overcome the shortcomings 
associated with majority rule in a manner that allows them to also constitute the historical 
core for the consolidation of civilisation and for the development of the necessary human 
powers to overcome the historical entanglement brought about by the projection of 
people’s unsocial character to the level of world politics. It is Kant’s argument that 
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republican states with a government which is responsive to the will of their citizenry and an 
open public sphere for the rational discussion of the law that should regulate social life 
gather the required conditions for the development of more cosmopolitan perspectives on 
the part of their citizens and for a more civilised pattern of rational self-control over their 
inclinations.  Public debate and its influence over government cultivates the development of 
people’s self-control over their particular points of view and desires as a condition for the 
collective assessment of interests and social norms, which obliges participants to learn 
rational detachment i.e. to step back from their more parochial and individual positions in 
order to take the others’ points of view into account when assessing the validity and 
universality of proposed laws.148 In this manner, republican states are liable to undergo a 
collective process of ‘enlightenment’ through which their citizens progressively attain a 
more detached perspective of their conditions of existence and a more civilised pattern of 
behaviour and internal conscious management of their animalic inclinations.149 Such 
development is bound to bring to their consciousness the incompatibility between 
civilisation inside the state and a state of perpetual war at the level of world politics.150 
Consequently, the citizens of republican states appear to be in the best historical position to 
develop the necessary cosmopolitan perspective to better attune themselves to the reality 
of human global interconnectedness and to the problems it poses for human freedom while 
it is not matched by a cosmopolitan form of political organisation which unites humankind 
under a common system of law that regulates people’s relations of mutual interdependence 
and brings under control the unplanned effects of human beings’ more unsocial and 
animalic impulses.151 
 Kant’s proposal for a League of Nations initially built around a core of republican 
states and eventually coming to encompass all of humankind can be seen here as an 
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orientating device on the basis of which the further civilisation of the species can occur and 
the ideal of the kingdom of ends approximated.152 As we noted in section two, Kant 
observes that humans do not immediately recognise the transcendental model of a world 
federation of free and republican states as a precondition for their freedom. As such, the 
complete actualisation of the kingdom of ends might remain indefinitely beyond their grasp, 
making the establishment of ‘perpetual peace, [which is] the ultimate goal of the whole 
right of Nations, an unachievable idea’153. However, the possibility of human progress is not 
lost, since ‘the political principles directed towards perpetual peace, of entering into such 
alliances of states which serve for continual approximation to it, are not unachievable’154. 
Hence, the League of Nations appears as a normative standpoint of orientation that arises 
from an analysis of the potential gathered by the long-term process of human development 
and guides people as to how that potential can be used in a manner that at least 
approximates the kingdom of ends by bringing world politics more into line with the global 
character of human interdependence and the preconditions of human freedom. 
 As such, unlike the transcendental model of a world federation, Kant does not 
conceive of the League of Nations as initially encompassing the whole species or ever 
assuming sovereign authority which grants it the capacity to carry out punitive actions 
against the members-states which violate international law. Instead, the League is built 
around a small core of republican states committed to the further civilisation of their 
societies and the establishment of a condition of perpetual peace in their mutual relations. 
Furthermore, it should be an alliance that can be renounced at any time.155 Kant’s position 
regarding the non-coercive character of the League is not to be explained only as a 
capitulation to the realist argument about states’ unwillingness to submit to a superior 
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authority.156 Instead, it can also be read as an expression of his conception of civilisation as a 
long-term process through which human beings learn rational self-control over their 
inclinations and how to exercise their powers of self-determination. By making both the 
membership of the League and the adherence to its laws voluntary, Kant achieves two main 
effects. On the one hand, the cosmopolitan character of the League is preserved to the 
extent that it cannot become the instrument of a majority of member-states to impose their 
will, thus making the League an expression of particularistic interests and points of view 
which violates the self-determination of its members.157 On the other hand, it ensures that 
the League fulfils a similar function, at the level of world politics, to that of the public sphere 
within republican states. By making its laws the subject of unanimous approval and 
voluntary respect, the League can constitute a true international forum for the 
consensualization of international norms based on the universalisation of perspectives. It 
creates the conditions under which each state is compelled to detach from its parochial 
points of view and particularistic interests and to assume a more cosmopolitan perspective 
which encompasses the points of view of the other participants in the deliberation process. 
In this manner, in light of Kant’s more detached conception of civilisation, the League of 
Nations can be said to fulfil a fundamental civilising role, to the extent that, as it 
encompasses more and more states under a universal system of law which all of its 
members constitute and to which all voluntarily submit, it progressively approximates a true 
cosmopolitan condition in which the citizens of those states able to bring under their 
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collective and conscious control the so far unplanned dynamics of their mutual global 
interdependence.158  
 A final aspect of our reading of Kant’s proposal for the League of Nations as an 
orientating device bringing together both dimensions of the problem of orientation in his 
work is how Kant argues that complementing the civil law of republican sovereign states 
and the international law enacted by the tendentially global association of states, there 
should be a third level of law, cosmopolitan law based on the universal attribution of world 
citizenship to every human being on the planet. World citizenship expresses the truly 
cosmopolitan outlook of the League of Nations and its aspiration at actualising the ideal of 
the kingdom of ends. Its main purpose is to regulate the relations between sovereign states 
and individual human beings through the establishment of a universal right of hospitality. 
Kant describes universal hospitality as ‘the right for a stranger not to be treated with 
hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory, (…) so long as he behaves in a peaceful 
manner in the place he happens to be in’.159 The stranger can be turned away or denied 
entry by the state but only as long as this does not cause his or her death.160 The 
implications of the right of hospitality are significant.161 By entailing that states are under 
the obligation to accept into their territory individuals from other states if turning them 
away would entail their death, it effectively establishes a right of refugees, protecting them 
from any form of social or natural harm that could cause their death in their country of 
origin. It is thus oriented towards a universal expression of human sympathy that cuts 
across the parochial and more ethnocentric perspectives of sovereign states.162 
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 Furthermore, the right of hospitality also establishes that not only those visiting a 
state must be treated adequately, but also that those visiting other peoples’ territories must 
obey the moral principles compatible with the freedom and dignity of the human person in 
their relations with them. In this context, Kant observes how his conception of cosmopolitan 
law implies an inherent critique of European colonialism, arguing that the conduct of 
‘civilised’ Western states – in the more involved perspective of the term – reveals itself to 
be highly ‘inhospitable’. When visiting non-European countries which, Kant notes, actually 
entail conquering them, the behaviour of Western nations is in marked contrast with 
cosmopolitan law, bringing upon the natives ‘widespread oppression, the incitement (…) to 
war, famine, insurrection, treachery and the whole litany of evils which can afflict the 
human race’.163 In light of cosmopolitan law, Kant argues that non-European peoples, having 
‘experienced such guests’ have the right to ‘placed restrictions on them’ and limit the right 
to visit of European citizens to their territories.164  
 Kant’s observations on European colonialism as a corollary of his proposal for 
perpetual peace and the triple constitutionalization of world politics is thus a clear 
expression of the extent of Kant’s attempt to achieve a more cosmopolitan perspective in 
his work, which detaches itself from the point of view of the society and the time period to 
which he belongs. However, as we argue in the next section, despite the contribution of 
Kant’s work for the development of a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human 
condition, it also exhibits serious limitations as an answer to the problem of orientation, 
which ultimately undermines its cosmopolitan character and shows it to be only the first 
step towards a more adequate means of orientation.  
 
5. Universalism and history 
 
Throughout this chapter we have addressed Kant’s work as an answer to both the 
explanatory and the anticipatory dimensions of the problem of orientation. In particular, we 
focused on how Kant strives to achieve a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human 
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condition which serves as a means of orientation on the basis of which people might acquire 
a better understanding of themselves, of the predominant dynamics and social processes 
shaping their history, and of how to better attune to their conditions of global 
interdependence in order to exercise a greater degree of conscious and collective control 
over them.  
 In this section, and with reference to Kimberly Hutchings and Andrew Linklater’s 
critiques of Kant, we argue that Kant’s contribution for the development of a more 
adequate answer to the problem of orientation lies also in the shortcomings of his work. 
Two interconnected shortcomings are particularly important for our inquiry. First, Kant’s 
answer to the anticipatory dimension of orientation through the transcendental 
ascertainment of the preconditions of freedom inherently entails a theoretical dualism 
between history and morality which poses a fixed conception of the ultimate end towards 
which humanity develops and ignores alternative paths of human historical development as 
legitimate expressions of human self-determination. And second, Kant’s answer to the 
explanatory dimension of orientation in the form of a linear and teleological philosophy of 
history implies a conception of the history of the species that also blocks an awareness of 
the multi-linear and open-ended character of human development in a manner that 
inherently characterises as illegitimate, or as detour from the ‘moral’ path, all forms of 
human self-expression which do not reproduce Kant’s conception of the structure of history 
and the stages of development of the species. As such, Kant’s work reveals itself to be 
inadequate as a means of orientation and actually liable to reproduce forms of modernist 
myth that legitimize practices of domination, exclusion and violence between different parts 
of humanity, by privileging one particular expression of human self-determination as the 
‘moral’ and ‘universal’ path of human development.  
 In the book ‘Kant, Critique and Politics’, Hutchings observes that a ‘gulf’ runs through 
Kant’s work between his transcendental ascertainment of the moral law and the 
preconditions of freedom and his inquiry into history and politics.165 In Hutchings’s 
assessment, Kant’s critical theory is unable to ‘bridge’ this gulf, as his theoretical connection 
between the transcendental ideal and the historical development of the species is never 
‘genuinely secure’.166 As we saw in sections three and four above, Kant can be read as 
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making this connection through a philosophy of history which interprets the long-term 
history of the species as if it is progressing towards the greater actualisation of the kingdom 
of ends. Essential in this context is Kant’s more detached conception of civilisation as a 
species-wide long-term process characterised by the progressive development of human 
reason and people’s capacity to rationally self-control their more animalic inclinations in a 
manner that sustains the widening of their perspectives in the direction of cosmopolitanism.  
 However, as Hutchings adequately observes, Kant’s connection between the 
transcendental moral law and human empirical history depends only on the philosopher’s 
own judgement and choice to read history ‘as if’ it obeys a linear and teleological structure 
of development; a choice which Kant cannot theoretically sustain as ‘history needs not be 
read as progress, and the philosopher’s judgement has no guarantee of effectiveness’.167 
Kant’s philosophy of history thus has no other theoretical reason other than it fulfils the 
subjective need of the philosopher for history to have a rational meaning. As such, in the 
absence of determinate rules grounding the choice for the particular linear and teleological 
interpretation of history which Kant chooses as more adequate to address the long-term 
development of the species, his particular approach occupies an ‘inexplicable no man’s land’ 
and becomes ‘a peculiar invention, the legitimation of which (…) is mysterious’.168 
 Furthermore, Hutchings observes that by establishing the transcendental 
preconditions of freedom, in the form of the idea of the kingdom of ends, as the moral end 
of the species towards which human history develops, Kant’s political thinking ‘organises 
the world, spatially, temporally and morally in a particular way’.169 The assumption of a 
linear and teleological path of human development necessarily implies that some parts of 
humanity are further along the road than others. As such, from the perspective of Kant’s 
theoretical framework, the process of development of globalised humanity ‘acquires a 
centre and a future in which the highest good is manifested, [in comparison with which] 
peripheral places become identified with temporal as well as spatial distance, backward in 
the progressive workings of history’.170 In other words, Kant’s theoretical framework implies 
that human groups whose course of development does not follow his linear and teleological 
model of the species’ history are identified as either being ‘backward’ in terms of their 
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development, or as incurring in some kind of developmental ‘error’. In either of these two 
cases, their difference can be attributed to either ‘immaturity’ or ‘ignorance’, ‘in which case, 
as in children, education is the answer (…) to set them right’.171 As such, Hutchings argues, 
‘spatio-temporal distances’ between human groups quickly become identified as forms of 
‘moral distance’, in a manner that legitimizes practices of domination between different 
parts of humanity which envision putting those human groups that are considered backward 
or deviant back on the correct and moral path of human development.172 In this manner, 
despite Kant’s stance against European colonialism, his own theoretical framework 
legitimizes, even if unwittingly, practices of domination and exclusion of difference and of 
the multiple forms of self-expression and self-determination of human beings. 
 In this context, we can also address Linklater’s critique of Kant’s work as in part 
echoing Hutchings’s arguments. In his book ‘Men and Citizens in the Theory of International 
Relations’, Linklater refers to the historicist critique of universalist rationalism to observe 
that Kant, by assuming the possibility of ascertaining the a priori transcendental 
preconditions of freedom, poses the ‘existence of an immutable, universal set of human 
moral capacities’ in a manner which ‘ignores the complex social and historical forces which 
made universalism possible’.173 It ignores the manner in which it is impossible to justify the 
existence of moral universalism in a transcendental manner, which is independent of its 
emergence in the actual course of human historical development.174 Just like the choice to 
interpret history as if it is progressing towards the greater development of reason and the 
actualisation of the kingdom of ends, the conception of the moral law and the preconditions 
of the freedom as independent of the species’ history is not theoretically sustainable in a 
manner other than owing its existence to the subjective judgement and choice of the 
philosopher. As such, Linklater argues that a ‘more complete theory’ of human historical 
development must incorporate the historicist challenge to Kant’s universalism by 
recognising that ‘no immutable standard of morality is acknowledged by the whole of 
humanity’ and that morality is expressed in ‘several strands’ within different cultural 
contexts, in a manner that highlights the multi-linear character of human development.175 
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However, Linklater also observes that this more complete theory cannot rely purely on a 
historicist perspective, which tends to highlight the differences between human groups in 
the same manner that Kant’s universalism ignores them. The historicist approach frequently 
fails to acknowledge the development, under conditions of increasing global integration, of 
more universal modes of collective and conscious regulation of the patterns of human 
interdependence, on the basis of which more cosmopolitan perspectives on the human 
condition, as well as more universal moral standards, can develop and emerge historically. 
As such, Linklater argues that a more complete theory needs to bridge Kant’s search for a 
cosmopolitan perspective with the historicist recognition of human different and the multi-
linear character of human development. It would ‘respond to the existence of social change 
and moral development by proposing an account of the [historical] emergence of 
universalism’.176 Linklater’s argument is that the beginning of such an approach can be 
found in Marx’s materialist and emergentist conception of human development, a position 
which is supported by our inquiry into the problem of orientation in the next chapter.177 
 Hutchings and Linklater’s critiques highlight the inadequacy of Kant’s critical 
approach as a means of orientation. They show how the dualism he establishes between 
history and morality and his linear and teleological philosophy of history block an awareness 
of the multi-linear and open-ended character of human development in a manner that has 
important consequences when analysed from the point of view of both the anticipatory and 
the explanatory dimensions of the problem of orientation. Kant’s theoretical framework 
excludes alternative expressions of human self-determination which do not match his 
conception of the linear path of the species’ history. This exclusion inherently legitimizes 
practices of domination over these alternative forms of human self-expression in order to 
put them back on the correct path and approximate them to the moral centre of the 
species, expressed in those sections of humanity that most closely follow Kant’s model of 
historical development, namely, the societies of Western Europe of which Kant is a member. 
As such, despite Kant’s attempt to attain a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human 
condition, the theoretical framework on the basis of which he tries to fulfil this task actually 
undermines his objectives and throws Kant back onto a more involved perspective which 
locks him in the moral and historical horizon of Western modernity. In this manner, Kant’s 
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work is inadequate as an answer to the problem of orientation given how, under the cover 
of its supposed cosmopolitanism, and even against the better intentions of its author, it 
expresses an involved, particularistic, society and time bound perspective of the history of 
the species, which blocks from awareness its multiple paths of development and legitimises 
practices of exclusion and violence between different sections of humanity.  
   
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we addressed Kant’s classical texts from the perspective of our inquiry into 
the problem of orientation. This analysis led us to several interconnected conclusions. First, 
Kant’s work clearly demonstrates how, under conditions of human global interdependence, 
a more adequate answer to the problem of orientation requires the development of 
theoretical frameworks which are capable of promoting a more cosmopolitan perspective 
on the human condition. Only in such a way can more parochial, ethnocentric and overall 
involved perspectives be tempered with a more detached conception of the conditions of 
existence of the human species on the basis of which people can be expected to attune to 
each other as human beings rather than as members of morally limited and self-regarding 
political communities. A more cosmopolitan means of orientation thus proves fundamental 
to help people collectively bring under greater conscious control the unplanned social 
processes arising from their global interconnectedness. Furthermore, Kant’s work shows 
that a more cosmopolitan means of orientation requires the production of grand narratives 
that encompass the whole of humanity and are capable of theoretically linking a more 
adequate understanding of the species’ history with an inquiry into the conditions for the 
expansion of human freedom.  
 In this context, our reading of Kant enables us to argue that a more adequate answer 
to both dimensions of the problem of orientation needs to understand the fundamental link 
between the dimensions of the triad of controls related to the development of human 
beings’ capacity for self-control over their more animalic impulses, the development of 
more detached and cosmopolitan points of view, and the development of the human 
powers of control over social processes through the production of more universal norms 
regulating social interactions. Moreover, it shows that such an assessment needs to 
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encompass an analysis of the developmental interplay between social processes such as 
state formation, the development of social norms, and the dynamics of world politics. 
 However, Kant’s work also shows that this inquiry cannot be carried out on the basis 
of a transcendental ascertainment of the ideal preconditions of freedom or of a linear and 
teleological philosophy of history. These two theoretical approaches – which can be 
identified as an attempt to answer, respectively, the anticipatory and the explanatory 
dimensions of orientation – are inadequate to the extent that they lead Kant to not only 
ignore the multi-linear and open-ended character of human development but to also pose 
an ideal model of human history which, taken as the species’ universal and moral path, runs 
the risk of reproducing forms of modernist myth that hide a more involved perspective and 
can legitimize practices of domination and exclusion.  
 In this manner, our analysis of Kant’s work reveals it as an important step towards a 
more cosmopolitan means of orientation regarding the conditions of existence of globalised 
humanity by highlighting some fundamental aspects that a more adequate answer to the 
problem of orientation has to encompass, as well as some of the more important 
shortcomings that it needs to overcome. In the next chapter, we move to an analysis of 
Marx’s work in order to argue that his materialist and emergentist approach to human 
development points us in the direction of how these conditions can be fulfilled and a more 
adequate answer to the problem of orientation can be developed.  
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Chapter Three 
Karl Marx 
The historical emergence of humanity 
 
In the previous chapter we interpreted Kant’s work as an answer to the problem of 
orientation and argued that it highlights the need for a more cosmopolitan means of 
orientation which, based on a grand narrative regarding the long-term development of 
globalised humanity, provides human beings with a better understanding of their collective 
history and of how to exercise a greater degree of conscious control over its future 
development. In this context, we noted that Kant shows that a more adequate orientating 
framework requires a better grasp of the role assumed in the species’ history by the 
interconnected development of human self-control and control over social processes and 
how it is expressed in the development of states, social norms and the constitutionalization 
of world politics.    
 However, our analysis also led us to argue that this orientating framework cannot be 
built on the basis of a transcendental ascertainment of the preconditions of freedom nor on 
a philosophical history that poses a linear and teleological model of human development. 
Such an approach inherently reproduces a form of modernist grand narrative which hides a 
more involved perspective that not only blocks an awareness of human diversity but also 
legitimises particularistic points of view and forms of domination. 
 In this chapter, we discuss Marx’s work to argue that his materialist and emergentist 
approach to human development, by highlighting the role of another pair of the triad of 
basic controls – control over external non-human nature and control over social processes – 
opens the way for a more cosmopolitan perspective that overcomes the limitations found in 
Kant’s critical theory. In particular, we observe how Marx’s critical approach gathers the 
potential, on the one hand, for a multi-linear and open-ended model of human history and, 
on the other hand, for a historically-embedded and processual assessment of the conditions 
for the further expansion of people’s capacity for self-determination. In light of our 
conceptual framework, Marx’s work can thus be read as pointing us in the direction of a 
more adequate answer to both the explanatory and the anticipatory dimensions of the 
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problem of orientation by abandoning Kant’s philosophy of history and the transcendental 
ascertainment of the preconditions of freedom.  
 However, we also argue that the same perspectival shift which enables Marx’s 
critical theory to gather this potential, also ultimately leads him to squander it. Throughout 
his writings Marx attributes a linear causal role to human productive activity as the main 
determinant in the history of the species. This leads him to establish of a direct theoretical 
link between the material conditions of human existence and the development of people’s 
perspectives, forms of emotional identification, and overall modes of attunement towards 
each other and the world. As such, Marx predominantly ignores several themes that Kant’s 
work showed to be fundamental for a more adequate answer to the problem of orientation. 
In particular, he dismisses the concomitant role of the development of the human powers of 
self-control over their more animalic impulses and its connection with processes such as 
state formation, inter-state conflict and the linguistic consensualization of social norms. 
Consequently, Marx’s work also highlights how a more adequate orientating framework 
needs to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the interplay between the 
different dimensions of the triad of controls in the long-term process of human 
development. In the absence of such an account, Marx ultimately falls into a philosophy of 
the subject which, by ignoring the fundamental condition of plurality of the human species, 
reproduces a form of modernist myth and reveals a more involved perspective on the 
human condition than that to which Marx aspires. 
 The chapter is organised in four main sections. In the first section, we argue that 
Marx’s materialist and emergentist conception of human development gathers the potential 
for a more cosmopolitan perspective by providing the theoretical basis for both a model of 
the species’ history which is multi-linear and open-ended and for a historically-embedded 
and processual assessment of the conditions of human self-determination. In the second 
section, we address Marx’s theory of history to note that while his work gathers this 
potential for a more cosmopolitan perspective, his focus on the role of human productive 
activity also leads him to adopt a linear conception of the dynamics of human development 
that blocks its actualisation. In the third section, we discuss Marx’s critique of capitalism in 
order to argue that it exhibits exactly this tension present in Marx’s work between its 
potential for a more adequate answer to the problem of orientation and its linear 
conception of human history. Finally, in the fourth section, we analyse why Marx is unable 
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to overcome this tension and we discuss what we can learn from his work in order to 
develop a more adequate means of orientation. 
 Before we move to our analysis, a final note must be made. The treatment of Marx’s 
writings in this chapter will not account for the separation that sometimes operates in the 
literature between the so-called early and later Marx.178 This differentiation, arising both 
from the chronological order in which Marx’s texts became known and from the apparent 
distinction between the more philosophically oriented early writings when compared to 
Marx’s later work, is here overcome by an analysis of Marx’s critical theory as a single body 
of thought. One whose internal differentiations have to be seen not in light of a 
confrontation of the early with the later Marx, but according to an internal analysis of the 
pattern of development of Marx’s approach. In this context, the chapter expresses the view 
that despite differences arising mainly from a transition in Marx’s analytical framework from 
philosophy to economics and sociology, the fundamental themes of his thought remain the 
same throughout. In particular, we are concerned with highlighting the maintenance of 
Marx focus on a materialist, emergentist and dialectic conception of human history, through 
which he strives to attain a more detached perspective of the main patterns of the long-
term development of the species and orientate human beings in identifying and actualizing 
the immanent potentials gathered at each particular historical juncture that might enable 
them to ‘make more of their history under conditions of their own choosing’.179  
 
1. The humanism of nature and the naturalism of humanity 
 
In this section we argue that one of Marx’s main contributions for the development of a 
more adequate answer to the problem of orientation lies in his analysis of the role of human 
control over non-human nature in the overall process of human development. On the basis 
of this analysis, Marx develops a materialist and emergentist approach to the long-term 
history of the species that gathers the potential for a more cosmopolitan perspective that 
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captures its diversity and multiple possible paths and that provides a historically-embedded 
assessment of the conditions of human self-determination. 
 In texts such as the ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’, ‘The German 
Ideology’, and ‘Capital’, Marx lays the theoretical foundations of his materialist and 
emergentist approach by arguing that a more adequate understanding of human historical 
development must rely not on the ‘abstraction’ of philosophical history, but rather on an 
understanding of human beings ‘as they are’, i.e. on the ‘study of the actual life-processes 
and the activity of the individuals of each epoch’.180 It must start from the basic conditions 
which make history possible, and the most basic of all, Marx argues, is that people ‘before 
everything else, need to eat, to drink, a habitation, clothing and many other things’.181 The 
first historical act is ‘the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of 
material life itself’.182 A more adequate understanding of human development thus depends 
on a theoretical framework which captures the necessary interactions between humans and 
non-human external nature, through which the former transform the latter into the objects 
of their needs.183 Marx can be observed here to share Kant’s conception of humans as 
natural beings subject to animalic inclinations. However, he also develops this conception in 
at least two ways. First, Marx highlights how the satisfaction of these natural inclinations 
requires the constant engagement in material productive activity. And second, he shows 
that as the human powers of control over nature develop, not only the manner of the 
satisfaction of these natural inclinations changes, but also new inclinations emerge 
throughout history in the form of social needs which were previously absent from the 
human animal.184  
 Marx defines productive activity as a process by which people mediate, regulate and 
control their metabolism with nature.185 Given that human control over external nature 
constitutes the fundamental premise of the species’ existence and of its continued survival 
it can be argued that, to Marx, human beings do not have the option of not exercising 
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control over nature, under penalty of threatening their sustenance and the reproduction of 
their conditions of existence. If at all, they have a choice regarding how this control is 
exercised in the context of historically changing conditions.186 This position is grounded in 
Marx’s argument that the particular type of control that humans have come to be 
historically able to exercise over nature differentiates them from all other species on the 
planet. Marx recognises that other animals also transform nature for the satisfaction of their 
needs, mentioning the beaver, bees and ants ‘which build nests and dwellings’.187 However, 
he also notes that while these animals produce only under the compulsion of their 
immediate needs and only according to the standards that are naturally inscribed in them – 
i.e. they only produce in a species-specific manner with little changeability between groups 
of individuals of the same species – an analysis of the development of human labour shows 
that human beings have historically developed the capacity to increasingly carry out their 
productive activity in a ‘conscious’ manner.188 Hence, Marx argues that, unlike other animal 
species, humans have come to be able to produce according to self-defined standards, 
rather than only driven by the compulsion of their natural inclinations.189 The historical 
emergence of human conscious activity explains the great diversity of modes of production 
and products of labour of different human groups and proves that human beings can make 
‘life activity itself an object of their will and consciousness (…) [and this] directly 
distinguishes them from [other] animals’.190   
 In this context, Marx observes that human adaptation to the natural environment 
has thus come to rely predominantly not on the development of specialized bodily organs, 
as occurs in other animals, but rather on the historical development of artificial adaptive 
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organs, in the form of tools which are fashioned through the conscious labouring of non-
human nature into forms adequate for the satisfaction of human needs.191 In a sense, 
nature came to be ‘one of the organs of human activity, which is annexed to humans’ own 
bodily organs’, it is humanity’s ‘original tool house’ and itself constitutes ‘an instrument of 
labour’.192 In Marx’s assessment, the human capacity for rational self-determination thus 
cannot be interpreted as an a priori property of the species. Rather it is the product of the 
largely unplanned and long-term developmental process throughout which human beings, 
in the context of their labouring activity to satisfy their more animalic needs, have come to 
develop the capacity to more consciously control their metabolism with nature. As such, to 
Marx, in a very literal sense, the history of tool production and the development of 
technology express the history of the development of reason and of the emergence of the 
human powers of control and self-determination.193 As people labour they bring out what is 
specifically human about them, developing their ‘human-nature’, i.e. their species-specific 
character as beings with a capacity for freedom. The history of the species comes to be 
characterised by Marx as a long-term process of ‘humanization’ of both nature and 
humankind, throughout which the human animal develops its specifically human character. 
It is in this sense, then, that Marx speaks of history as the slow emergence of the ‘humanism 
of nature’ and the ‘naturalism of humanity’.194 
 In light of our engagement with the problem of orientation, Marx’s materialist and 
emergentist approach points to a set of fundamental dynamics which have shaped the long-
term process of human development and which have to be taken into consideration by any 
grand narrative that aspires to constitute a more adequate means of orientation. It show 
that human beings’ capacity to rationally escape the determination of nature and self-
determine their conditions of existence is a historically emergent characteristic of the 
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species that indeed distinguishes it from other animals, but which is grounded in the 
biological evolution of the human animal itself. In this manner, Marx avoids both a 
mechanistic materialism that reduces human beings to an expression of their biological 
characteristics and an idealist perspective that elevates them to beings that are somehow 
animated by a spiritual essence which is separate from the realm of natural evolution.  
 Furthermore, we can argue that by conceiving of human beings as a part of nature 
which has acquired the capacity to self-regulate its metabolism with the surrounding 
environment, Marx also promotes a more ecological and detached orientation towards 
human relations with the non-human part of the universe, in which the latter is no longer 
understood from a species-centric point of view as simply an object of manipulation and 
control which exists separately from humans. Instead, the historical emergence of the 
human powers of control over the natural environment – seen as a continuation of the 
evolutionary process on Earth – comes to be regarded as inherently connected with the 
conditions of natural sustainability on the planet. From this more detached point of view, 
the human capacity for self-determination is recognised to be dependent on fundamental 
conditions of natural sustainability which cannot be undermined but must be nourished and 
protected by the conscious part of the planet’s biosphere. The penalty for the ignorance or 
violation of these conditions is the unplanned development of natural processes that have 
potentially harmful and disruptive effects both for humans and for the non-human part of 
the planet, causing what Marx characterises in ‘Capital’ as the ‘disturbance of the metabolic 
interaction between human beings and the Earth’.195  
 In this context, Marx develops a harsh environmental critique of capitalism noticing 
how its incessant mania for the accumulation of capital, while radically expanding the 
human capacity to control nature, does so on the basis of what we can characterise as a 
more involved orientation towards nature, which understands it as a separate object that 
exists only for manipulation and exploitation. As such, and referring to capitalist large-scale 
agriculture in particular, Marx observes that its ‘development of the social process of 
production [is based] on the simultaneous undermining of the original sources of all wealth 
– the soil and the worker’.196 
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 Furthermore, our reading of Marx’s work as an expression of a more detached and 
ecological perspective of human relations with nature can also be extended to demonstrate 
how Marx’s materialist and emergentist approach can constitute the basis for a more 
cosmopolitan means of orientation that captures the multi-linear and open-ended character 
of the long-term process of human development. As we mentioned above, Marx considers 
that the specifically human mode of life is connected with peoples’ capacity to consciously 
transform nature in order to satisfy their needs. As such, whether or not to exercise control 
over nature is not an option which is historically open to human beings, as their very 
survival depends on it. Rather, the historical challenge which emerges throughout the 
history of the species – and which is expressed with particular clarity by Marx’s more 
ecologically oriented observations – is how to exercise that capacity for control in a manner 
which ensures that human beings are able to self-determine their conditions of existence 
without producing unintended social processes which entail unplanned harmful 
consequences both to themselves and to the natural environment of which they are a part. 
Humans are thus faced with the historical challenge of more consciously controlling their 
own capacity for control. A challenge which is inherently connected with the adequacy of 
the means of orientation that are available to people at each particular moment in history, 
given that its answer depends on human beings’ capacity to grasp the predominant 
dynamics and social processes shaping the long-term development of their powers of 
control, and orientate themselves as to how to exercise them in a more conscious and self-
determined manner which avoids their unplanned and disruptive effects.  
 Moreover, it can be argued that from the perspective of Marx’s materialist and 
emergentist approach the answer to this challenge cannot be found through the 
transcendental ascertainment of the ideal preconditions of human self-determination. 
Instead, it depends on an empirical and historical assessment of the predominant social 
forces shaping the process of human development and on an identification of the immanent 
potential these gather, at each particular historical juncture, for an expansion of the human 
powers of conscious control. As such, a reading of Marx’s work from the perspective of our 
inquiry, leads us to argue that Marx advances an answer to the anticipatory dimension of 
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orientation which is not transcendental but rather processual and historically-embedded, to 
the extent that it implies a normative commitment to the expansion of human self-
determination but recognises that this implies different things, to different human groups, 
in different moments and areas of their historical process of development, and thus cannot 
be expressed by a fixed and universal blueprint of the ideal conditions of freedom.  
 In this manner, Marx’s materialist and emergentist approach to human development 
provides us with the theoretical resources to overcome several of the shortcomings 
connected with Kant’s critical theory. First, it abandons the need for a transcendental 
normative standpoint of orientation which, by being fixed and supposedly universally valid 
across space and time, is also theoretically disconnected from the actual course of human 
historical development, thus establishing a gulf between the actual living conditions of 
human beings and the transcendental ideal conditions of freedom. And second, by 
historicising the conditions of human self-determination and understanding them as part of 
the long-term process of human development, Marx’s approach also opens the way for an 
engagement with the explanatory dimension of orientation which is based on a multi-linear 
and open-ended model of the species’ history that acknowledges and recognises the 
legitimacy of its multiple paths and forms of human self-expression. As such, Marx’s work 
exhibits the potential for the development of a more cosmopolitan means of orientation 
which presents a more detached perspective on the human condition by recognising both 
the historical emergence of the human powers of control and their multiple forms of 
expression throughout the species’ history. In this manner, a means of orientation based on 
Marx’s materialist and emergentist approach can not only overcome the dualism between 
morality and history found in Kant’s work, but can also potentially overcome the linear and 
teleological conception of human development implied by philosophical history and thus 
more adequately avoid a reproduction of modernist grand narratives that hide more 
involved, parochial and ethnocentric world-views.  
 However, as we argue throughout the rest of this chapter, Marx is unable to 
actualise the potential found in his work for the attainment of a more cosmopolitan 
perspective on the human condition. In particular, his analytical emphasis on the role of 
human control over non-human nature in the species’ history leads him to attribute causal 
primacy to human productive activity in detriment of other dynamics shaping human 
development, such as social norms, the formation of political community or the dynamics of 
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world politics and how, as we saw in the previous chapter, these are connected with the 
development of people’s capacity to self-control their more animalic impulses and with the 
universalisation of people’s modes of attunement towards each other and the world. As 
such, in the next two sections, we argue that an analysis of the shortcomings of Marx’s work 
is also instructive for our inquiry, given how it points to the need of a grand narrative which 
is capable of providing a more comprehensive understanding of the interplay between the 
different dimensions of the triad of basic controls on the basis of a materialist and 
emergentist model of human historical development that captures its multi-linear and open-
ended character. In the absence of such a model, any answer to the problem of orientation 
inevitably reproduces modernist forms of myth that ignore the plurality of species and 
express more involved and parochial points of view which are unable to either understand 
or eliminate the particular relations of domination and exclusion which are connected with 
them.    
 
2. Production and history 
 
In this section we address Marx’s theory of history from two points of view. In the first 
subsection, we discuss it as an answer to the explanatory dimension of orientation by 
noticing how it attempts to produce a theoretical framework that captures the predominant 
dynamics and social processes shaping the long-term development of the species. In 
particular, we focus on the connection that Marx establishes between the development of 
human control over nature and that of more cosmopolitan perspectives and universal forms 
of attunement between people to argue that, despite Marx’s many insights, his attribution 
of causal primacy to human productive activity in his account of these processes leads to a 
linear and unitary model of the species’ history that undermines its adequacy as an 
orientating framework. In the second subsection, we further develop this argument by 
focusing on Marx’s dialectical conception of human historical development to note how the 
potential of his historically-embedded and processual assessment of the conditions of 
human self-determination to provide a more adequate answer to the anticipatory 
dimension of orientation is ultimately undermined by Marx’s linear theory of history.  
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2.1. The universalisation of humanity 
 
Marx’s theory of history is presented with most clarity in works such as ‘The German 
Ideology’, ‘Grundrisse’, or ‘Capital’. According to Marx, a more adequate understanding of 
the human condition depends 
 ‘on our ability to expound the real process of production, starting out from the 
material product of life itself, and to comprehend the form of intercourse 
connected with this and created by this mode of production (…) as the basis of all 
history, and to (…) explain all the different theoretical products and forms of 
consciousness, religion, philosophy, ethics etc. and trace their origins and growth 
from that basis: by which means, of course the whole thing can be depicted in its 
totality, and therefore, too, the reciprocal action of the various sides on one 
another’.197 
It is our argument, however, that Marx’s attribution of causal primacy to productive activity 
makes him unable to attain the degree of detachment required to capture the ‘reciprocal 
action of these various sides on one another’. Instead, it leads him to a linear grand 
narrative in which people’s control over nature is identified as the main dynamic shaping 
the development of individual identities, patterns of behaviour, forms of mutual 
identification and basic orientations towards the world and social relations. From the 
perspective of our engagement with the problem of orientation, Marx’s linear theory of 
history locks him into a more involved perspective of the human condition which fails to 
recognise how social processes such as the monopolisation of force by the state, inter-
societal relations, and processes of linguistic consensualization of social norms shape human 
history in a multitude of ways and produce different forms of human self-expression which 
cannot be traced to the linear causality of human technological development. In this 
manner, he tends to present a linear and tendentially teleological model of the species’ 
history that reproduces the shortcomings of Kant’s philosophical history by ignoring the 
diversity of humankind and presenting a more involved and Wester-centric perspective of 
human development that understands the differences of human groups that do not follow 
the developmental path of the West as evidence of developmental backwardness which 
needs to be brought into line with the more advanced sections of humanity, understood as 
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those which have attained a higher degree of conscious control over nature.198 As such, 
Marx not only fails to recognise human plurality, but also ignores forms of exploitation and 
exclusion between people whose character cannot be reduced to their material conditions 
of existence but depends also on their belonging to self-regarding communities and their 
associated prejudices based on ethnocentric personal identities and more parochial forms 
of orientation, as is the case of discrimination and exclusion based on gender, nationality, 
ethnicity or religion.199 Hence, despite Marx’s efforts to produce a more comprehensive 
model of human development and attain a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human 
condition, again and again he returns to the attribution of causal primacy to human 
productive activity in a manner that undermines his capacity to actualises the potential in 
his own materialist and emergentist approach for a more adequate answer to the problem 
of orientation.   
 When addressing Marx’s theory of history from the perspective of the explanatory 
dimension of orientation it can be observed that, by placing human relations with nature at 
the centre of his analysis of historical development, Marx characterises each stage of that 
process as the ‘material result (…) of a sum of productive forces which, expressed in a 
historically created relation to nature and of individuals to one another, is handed down to 
each generation from its predecessor’.200 Each of these stages is ‘modified by the new 
generation, but also prescribes for it its conditions of life and gives it a definite 
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development, a special character’.201 The challenge in making the movement of human 
development more intelligible thus lies in understanding the predominant social dynamics 
which constitute the ‘real ground’ of human history and that shape it to assume particular 
directions and produce specific material results.202 In Marx’s view, amongst these dynamics 
the development of the division of labour, and the way it connects the development of 
human control over nature and over social processes, is one of the most prominent.  
 Expressed in the functional and technological specialisation of human productive 
activity, the division of labour arises in an unplanned manner within the labour process. In 
the earlier stages of human history, it is ‘nothing but the division of labour in the sexual act, 
then that division of labour which develops spontaneously or ‘naturally’ by virtue of natural 
predisposition (e.g. physical strength, needs, accidents, etc.)’.203 But as people transform 
nature to meet their needs and, in the process, acquire a more adequate understanding of 
its natural processes and how to control them, so too they develop increasingly more 
specialized tools and areas of activity to mediate their interactions with it. The overall 
direction of the historical development of humanity is thus towards the increase in the 
division of labour, the specialization of productive activity between different individuals and 
groups and the growth of human conscious control over non-human nature.  
 However, Marx also observes that as the division of labour increases, each 
individual’s social activity becomes more circumscribed and social groups come to be 
differentiated according to their respective position in the overall process of social 
production, thus progressively becoming differentiated as social classes.204 The historical 
consolidation of different social classes with different areas of social activity and specialized 
functions means that the satisfaction of human needs comes to depend more and more on 
wider and more intricate networks of production which, through commerce, come to link 
together distant societies and groups of people in relations of mutual functional 
interdependence upon which all depend for their survival and for the reproduction of their 
conditions of existence. According to Marx, in the most advanced stages of social 
development, when the division of labour is particularly high, ‘almost every piece of work 
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done by a single individual is part of a whole, having no value or utility of itself’.205 Every 
area of activity thus comes to be necessarily bound in long webs of human interdependence 
that complement it and give it meaning both within and across different societies. 
Furthermore, Marx argues that this process of growing interdependence is neither linear 
nor conflict free and occurs in a largely unplanned manner throughout history. As the 
division of labour develops, people’s relations of mutual interdependence evolve and 
assume different patterns in an almost ‘natural’ manner, i.e. they are ‘not subordinated to a 
general plan of freely combined individuals, but proceed from various localities, tribes, 
nations, branches of labour, each of which to start with develops independently of others 
and only gradually enters into relations with others’.206  
 The predominantly unplanned character of this process means that, as different 
classes and human groups are thrown together in mutual dependence, all manners of 
tensions and conflicts arise between them, as they struggle with each other in an attempt to 
control the social bonds that unite them in ways that are more advantageous to each 
particular group. All the more so given how belonging to a particular class implies not only 
different specialised forms of activity, but also different forms of ownership and access to 
the production of social labour.207 These struggles and the interweaving of multiple 
intentional actions of human beings across ever expanding networks of production further 
reinforce the overall unplanned character of the social processes in which people are 
enmeshed. Consequently, the human social bond predominantly develops in unplanned 
directions that no singular person or group is capable of fully controlling or even 
understanding. In this manner, Marx observes that the growth of human control over 
nature throughout the history of the species is not concomitant with a similar growth of 
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conscious and collective control at the level of human social relations.  Instead, it actually 
reinforces the lack of human control over social processes.208 
 In this context, Marx’s work also provides us with a fundamental insight regarding 
the connection that operates historically between the expansion of people’s control over 
nature, the transformation of human material conditions of existence and bonds of social 
interdependence, and the changing forms of orientation and mutual identification between 
people. According to Marx, accompanying the changing patterns of human global 
interdependence, people’s perspectives of themselves, the world and each other also 
undergo a transformation which is connected with the development of the division of 
labour. The overall direction of this change, in Marx’s view, is towards the development of 
more cosmopolitan perspectives of the human condition and of the relations between 
human beings, nature and society.  
 Considering human relations with nature, Marx argues that as the division of labour 
progresses, human knowledge of natural processes increases in many of its dimensions, as 
does people’s capacity to exert greater conscious control over increasingly smaller and finer 
areas of their natural metabolism. People’s relations with the non-human part of the 
universe thus become more multi-sided and specialized, and their conceptions of nature 
progressively come to contemplate it in an increasingly universal manner. The latest stage in 
this long-term process – but by no means the last – is reached with the capitalist mode of 
production, when human consciousness of nature ceases to be mere ‘nature-idolatry’ to 
instead perceive it as ‘an object for humankind’.209 While human beings at an earlier stage 
of development perceive nature as a ‘completely alien, all powerful and unassailable force, 
with which man’s relations are purely animal and by which they are overawed like beasts’, 
human relations with nature under capitalism can be characterised as more detached, being 
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focused ‘on the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws (…) so as to subjugate it under 
human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production’.210  
 If people’s conceptions of nature become more universal as they bring it under 
increasingly finer, multi-sided and conscious control, Marx argues that a similar process 
occurs in people’s mutual attunement to each other as their social bonds of 
interdependence become increasingly global and more intricate. According to Marx, as the 
division of labour increases in connection with the expansion of human control over nature, 
the products of social labour also multiply. As these products become more differentiated 
and of more diverse origin, human beings also become more interdependent with each 
other, not only in their productive activity but also in their patterns of consumption, as 
international trade grows and new socially produced needs constantly emerge. Hence, 
human social production and needs become increasingly more refined and demand global 
intercourse for their satisfaction. As Marx observes, in ‘place of old wants, satisfied by the 
production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products 
of distant lands and climates’.211 In place of the ‘old local and national seclusion and self-
sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations’.212 
The development of the division of labour thus transforms human needs and basic modes of 
orientation towards the world and gives them a more universal, multi-sided, highly refined 
and all-round character. In this context, Marx argues that as the webs of social 
interdependence become lengthier and more intricate, effectively assuming a global 
character, human intercourse also becomes progressively universal, encompassing the 
whole species. Hence, in place of local, particular individuals whose intellectual and moral 
horizons stop at the frontier of their particular political communities, the bonds of 
interdependence that the division of labour produces pose the historical emergence of 
‘world-historical’ individuals; i.e. people whose perspectives are shaped by increasingly 
cosmopolitan standards, who relate universally to nature and to the species, and whose 
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emotional identification and forms of attunement encompass increasingly wider groups of 
human beings.213  
 In this manner, Marx’s theory of history establishes a direct causal link between the 
development of human control over nature and the universalisation of people’s 
perspectives and modes of orientation. However, as we argued in the beginning of this 
subsection, this connection is not sustainable under a critical scrutiny that highlights the 
extent to which Marx attributes less causal weight in his analysis to other social processes, 
such as the development of political community and the linguistic consensualization of 
social norms, which, as we addressed in the context of our analysis of Kant’s work in the 
previous chapter, are also fundamental factors in the development of people’s perspectives 
and the universalisation of their modes of attunement. However, Marx’s work also clearly 
shows that a more adequate answer to the problem of orientation needs to combine an 
analysis of these social processes with his insights regarding the connection that operates 
between the development of the human material conditions of existence, the historical 
emergence of more detached and cosmopolitan perspectives, and the possibility of a more 
adequate assessment of how human beings can come to exercise a greater degree of 
conscious control over their conditions of existence. A more adequate means of orientation 
thus depends on a more comprehensive assessment of the role of the interplay of the triad 
of controls in the species’ history and how it is manifested in the interweaving of social 
processes that encompass human technological development, the division of labour, the 
monopolisation of force by states, the dynamics of world politics and the development of 
legal frameworks regulating human interdependence. In the next subsection, we further 
develop this argument by returning to a discussion of how Marx’s materialist and 
emergentist approach, now considered in the context of his theory of history, can be read as 
providing a non-transcendental answer to the anticipatory dimension of the problem of 
orientation.   
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2.2. The dialectical movement of history 
 
Throughout his work, Marx characterises the long-term process of human historical 
developmental as dialectical. Two main arguments can be made with reference to Marx’s 
conception of the dialectical movement of history regarding the problem of orientation. 
First, Marx’s dialectical analysis can be interpreted as a further development of his answer 
to the explanatory dimension of orientation which seeks to capture the predominant 
dynamics shaping the species’ history. And second, we argue that his dialectical conception 
of human development also expresses how Marx’s non-transcendental answer to the 
anticipatory dimension of orientation can be applied to historical analysis in a manner that 
helps constitute an orientating framework regarding how human beings might come to 
exercise a greater degree of conscious and collective control over their conditions of 
existence.  
 According to Marx, the dialectical movement of human history is exhibited in the 
fact that, at any given historical juncture, a certain pattern of social interdependence and its 
class structure – corresponding to a particular stage of development of the forces of 
production, the division of labour, the relations of production and their associated forms of 
ownership – might constitute the necessary social context for the development of human 
productive activity. However, as technology and the division of labour develop, the relations 
of production do not transform themselves automatically in order to accompany these 
changes. Instead, modes of social intercourse tend to resist change, as the classes that 
benefit from their particular pattern of relations of power and interdependence try to 
maintain them unaltered in order to protect their social status and interests. Consequently, 
the same relations of production that might have been conditions for the development of 
human productive activity in the past eventually come to constitute a barrier to its further 
development. Hence, Marx observes that a predominant pattern of human historical 
development has been that in place of an earlier ‘form of intercourse which has become a 
fetter, a new one is put, corresponding to the more developed productive forces and, 
hence, to the advanced mode of the self-activity of individuals, a form which in its turn 
becomes a fetter and is then replaced by another’.214  
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 It is Marx’s argument that the main historical manifestation of this dialectical 
movement is the social confrontation between, on the one hand, those classes whose 
position in the division of labour and relations of production enables them to own the 
means of production and who thus possess an active interest in the maintenance of the 
inherited state of affairs and, on the other hand, those classes who do not control the 
means of production and thus would benefit from a change in the predominant patterns of 
human relations of interdependence. To Marx, the transformation of the inherited social 
form can only occur if the classes interested in such a transformation are capable of carrying 
out a revolutionary overthrow of the ruling conservative classes. However, the success of 
such revolutionary movement is always conditioned by the actual development of 
productive activity and the corresponding universalisation of people’s perspectives and 
social intercourse.215 As Marx notes, only when the ‘contradiction’ between the 
development of the forces of production and the predominant relations of production in 
society has reached its zenith and, concomitant with these, a sufficient universalisation has 
been achieved of the social bond and of people’s perspectives and modes attunement to 
each other – especially between the members of those classes which lack control over the 
means of production – can a successful revolution occur.216 The revolutionary dispossessed 
classes thus need to be bound together both by their shared material conditions of 
existence and, connected with them, by their shared orientations towards the world for a 
successful revolutionary movement to occur.217 Until these objective and subjective 
conditions have been gathered historically, ‘it is absolutely immaterial whether the idea of 
revolution has been expressed a hundred times already’.218  
  As Marx argues, once a revolution is successful, a new pattern of relations of 
production is established by the revolutionary classes, which becomes the new boundary 
condition for the further development of human productive activity. Then, the whole 
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process is once again reproduced at a higher stage of development. The previously 
revolutionary classes eventually become the ruling conservative upholders of their 
established order, while other classes will come to claim a revolutionary transformation of 
society in order to actualize the immanent potential that has gathered in whatever further 
innovations have occurred at the level of human forces of production and the 
universalisation of people’s perspectives and forms of intercourse.219 
 In Marx’s view, this dialectical movement of human development is a product of the 
fact that despite each social order inaugurated by a new ruling class expressing a greater 
degree of universality both in people’s perspectives and in the expansion of the human 
powers of control over nature, still, each of them is ultimately revealed as limited in its 
character and transitions from being a condition for the development of the forces of 
production to become a fetter upon them.220 Hence, this dialectic derives mainly from the 
fact that the development of human productive capacity has hitherto remained incapable of 
solving the fundamental problem of the scarcity of the means for the overall satisfaction of 
the historically expanding needs of human beings. As such, because of these prevalent 
limitations, all revolutions that have occurred so far in the species’ history have become 
only a question of a transformation in the distribution of the product of social labour and a 
change in the distribution of labouring activity between different people.221 In this manner, 
all historical modes of production have necessarily implied the continued existence of 
relations of domination and exploitation between ruling and ruled classes, with different 
levels of access to the products of social labour and different relations to productive activity. 
As Marx observes all emancipation carried out hitherto has been based on ‘restricted’ 
productive forces.222 As such, throughout the history of the species development has been 
possible  
 ‘only if some persons satisfied their needs at the expense of others, and therefore 
some – the minority – obtained the monopoly of development, while others – the 
majority – owing to the constant struggle to satisfy their most essential needs, were 
                                                          
219
 As Linklater notes, Marx conceives of the long-term process of human development as entailing an ‘ascent 
to universality’, in the sense that universalism is an emergent product of historical development rather than a 
prior condition of human existence see: Linklater, A. Beyond Realism and Marxism, p. 35. 
220
 The dialectic of history thus possesses a ‘tragic’ element in that the historical development of freedom is 
always accompanied by its own negation. See: Linklater, A. Beyond Realism and Marxism, p. 37. 
221
 Marx, K. and Engels, F. The German Ideology, p. 60. 
222
 Marx, K. and Engels, F. The German Ideology, p. 456. 
93 
 
for the time being (i.e. until the creation of new revolutionary productive forces) 
excluded from any development’.223 
 This exposition of Marx’s analysis of the dialectic of human history allows us to more 
clearly discuss how his non-transcendental answer to the anticipatory dimension of 
orientation can be applied to an analysis of human historical development concerned with 
providing orientation to human beings as to how they can exert a greater degree of 
collective and conscious control over their conditions of existence. As seen in the first 
section, Marx maintains a normative commitment to the expansion of people’s capacity for 
self-determination and thus to their ability to make more of their history under conditions 
of their own choosing. This entails, first of all, people’s capacity to consciously control their 
metabolism with nature, and second, their capacity to collectively exert control over their 
social processes. Both of which depend on the progressive universalisation of people’s 
perspectives and modes of mutual identification as they develop more cosmopolitan and 
less parochial orientations towards each other and the non-human part of the universe. 
From the perspective of Marx’s dialectical understanding of history, this normative position 
requires a historically embedded assessment of the immanent potential, gathered at each 
particular historical juncture, for the actualisation of social relations which embody and 
enable the development of these more universal perspectives, forms of intercourse and 
relations with nature. As such, Marx’s assessment of the conditions of human self-
determination is always historically-embedded and processual, varying with the place in the 
dialectical movement of history in which the critical thinker might find him or herself at each 
particular moment. Consequently, Marx’s answer to the anticipatory dimension of 
orientation, rather than involving the establishment of a transcendental blueprint of the 
ideal conditions of freedom which are considered universally valid, is based on a historically-
contextualised normative preference for those forms of social intercourse, and those social 
classes that, at any particular moment in the history of the species, more adequately 
promote the further development of human self-determination. Hence, Marx is capable of 
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supporting, on a normative basis, a specific form of social intercourse that produces the 
conditions for the further development of human productive capacity at a particular 
historical juncture, to then come to criticize that same form of intercourse once it has 
become a barrier to the further development of the human powers of control and has 
created, immanent in it, the possibility for their further development to occur under a 
different pattern of human interdependence.224 
 In this manner, and following from what we already argued in the first section of this 
chapter, Marx’s non-transcendental answer to the anticipatory dimension of orientation not 
only appears more adequate than that found in Kant’s work to the extent that it is better 
able to connect to the empirical and historical process of human development, but also 
because it gathers the immanent potential for a multi-linear and open-ended model of the 
species’ history. Even if this potential is not actualised in Marx’s work given how his non-
transcendental approach is framed in a linear and teleological theory of history that 
reproduces the modernist forms of myth that also affect Kant’s critical theory, it opens the 
way for a historically-embedded assessment of the conditions of human freedom which, by 
being oriented to the empirical circumstances of human beings at each particular historical 
juncture, is in principle capable of encompassing different paths of human development and 
their open-ended character in a more comprehensive grand narrative of the species’ history. 
As such, we can argue that in light of our engagement with the problem of orientation, 
Marx’s non-transcendental answer to the anticipatory dimension of orientation, if framed in 
a more adequate explanatory model of human development than Marx’s theory of history, 
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points us in the direction of how to produce a means of orientation that exhibits a more 
adequate involvement–detachment balance. In other words, a means of orientation which 
is simultaneously capable of providing a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human 
condition, which is more detached from ethnocentric and parochial points of view, and 
which permits a secondary re-involvement oriented to an historically-embedded assessment 
of the conditions for human self-determination which have been gathered at each historical 
juncture and in the context of particular and diverse developmental processes whose global 
interweaving increasingly binds together all members of the species.  
 However, as we already argued above, Marx’s theory of history blocks his capacity to 
provide this more comprehensive grand narrative of human development. As this section 
has shown, his dialectical analysis is based on a linear conception that derives from his focus 
on the causal role of human productive activity in the development of the human conditions 
of existence and of people’s perspectives and modes of attunement towards each other and 
the world. The inadequacy of Marx’s theory of history as a means of orientation is clearly 
expressed in the above exposition of his argument regarding the more universal character 
of each new revolutionary class throughout history. While Marx’s observations highlight the 
role that human control over nature and the material conditions of human existence have in 
the universalisation and greater detachment of people’s perspectives, he establishes a too 
direct causal link between the two, ignoring how the emergence of more cosmopolitan 
orientations and modes of mutual attunement between people is also necessarily caught up 
with other social processes such as the development of people’s self-control over internal 
human nature or the patterns of development of inter-state competition and war. By 
disregarding these dynamics in his theory of history, Marx falls back upon a linear and 
tendentially teleological conception of human development which not only is inadequate as 
a means of orientation but reproduces a form of modernist grand narrative that hides, 
under the cover of his supposed cosmopolitanism, a highly involved and Western-centric 
perspective. As the next section shows, this tension between the immanent potential in 
Marx’s work for a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition and his linear 
theory of history is particularly evident in his critique of capitalism.  
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3. The dialectic of capitalism 
 
In this section, we discuss Marx’s critique of capitalism and show how it expresses both the 
strengths and the limitations of Marx’s work as an answer to the problem of orientation. 
Our main focus is on how Marx’s explanatory analysis of the predominant dynamics shaping 
the capitalist stage of social development informs his anticipatory assessment of the 
immanent potential it gathers for a radical expansion of the human powers of conscious 
control over nature and the global networks of human interdependence. In this context, we 
observe that Marx’s critique of capitalism promotes a more cosmopolitan orientation on the 
basis of which people can better attune to each other on a species-wide scale and develop 
forms of mutual empathy which overcome particularistic points of view and which Marx 
considers to be fundamental for human beings to more consciously navigate the future 
stages of the global integration of the species and reduce the exploitative and demeaning 
character of their social bonds. However, we also argue that Marx’s linear theory of history 
– based on a direct causal connection between the expansion of human control over nature 
and the universalisation of people’s perspectives – actually throws his analysis of capitalism 
back upon a more involved perspective which proves to be more society and time bound 
than what Marx anticipates. As we argue throughout this section, this is particularly evident 
in Marx’s usage of the concept civilisation in this context. Similarly to Kant, Marx shifts 
between a more static and a more processual conception of civilisation, however, unlike 
Kant, the latter understanding of the concept tends to predominate. As such, Marx 
conceives of civilisation predominantly as being connected with a specific stage of human 
development, when human productive activity, technological development, and 
cosmopolitan orientations have attained a certain level of expression. In the absence of a 
more detached and technical usage of the concept – and even though Marx does not 
characterise capitalism as the pinnacle of civilisation – there is an inherent distinction in 
Marx’s work between the ‘barbaric’ peoples who have not yet reached the capitalist stage 
of development and the ‘civilised’ Western capitalist nations. Marx’s discussion of 
civilisation in his critique of capitalism thus clearly expresses the involved and Western-
centric perspective to which his linear theory of history leads him and how, immanent in it, 
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is a legitimation of practices of domination and exclusion of alternative paths of human 
development and self-expression.225  
 For the purpose of clarity our analysis is divided into two subsections. First, we 
address the connection between capitalist development and the expansion of the human 
powers of control over their metabolism with nature, and second, we address its connection 
with the development of human control over social processes and the networks of 
interdependence of globalised humanity. 
 
3.1. The conscious control of the human natural metabolism 
 
As Marx notes in the ‘Grundrisse’, one of the defining features of capitalism as a specific 
form of organization of human production and social intercourse is that it ‘posits the 
production of wealth itself, and hence the universal development of the productive forces, 
(…) as the presupposition of its reproduction’.226 Capitalism’s wealth appears in the form of 
a constant process of accumulation of capital, a process which is expressed in the 
continuous search, on the part of the bourgeois class, to expand both productive capacity 
and commercial intercourse throughout the globe, selling products on the world market at a 
profit which is then turned into capital by being reinvested into the productive process in 
order to generate yet further capital. According to Marx, three historical conditions are 
essential to ensure the continued reproduction of capitalism. First, the class of proletarians 
needs to be socially compelled to engage in productive activity, with workers selling their 
labour-power in exchange of a wage which is then used to buy the products for the 
satisfaction of their historically developing needs on the world market. Second, the 
productive process itself needs to be characterized by the constant development of the 
forces of production, so that an increased proliferation of products is produced in less time 
and with lower cost. And third, the world market needs to be constantly expanding, creating 
increasingly wider and more interdependent webs of production and trade throughout the 
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globe, which simultaneously respond to, and develop, human needs for the objects of an 
increasingly multi-sided, specialized and multifarious social production. This constant 
capitalist urge for the development of the forces of production is expressed in the ‘universal 
appropriation of nature’ and in the use of science in order to discover ‘new things of use as 
well as new useful qualities of the old’.227  
 As such, capitalism implies a radical universalisation of human relations with nature, 
marked by its multi-sided exploration and transformation, accompanied by a growing 
division of labour and the industrialization of productive activity. The human natural 
metabolism is laid open to a greater degree of conscious regulation through the 
development of the natural sciences and technology as well as of increasingly more 
specialized tools and industrial processes, which ‘reveal the great civilising influence of 
capital’.228 This influence is further expressed by the fact that capitalism develops the 
general industriousness of the proletariat by locking the satisfaction of people’s needs to 
the sale of their labour-power and their engagement in the productive process of society. As 
such, capitalism develops not only the technological side but also the human side of the 
productive forces, as it ‘incessantly whips labour onward with its unlimited mania for wealth 
(…) driving it beyond the limits of its natural paltriness’.229 
 Furthermore, Marx’s analysis of the main dynamics shaping the capitalist stage of 
human development also leads him to argue that, by requiring the constant development of 
the forces of production for its reproduction, capitalism implies not only a radical historical 
growth of the human powers of control over nature but also gathers the potential for a 
fundamental transformation of the human condition, characterised by a more conscious 
regulation of the human natural metabolism and by the future possibility of diminishing the 
condition of scarcity and limited productive capacity which has defined the long-term 
history of the species on the planet. As he observes, one of the main expression of the 
civilising thrust of capital is its ever growing division of labour that ‘gradually transforms the 
worker’s operations into more and more mechanical ones, so that at a certain point a 
mechanism can step into their place’.230 Hence, what was the living worker’s activity 
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‘becomes the activity of the machine’.231 The worker effectively ‘inserts the process of 
nature, transformed into an industrial process, as a means between him and inorganic 
nature, mastering it, (…) he steps to the side of the production process instead of being its 
chief actor’.232 By directing and integrating natural processes into the production process, 
humans collectively acquire a greater degree of control over their metabolism with nature.  
 However, the most radical innovation of this development is that they not only 
exponentially increase their productive capacity, but also open up the possibility for the 
progressive automation of the production process, with significant implications. On the one 
hand, the role of individuals in the production process progressively shifts from direct labour 
in the transformation of nature to assume a more ‘supervisory and regulatory role’, implying 
predominantly the development of the ‘powers of the human head’, i.e. the development of 
scientific knowledge in all of its dimensions and its application to new technology.233 On the 
other hand, labour changes not only qualitatively but also quantitatively. As the human 
forces of production grow, and the scientific appropriation of nature into the production 
process becomes more prevalent and expressed in the growing automation of industry, so 
too the amount of necessary labour on the part of each worker, required for the satisfaction 
of society’s ever expanding needs, diminishes.234 Capitalism thus creates the possibility for a 
radical diminution of the labour time individuals have to dedicate daily not only to the 
reproduction, but also to the development, of their conditions of existence. With the 
historical emergence of large industry, the creation of ‘real wealth’ – not measured in 
capital but rather in the proliferation of products for the satisfaction of human needs – 
comes to ‘depend less on labour time and on the amount of labour employed, than on the 
power of the agencies set in motion during labour time, whose effectiveness (…) depends 
on the general state of science and (…) technology, and their application (…) to 
production’.235 It is thus one ‘of the civilising aspects of capital that it (…) creates the 
material means and the nucleus for relations that permit (…) a greater reduction of the 
overall time devoted to material labour’.236  
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 As such, according to Marx, capitalism gathers the historical conditions for a radical 
expansion of human self-determination expressed in the universalisation of people’s 
relations with nature and in the development of their capacity to consciously control their 
natural metabolism in a manner that guarantees both the growth of human productive 
powers and the possibility of reducing the time that people have to dedicate directly to the 
activity of labour in order to satisfy their needs, even under conditions of historically 
expanding societal needs. As Marx argues, and it is worth quoting at length,  
 ‘the real realm of freedom really begins only where labour determined by necessity and 
external expediency ends; it lies by its very nature beyond the sphere of material 
production proper. Just as the savage must wrestle with nature to satisfy his needs, (…) so 
must civilised man, and he must do so in all forms of society under all possible modes of 
production. This realm of natural necessity expands with his development, because his 
needs do too; but the productive forces to satisfy these expand at the same time. Freedom, 
in this sphere, can only consist in (…) governing the human metabolism with nature in a 
rational way, bringing it under their collective control (…) accomplishing it with the least 
expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate for their human 
nature. But this always remains a realm of necessity. The true realm of freedom, the 
development of human powers as an end in itself, begins only beyond it, though it can only 
flourish with this realm of necessity as its basis. The reduction off the working day is the 
basic prerequisite’.237 
However, in keeping with his dialectical conception of human historical development, Marx 
also observes that although capitalism holds the immanent potential for a radical expansion 
of freedom, it also comes to historically deny its full actualization. In particular, Marx argues 
that as the productive capacity of society becomes more and more disproportionate in 
relation to the amount of labour that needs to be input in the production process, the need 
to labour for long hours is significantly reduced for a part of the population given the 
growing automation of industry. However, since capitalism presupposes the intermediation 
of money – in the form of a wage paid in exchange of proletarians selling their labour-power 
to the bourgeois class to access the products of social labour being sold on the world market 
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– the reduction of labour time, instead of posing the emancipation of individuals, implies 
the reduction of their means of interchange to access the products that satisfy their 
needs.238 As such, while capitalism poses potential universal abundance and growth of free 
time, the social relations of production on which it stands imply that these civilisational 
achievements turn into their opposite, i.e. the pauperisation of the proletarians and the 
perception of free time as a curse instead of a liberation.239 
 According to Marx, capitalism cannot avoid this dialectical contradiction. Avoiding it 
would imply the supersession of the wage-form tied to labour time as the dominant mode 
of regulation of the access to the products of social labour. Capitalism cannot achieve such 
supersession given that the constant accumulation of capital is fundamentally dependent on 
continuously selling an increasing abundance of privatised products to the proletarians. And 
while each individual capitalist may wish that all the other capitalists pay better wages and 
employ increasing numbers of people – and thus create the social conditions for the sale of 
his or her products – each capitalist’s accumulation of capital is also dependent on the 
reduction of his or her own production costs, which is achieved through the development of 
the forces of production so as to shorten the amount of labour required and thus the 
amount of wages paid. Consequently, as a social class, the bourgeoisie constantly strives to 
attain two contradictory goals. One the one hand, the further development of the forces of 
production and the reduction of labour time and, on the other hand, the simultaneous 
increase of social consumption mediated by the wage-form. As Marx observes, capitalism is 
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a ‘moving contradiction in that it presses to reduce labour time to a minimum, while it 
posits labour time, on the other side, as the sole measure and source of wealth’.240  
 The dialectic of the capitalist stage of human development is thus expressed in the 
fact that ‘all the progress of civilisation’ – in Marx’s more involved sense – ‘such as results 
from science, inventions, division and combination of labour, improved means of 
communication, creation of the world market, machinery etc., enriches not the worker but 
rather capital’.241 Being the social measuring rod of wealth, capital subsumes everything to 
its single-minded quest for growth. The development of the forces of production, the 
scientific control of nature, and human beings themselves, all become means for the 
ultimate end of capital.  As Marx argues, human relations are thus inverted, as the subjects 
of history – people – become merely the means for the growth of the objects they 
themselves have created and the social forces they have unleashed; i.e. capital and the 
capitalist mode of social and productive organization. Under capitalism, the whole 
development of civilisation proceeds ‘in a contradictory way’ in that the growth of the 
productive forces, of general wealth and knowledge, appear in such a way that individuals 
relate to them not as ‘their own’ but as an ‘alien’ force.242  
 According to Marx, capitalism thus comes to eventually pose itself as a historical 
barrier to the actualisation of the immanent potential it has created for the further 
development of human self-determination. The need to continuously tie the growth of 
capital to wage-labour, and the prevalence of competitive relations between capitalists and 
between workers in the process of social production, implies not only that developments 
such as the automation of industry cannot occur beyond a certain point on risk of disrupting 
the whole mode of social and productive organization founded on capital, but also that 
important technological and scientific innovations, whose very character makes them 
incapable of being subsumed to capitalist relations, end up not being developed. As such, 
beyond a certain stage, Marx argues, ‘capital, i.e. wage labour, enters into the same 
historical relation towards the development of social wealth and the forces of production as 
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the guild system, serfdom and slavery’.243 It shows itself to be a ‘barrier’, a ‘fetter’ and that 
it ‘is becoming senile and has further and further outlived its epoch’.244  
 By addressing Marx’s critique of capitalism in what regards human relations with 
non-human nature from the perspective of our inquiry into the problem of orientation we 
can argue that it constitutes an attempt at providing an orientating framework on the basis 
of which people might better understand the connection between the development of 
capitalism and that of their capacity to more consciously control their metabolism with 
external nature. As such, when read as a means of orientation, Marx’s analysis of capitalism 
shows itself capable of simultaneously, and on the same normative basis, orientating people 
towards supporting the development of capitalism or towards calling for its abolition, in 
accordance with the historical point of view from which they are making their anticipatory 
assessment of the conditions for the expansion of the human powers of conscious control. 
From the point of view of a stage of human development characterised by an absence of 
industrial production and the natural sciences, the development of capitalism appears to be 
highly emancipatory in what concerns people’s relations with nature, expanding the human 
powers of self-determination over their natural conditions of existence. On the other hand, 
from the point of view of a stage of human development in which capitalism is becoming a 
barrier to the further automation of industry and to a more conscious regulation of the 
human natural metabolism, the same normative commitment to the expansion of human 
self-determination leads Marx to orientate people towards the abolition of capitalism and 
its substitution with a mode of social production which is more adequate for the 
actualisation of the immanent potential that capitalism has gathered for the further 
development of the human powers of conscious control. The non-transcendental answer to 
the anticipatory dimension of orientation which can be found in Marx’s work thus expresses 
a more adequate involvement–detachment balance in its perspective of the conditions of 
existence of globalised humanity. It does so to the extent that, on the one hand, it provides 
a more detached and less time-bound assessment of the conditions of human freedom – by 
understanding it as part of a long-term developmental process – and, on the other hand, it 
is based on a historically-embedded assessment of the immanent potential that each 
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particular moment in the history of the species has gathered for the further development of 
human self-determination.  
 However, as we argue in the next subsection, the adequacy of Marx’s answer to the 
anticipatory dimension of orientation in what regards human relations with non-human 
nature comes to be undermined by his linear theory of history and the way in which it 
conceives of the connection between capitalism and the development of human control 
over social processes.  
 
3.2. The global self-determination of the species 
 
As mentioned in section two, Marx considers that the predominant direction in the history 
of the species has been towards the growth of the universality of human intercourse 
accompanying the development of the division of labour, a process which, according to 
Marx, reaches a truly global character under capitalism. In this context, we can argue that 
Marx’s analysis of the universalisation of human relations and perspectives under capitalism 
is particularly evident of the limitations of his linear theory of history and its inadequacy as a 
means of orientation. In particular, its theoretically established linear and causal connection 
between the development of human control over nature and the universalisation of 
individual orientations leads Marx to consider that the globalisation of the capitalist mode 
of production, by reproducing the same material conditions of existence across the whole 
species, also reproduces globally the same basic patterns of social relations and individual 
identities, perspectives and forms of attunement between people. This linear and 
homogenising conception of capitalist globalisation becomes particularly evident in Marx’s 
usage of the concept of civilisation. While Marx’s assertion that capitalism brings the whole 
species under a global civilising process might strike a correct note, his more involved 
conception of the term leads him to characterise that global civilising process as entailing 
the reproduction, on a species-wide scale, of the basic pattern of Western civilisation in a 
manner that tramples all previous, localised, and less developed forms of human self-
expression.  
 This is evident in Marx’s argument in ‘The Communist Manifesto’ that the 
improvement of the means of production and communication under capitalism has enabled 
the conquest of space and time and brought the whole species, ‘even the most barbarian 
105 
 
nations, into civilisation’.245 Capitalism, in keeping with its conditions of reproduction ‘tears 
down every spatial barrier to intercourse and conquers the whole Earth for its market’.246 In 
the process, it ‘batters down all Chinese walls’ and forces all particular, self-contained 
expressions of humanity to ‘capitulate’ and to adopt, ‘on pain of extinction’ the capitalist 
mode of production.247 It thus ‘creates a world after its own image’ and reproduces, 
globally, the same conditions of existence that are verified in its place of birth, Western 
Europe.248 According to Marx, the subsumption of the whole species under a single global 
civilisation is an inherently dialectical process. On the one hand, it entails extreme violence, 
as large sections of humanity are brutally colonized and forced to integrate the global 
market and feed capital’s growth. Previously self-contained modes of life are disrupted and 
outright destroyed, as all human societies are forcefully subsumed under the capitalist 
mode of production and social organisation. Millions of human beings are victims of 
dislocations, exploitation and domination as they are integrated into the global market as 
colonized subjects, either directly by Western colonial powers or indirectly, by seeing their 
patterns of life reshaped according to capitalist standards.249 However, on the other hand, 
by producing world spanning webs of human interdependence, and integrating the whole 
species in a single global civilisation, capitalism also produces the conditions for further 
civilisational development and the expansion of human self-determination. In particular, 
Marx notes that the universality of human intercourse brought about by capitalism and 
structured by the world market establishes the historical basis for the emergence of world-
historical individuals, human beings whose perspectives of the world and personal 
attunement towards other people assume a truly cosmopolitan character.250  
 In this context, Marx argues that the world market and the global networks of 
production, trade and consumption it establishes between industrial communities of 
proletarians in different countries, generates a material bond between each individual 
worker and the whole species in a manner that cultivates, amongst the workers of the 
world, an hitherto unknown cosmopolitan orientation towards the human condition and 
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powers of production.251 In Marx’s view, the historical emergence of a truly cosmopolitan 
outlook amongst the most dispossessed and exploited individuals in the class structure of 
world capitalist society constitutes the basis for the formation of bonds of solidarity and 
mutual identification based on common humanity rather than on membership of 
particularistic communities.252  
 However, from the perspective of our inquiry, Marx’s argument in this regard can be 
said to imply too quick a connection between the globalisation of the material conditions of 
human existence and the universalisation of people’s perspectives and modes of 
attunement. His predominant dismissal of the role of social processes such as state 
formation and world politics in the development of capitalism itself and of people’s personal 
identities and forms of orientation leads Marx to a conception of the human conditions of 
existence under capitalism which is inadequate as a means of orientation. On the one hand, 
from the point of view of the explanatory dimension of orientation, it ignores the multi-
linear and open-ended character of human development and the multiple expressions that 
capitalism can assume in different cultural and societal contexts under the influence of 
different processes of formation of political community, of different forms of linguistically 
established legal regulation of human interdependence and of different patterns of inter-
societal relations of cooperation and conflict. On the other hand, from the point of view of 
the anticipatory dimension of orientation, it is inadequate in so far as it leads Marx to a 
diagnosis of the immanent potential that capitalism has gathered for the further 
development of the human powers of control which, by ignoring the fundamental plurality 
of humankind, opens the way for the historical emergence of new forms of domination and 
exclusion in the name of cosmopolitanism and the emancipation of the species.  
 This latter aspect becomes particularly evident in Marx’s analysis of the dialectical 
relation between capitalism and the development of the human capacity to bring social 
processes under greater collective and conscious control. According to Marx, in keeping 
with its dialectical character, all of the civilising developments that capitalism produces in 
terms of the universalisation of the human social bond appear to the people caught up in 
them as not their own doing, but as an alien power that determines their existence. The 
proletarians’ global cooperative production, by assuming the form of a forced subsumption 
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to the interest of capital accumulation, does not appear as ‘their own united power, but as 
an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant’.253 
The first world-historical individuals are thus unable to control their own conditions of 
existence and direct their global co-operation to the satisfaction of human needs and the 
reduction of necessary labour time. Instead, the ‘broadening’ of human activity into world-
historical activity becomes ‘more and more enslaved under (…) a power which has become 
more and more enormous and, in the last instance turns out to be the world market’.254  As 
such, capitalism despite gathering, for the first time in history, the material, social and 
subjective conditions for the development of a global civilisation based on human co-
operation and solidary, which would enable people everywhere, united as a species, to 
more consciously control their social development and the future conditions of human 
existence on Earth, also ultimately denies the actualisation of this potential for human self-
determination. 
 This profound dialectical contradiction of capitalism, between the historical potential 
it gathers for the radical expansion of human self-determination and the barrier it 
constitutes to its actualisation, ‘sets existing individuals a very definitive task’, that of seizing 
the immanent potentials with which capitalism is ‘pregnant’ in order to ‘replace the 
domination of circumstances and chance over individuals by the domination of individuals 
over chance and circumstances’.255 The actualisation of this immanent potential, Marx 
observes, will not come about automatically by the natural development of capitalist 
relations. Instead, it demands the conscious and collective appropriation of the universal 
social bond and the planned transformation of capitalism into the next higher stage of 
civilisation, variously described by Marx as ‘socialism’ or ‘communism’.256 Essential in this 
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context is the conscious ‘transformation of capital back into the property of the producers, 
though no longer as the private property of individual producers, but rather as their 
property as associated producers, as direct social property’.257 Only in this manner, argues 
Marx, can wage-labour be abolished and, with it, the class relations that give capitalism its 
contradictory character. Such transformation implies a revolution in human being’s relations 
with nature and with one another, both as individuals and as members of the human 
species; a revolution which, in Marx’s view, can only be brought about by the truly world-
historical individuals emerging out of the capitalist process of production, the proletarians. 
Only proletarians, as a social class, gather both the objective and subjective conditions to 
carry this revolution forth, given their truly cosmopolitan character as a consequence of the 
deep interdependence of both their productive activity and their conditions of life with the 
global social bond of the species.  
 However, despite Marx’s grand vision of a global proletarian revolution ushering the 
species into a global civilisation based on universal empathy, the diminution of scarcity and 
a more conscious regulation of the human natural metabolism, when addressed from the 
perspective of our engagement with the problem of orientation this vision also appears 
highly problematic. Despite Marx’s analysis of capitalism clearly striving for a more 
cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition which can better attune people to both 
the reality and the potential of their global interdependence, his reliance on a linear theory 
of history actually leads him to fall back upon a more involved perspective which remains 
locked in the historical point of view of Western modernity. In particular, by ignoring the 
role of the monopolisation of force by the state and of inter-societal relations in the 
development of capitalism and in the long-term history of the species, Marx remains 
incapable of capturing the multiple potential paths of human development and of 
recognising the fundamental diversity of humankind and of people’s modes of existence and 
orientation, even when sharing the global conditions of interdependence brought about by 
the capitalist world market.  Marx thus advances a set of false assumptions regarding how 
the similarity of material conditions of existence across the world to those of the oldest 
capitalist nations also means that the perspectives and modes of orientation of people 
belonging to the class of proletarians is the same everywhere. In this manner, Marx elevates 
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the Western-centric world-views of the proletarians of the Western nations to a condition 
of universality, as representative of a truly human and cosmopolitan perspective shared by 
all human beings occupying the same position in the global networks of capitalist 
interdependence. A confusion that leads Marx’s work to inherently legitimise practices of 
exclusion of difference and domination over non-Western modes of human self-expression 
in the name of the supposedly universal orientation of the Western proletariat and its 
historical role to bring about world proletarian revolution and the cosmopolitan future of 
the species. As such, and as we argue in greater depth in the next section, our reading of 
Marx’s work and his critique of capitalism clearly indicates that while it holds the potential 
for a more adequate answer to the problem of orientation, this potential is also ultimately 
frustrated and substituted by a linear grand narrative that ultimately reveals Marx’s more 
involved and Western-centric perspective.  
 
4. The plurality of the human condition 
 
Throughout this chapter we have argued that Marx’s materialist and emergentist approach 
to the long-term process of human development opens the way to a non-transcendental, 
multi-linear and open-ended answer to the problem of orientation which would prove to be 
more adequate and less prone to the reproduction of modernist myths than Kant’s critical 
approach. However, we also noted that the same materialist approach which gathers this 
potential in Marx’s work, ultimately denies his capacity to actualise it, given how it leads 
Marx to over-focus on human productive activity and give it causal primacy in a linear 
theory of the history of the species. In this section, we return to this argument in light of 
Benhabib’s, Andrew Davenport’s and Linklater’s comments on Marx’s work. These authors’ 
analyses enable us to support our argument that a more adequate answer to the problem of 
orientation needs to build upon Marx’s work and combine its main strengths with the 
Kantian themes that the previous chapter identified as fundamental in the attainment of a 
more cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition. In particular, it needs to fulfil three 
main objectives. First, it needs to retain Marx’s numerous insights regarding the role of 
human control over external nature in the long-term process of human development, as 
well as his historically-embedded and processual assessment of the conditions of human 
freedom. Second, it needs to combine these Marxian themes with a Kantian assessment of 
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the role of human self-control over internal human nature, as well as the role of the 
linguistic consensualization of social norms, of state formation and of world politics in the 
development of people’s perspectives and basic modes of attunement towards each other 
and the world. And third, it needs to combine these two perspectives on the basis of a 
multi-linear and open-ended model of the species’ history, which provides a more 
comprehensive understanding of the interplay of the triad of basic controls in its context, 
and thus avoids both of these authors’ linear and teleological conceptions of human 
development and their inherent reproduction of modernist grand narratives.  
 Moving on to our analysis of these authors’ critiques of Marx’s work, we can argue 
that Benhabib points to the fundamental problem of Marx’s critical approach when read as 
an answer to the problem of orientation. According to Benhabib, Marx’s work embodies 
what she describes as a ‘philosophy of the subject’, which entails four main conceptions. 
First, it poses a unitary model of human activity; second, it understands history as 
constituted by the activities of a unitary subject; third, it views history as the unfolding of 
the capacities of this subject; and fourth, it implies a conception of human self-
determination as this subject’s ‘coming to consciousness’.258 As Benhabib observes, these 
four aspects of the philosophy of the subject are evident in Marx’s assumption that the 
emancipation of the proletariat expresses the emancipation of humankind itself, given how 
‘the specific interests of this class correspond to the universal interests of humanity’.259 
However, Benhabib argues that the underlying assumptions supporting Marx’s argument 
are ‘faulty’.260  
 In her view, Marx’s claim that there is a subject of history to whom we can ascribe 
collective interests rests on a confusion of empirical and normative categories.261 It is a 
result of the theoretical equivalence that Marx establishes between, on the one hand, his 
empirical identification of the historical emergence of humanity as a unit of social analysis – 
given the growing global interdependence of all human beings and societies – and, on the 
other hand, his normative assumption that human global interdependence represents the 
emergence of truly human and worldwide forms of solidarity and orientation. As we saw 
above, it derives from Marx’s assessment that human beings enmeshed in these global 
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webs of interdependence brought about by capitalism are subject to the same material 
conditions of existence everywhere, and thus necessarily develop increasingly more 
universal perspectives and form universal bonds of mutual identification which encompass 
all the other members of the species.  
 In this context, Benhabib shares our assessment that this is a flawed theoretical 
equivalence which rests on Marx’s establishment of a direct causal connection between the 
material conditions of human existence and the development of human identities and basic 
forms of orientation in the world; a connection which, Benhabib argues, arises from Marx’s 
‘focus on work’ as the main expression of human historical activity. It is her argument that 
Marx’s conception of work is a ‘monological one’ which ‘privileges the subject-object 
relations and abstracts from the dimension of subject-subject relations and from the social 
context of action’.262 While Marx recognises the inherently social character of labour, his 
focus on the material dimension of labouring activity leads him to ignore the extent to 
which human actions, perspectives and basic modes of orientation are ‘linguistically 
mediated’ insofar as ‘not only are what we as agents see as our purposes or wishes in the 
world linguistically formulated, but (…) others can understand what we do and who we are 
[only] insofar as our actions can be retold by them as a story, as a narrative’.263 Human 
conditions of existence are thus constituted not only by the material circumstances of the 
species, but also by the ‘web of interpretations’ that shapes human perspectives at any 
given moment.264  
 As such, in Benhabib’s assessment, Marx’s over-focus on a model of work which 
ignores this linguistic dimension of the human condition leads him ‘away from a politics of 
intersubjectivity to a politics of collective singularity’ and to the assumption that a single 
class can act as the representative of the collective, singular entity ‘humanity’.265 Marx’s 
critical approach leads him to ‘deny human plurality’ and how human interests do not arise 
from a singular collectivity of mind, shared by the whole species, but rather from the 
intermeshing and deliberative consensualization of what ‘struggling social actors themselves 
come to recognise as their own common goals and desires’.266 From such a point of view, no 
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social class can ever be understood as representing a truly universal interest or perspective. 
As Benhabib concludes, Marx’s over-emphasis on human productive activity, to the 
detriment of the role of language in human identity formation and modes of orientation, 
leads him to conceptually ‘shift from the plural to the collectively singular, from humans to 
humanity’.267 In this manner, his conception of human historical development as the 
actualisation of the human powers of self-determination comes to refer not to the 
actualisation of human beings’ capacity to more consciously and collectively control their 
conditions of existence in a manner which recognises the multiple forms of human self-
expression, but rather entails a conception in which history is the actualisation of a unitary 
model of human existence, and where a specific conception of humanity is understood as 
the ‘goal’ or the ‘telos’ of the long-term process of human historical development.268  
 Benhabib’s critique not only echoes our arguments regarding the shortcomings of 
Marx’s work, but can also be seen to support our assessment of how a more adequate 
means of orientation has to encompass an analysis of the role of state formation and world 
politics in the history of the species. Her argument regarding Marx’s lack of awareness of 
how human perspectives and collective interests depend both on the material conditions of 
human existence and on the clash between the different points of view of struggling actors 
enmeshed in a ‘web of interpretations’ takes us to a consideration of how this web is 
composed by people who are members of self-regarding political communities and 
structured by cross-border encounters and conflicts between them. It points us to the 
argument that the plurality of the human condition depends also on the long-term 
developmental patterns of world politics and the way processes of state formation and war 
have shaped both the development of capitalism and of more or less cosmopolitan modes 
of orientation at the level of people’s personality structures.  
 As Davenport notes, in the absence of a study of world politics, Marx remains 
incapable of conceiving how humanity ‘has always been divided into, and organised itself 
into, communities, of one sort or another, that are inherently limited and pluralistic, 
creating group identities, insiders and outsiders, friends and enemies, countrymen and 
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foreigners’.269 As such, Marx’s conception of unified humanity becoming the subject of 
history with the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism at the hands of truly universal human 
beings embodied in the proletariat of each nation constantly loses sight of the perennial 
condition of human multiplicity, and its consequences in terms of people’s capacity for 
global co-ordination and the self-determination of the species.270 It leads, according to 
Linklater, to an ‘ossified’ vision of universal socialism and to a conception of the rise and fall 
of modes of production which ‘largely ignores’ non-class-based modes of exclusion and 
leaves ‘unanswered’ important questions regarding the future role of the state and the 
institutions of international society in addressing the ‘tenacity’ of nationalism and war.271 As 
such, Linklater argues, Marxism ‘fails as a critical theory because it believes that 
reconstructing property relations is tantamount to transforming political community’.272 A 
more adequate approach thus requires the recognition that what Marx regards as the 
‘central axis’ of human development is just ‘one instance of a broader phenomenon’.273 
 From the perspective of our inquiry, Benhabib, Davenport and Linklater’s comments 
on Marx’s work point to fundamental shortcomings in the adequacy of his theoretical 
framework as a means of orientation. They show that, despite the potential that Marx’s 
materialist and emergentist approach gathers for the development of a multi-linear and 
open-ended model of human development, his conceptual over-emphasis on human 
productive activity and control over nature throws him back upon a linear and tendentially 
teleological conception of the history of the species. In this manner, Marx not only fails to 
actualise the immanent potential in his critical approach for a more cosmopolitan grand 
narrative, but actually reproduces the same type of modernist myth which undermines the 
adequacy of Kant’s work as a means of orientation. By producing a unitary model of human 
development which leads to the assumption that a global civilising process brought about by 
capitalism effectively abolishes human difference and reproduces the same conditions of 
existence everywhere on the planet, Marx not only ignores the diversity of the species and 
how, even under of global interdependence, human self-expression is multiple and varied, 
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but he does so in a way that inherently legitimizes practices of domination, exclusion and 
violence envisioning the elimination of difference in the name of humanity. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our discussion of Marx’s work as an answer to the problem of orientation has led us to 
several conclusions. It highlighted how Marx’s materialist and emergentist approach to 
human development gathers the potential for a more adequate answer to both dimensions 
of orientation in so far as it enables an anticipatory, non-transcendental, historically-
embedded and processual assessment of the conditions of human self-determination and 
opens the way for an explanatory model of human history which captures its multi-linear 
and open-ended character. As we have argued throughout the chapter, a theoretical 
framework which actualises this potential would be able to attain a more cosmopolitan 
perspective on the human condition on the basis of which people might more adequately 
orientate themselves in acquiring a better understanding of their conditions of existence 
and how to exercise a greater degree of conscious and collective control over them.   
 However, our analysis of Marx’s work has also highlighted several shortcomings 
which are instructive for our inquiry. In particular, it has shown the inadequacy of the 
establishment of relations of causal linearity as an explanatory framework regarding the 
long-term process of human development. In Marx’s case, this becomes evident through an 
assessment of the extent to which his theoretical focus on human productive activity and 
control over nature leads him to establish too quick and direct a connection with changes 
occurring at the level of people’s personality structures, and basic perspectives of the world 
and forms of mutual identification. In the process, Marx ignores the concomitant role that 
social phenomena such as the development of human self-control, the linguistic 
consensualization of social norms regulating human interdependence, the formation of 
state monopolies of force, and inter-societal relations of competition and cooperation have 
in the history of the species and in the development of the human capacity to more bring 
unplanned processes under greater conscious regulation. The absence of a more 
comprehensive and multi-causal understanding of how the triad of controls has shaped the 
long-term process of human development at the various levels of people’s relations with 
themselves, with non-human nature and with the social processes which they constitute, 
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locks Marx in a linear theory of history which blocks his capacity to actualise the immanent 
potential in his work and substitutes it with a more involved perspective, bound to the point 
of view of Western modernity. Consequently, Marx’s work ends up embodying a modernist 
form of grand narrative which is dismissive of human plurality, and ignores the role of 
several dynamics and social processes shaping the history of the species. 
 This conclusion has led us, in section four of this chapter, to argue that both the 
potentials and the shortcomings of Marx’s work point us in the direction of how a more 
adequate response to the problem of orientation might be developed which better attunes 
people to the reality of their global interconnectedness. In particular, we observed that it 
would have to assume the form of a theoretical framework which brings Marxian and 
Kantian themes together in a manner that captures the interplay between the different 
dimensions of the triad of controls and actualises the immanent potential in Marx’s critical 
theory for a multi-linear and open-ended explanatory model of the species’ history and for 
an anticipatory non-transcendental assessment of the conditions of human freedom.  
 In the following four chapters of this study, we inquire into how such a means of 
orientation can be developed. In the next two chapters, we address Habermas’s work and 
his reconstruction of Marx’s critical approach as the most comprehensive example, in 
critical theory, of an attempt to achieve a higher synthesis between Marxian and Kantian 
perspectives on human development. There, we argue that even though Habermas is 
successful in recovering the role of language, the state and inter-state relations in the 
species’ history, he does so, on a theoretical basis which reproduces a transcendental, linear 
and teleological answer to the problem of orientation and is thus found inadequate.  
 This conclusion leads us to the final two chapters of this study, where we carry out a 
detour from the critical theoretical tradition to engage with Elias’s process sociology. There, 
we argue that Elias’s more detached approach to the long-term history of the species can be 
read as a more adequate answer to the explanatory dimension of the problem of 
orientation. However, that same emphasis on detachment also blocks Elias’s capacity to 
provide a more adequate engagement with its anticipatory dimension, and the question of 
how human beings might make more of their history under conditions of their own 
choosing. As such, the final chapter of this study argues for the need of a higher synthesis 
between process sociology and critical theory, which would constitute a more adequate 
answer to both dimensions of the problem of orientation.  
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Chapter Four 
Jürgen Habermas 
Evolutionary logic and historical dynamics 
 
In the previous chapter we argued that Marx’s work points us in the direction of a non-
transcendental, multi-linear and open-ended approach to the long-term process of human 
development which could achieve a more cosmopolitan perspective on the conditions of 
existence of globalised humanity and thus constitute a more adequate answer to the 
problem of orientation. However, we also noted how Marx’s one-sided emphasis on human 
productive activity ultimately leads him to reproduce a linear model of the history of the 
species. This model poses a form of modernist myth which hides, under the veil of its 
expressed cosmopolitanism and its universal commitment to human self-determination, a 
more involved perspective which legitimizes relations of domination, exclusion and violence 
envisioning the subsumption of human difference to a single global model of ‘civilised’ 
society. As such, we concluded, Marx’s theoretical framework is inadequate as an answer to 
either the explanatory or the anticipatory dimensions of the problem of orientation. This 
conclusion led us to argue, at the end of the previous chapter, that a more adequate 
cosmopolitan means of orientation could be found through a theoretical framework which 
brought together Kantian and Marxian themes on the basis of a more comprehensive 
understanding of the role of the interplay between the different dimensions of the triad of 
controls in human development. 
 In this chapter and the following one, we read Habermas’s work as the latest and 
most comprehensive attempt, within critical theory, to provide an adequate answer to the 
problem of orientation. Habermas is distinguishable from other critical theorists in the post-
war period insofar as he maintains a commitment to the production of grand narratives 
which find their inspiration in the project for a self-reflexive Enlightenment – of which Kant 
and Marx can be read as a part of – envisioning the development of theoretical frameworks 
which enable a cosmopolitan study of the human condition and attune people both to the 
challenges and the opportunities of their global history and how they might more 
consciously navigate the future stages of their global integration. Habermas’s multi-
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disciplinary approach is evidence of this project, as his work weaves together several 
strands of thought, from pragmatism to critical theory, and encompasses very diverse 
authors such as Émile Durkheim, Max Weber, Herbert Mead, Talcott Parsons or Lawrence 
Kohlberg. In this study, we are particularly interested in highlighting how Habermas’s work 
synthesises several Marxian and Kantian themes in a single theoretical framework which 
strives to retain these authors’ most important insights regarding the long-term process of 
human development, while overcoming what Habermas sees as their most significant 
shortcomings; namely, the foundation of their respective critical approaches in a philosophy 
of history and a philosophy of the subject.  
 Our main argument in these two chapters is that Habermas’s critical theory indeed 
produces a theoretical framework which is capable of providing a more comprehensive 
understanding of the interplay between the three dimensions of the triad of basic controls; 
one which escapes Marx’s reductionist focus on human productive activity while recovering 
important Kantian themes, such as the role of language, social norms, state formation and 
world politics in the history of the species. Furthermore, Habermas also provides us with an 
awareness of the role of deliberative processes of public discussion in the expansion of the 
human powers of conscious control over social processes and leads us to conclude that a 
more adequate means of orientation needs to attain a more detached perspective which is 
focused not only in identifying the conditions for the expansion of human self-
determination but also the historical limits that it necessarily faces and that it must respect. 
 However, we also argue that Habermas is ultimately incapable of recovering, and 
actualising, the immanent potential of Marx’s materialist and emergentist approach for a 
non-transcendental, multi-linear and open-ended answer to the problem of orientation. 
From the perspective of our inquiry, it can be said that Habermas’s work implies an 
engagement with the explanatory dimension of orientation which is characterised by an 
attempt to achieve a more detached perspective on the predominant dynamics and social 
processes shaping human development through the production a theory of social evolution 
which operates on the basis of a theoretical distinction between the ‘logic’ and the 
‘dynamics’ of the long-term history of the species. By interpreting the logic of human 
development not as an expression of the actual course of human history – but rather an 
abstract model of the pattern of development of human competences, such as the human 
powers of control and self-determination – Habermas seeks to attain a more intelligible 
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understanding of the structure of history which avoids reading it as either necessary, 
irreversible, linear or teleological. However, as we demonstrate throughout these two 
chapters, such a distinction between the logic and the dynamics of human development also 
leads Habermas to recover a Kantian-type of transcendental answer to the anticipatory 
dimension of the problem of orientation, characterised by a reinstatement of a dualism 
between morality and history. Furthermore, associated with this transcendentalism, is also 
the reinstatement of a linear and teleological model of the logical structure human 
development. This model, even if not intended as an expression of the actual course of 
human history, still operates in Habermas’s critical approach as the lenses through which he 
interprets the historical conditions of existence of the species. As such, even if 
unintentionally, and despite Habermas’s claims to the contrary, he ends up recovering a 
Kantian engagement with the study of the long-term process of human development which 
poses a modernist grand narrative that, like Kant and Marx’s theoretical frameworks, is 
incapable of capturing the plurality of humankind, or understanding the multi-linear and 
open-ended character of the species’ history. Consequently, our analysis of Habermas’s 
work also indicates how, despite his capacity to produce a more comprehensive 
understanding of the interplay of the triad of basic controls, still, a more adequate answer 
to the problem of orientation cannot be found in a theory of social evolution which 
abstracts from the actual course of human historical development. This conclusion leads us, 
in chapter six, to engage with Elias’s work as a historically-grounded, sociological and 
materialist approach, which provides an alternative to Habermas’s more philosophical 
reconstruction of Marx’s critical theory.  
 Given the breadth and complexity of Habermas’s writings, as well as his position as 
the latest critical author which can be read as being engaged in the theoretical tradition of 
Kant and Marx envisioning the production of a more cosmopolitan means of orientation 
regarding the globalisation of the conditions of human existence, the analysis of his work is 
carried out, as already mentioned, in two chapters. The present chapter addresses 
Habermas’s theory of social evolution and how it can be interpreted as synthesising Marxian 
and Kantian themes in an attempt to produce a more comprehensive and adequate grand 
narrative regarding the global web of interdependent humanity and how people might bring 
it under a greater degree of conscious and collective control. The chapter is divided into four 
main sections. First, we address Habermas’s critique of Marx’s work and how it leads him to 
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argue for a reconstruction of Marx’s critical approach which preserves his insights 
concerning the long-term study of human development, while overcoming his one-sided 
emphasis on productive activity. Second, we read Habermas’s theory of social evolution as 
an engagement with the explanatory dimension of orientation and show how his 
reconstructive project leads him to a higher synthesis between Marxian and Kantian themes 
in his assessment of the predominant dynamics and social processes shaping the species’ 
history. Third, we address Habermas’s work from the perspective of the anticipatory 
dimension of orientation to show how his theory of social evolution implies a recovery of a 
Kantian-type of transcendental answer to the ascertainment of the conditions of human 
freedom. And fourth, we analyse how Habermas’s critique of modern societies can be read 
as bringing together these two dimensions of orientation.  
 This analysis leads us, in the next chapter, to engage with Habermas’s work on world 
politics and address how he applies his theoretical framework to an analysis of human 
global interdependence. In that context, Habermas is interpreted as promoting a more 
cosmopolitan attunement in people’s understanding of the conditions of existence of 
globalised humanity and how a greater degree of control can be exercised over the future 
stages of global integration of the species. Furthermore, in the next chapter, we also 
address the adequacy of Habermas’s theoretical framework as a means of orientation and 
argue that, despite his capacity to recover important Kantian themes that were lost in 
Marx’s work, Habermas also recovers a transcendental, linear and teleological model of 
human development which is inadequate as a means of orientation.  
 
1. Reconstructing Marx 
 
In this section, we address Habermas’s critique of Marx’s work to argue that his project for a 
reconstruction of Marx’s critical approach to overcome his one-sided emphasis on human 
productive activity leads Habermas to recover a Kantian awareness of the role of human 
self-control and linguistic consensualization of social norms in the long-term process of 
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human development as the basis for his more comprehensive account of the role of the 
triad of controls in the history of the species.274  
 In ‘Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism’, Habermas argues that 
Marx’s work is fundamentally compromised by a one-sided over-emphasis on production. 
The origin of this problem, according to Habermas, can be traced to the foundations of 
Marx’s critical theory and his study of the alleged distinction between human and non-
human animals. These reflections lead Marx to conceptualize ‘social labour’ as the 
distinguishing feature of the human stage of development. However, Habermas considers 
that the notion of social labour ‘cuts too deeply into the evolutionary scale’.275 It ignores 
how not only humans, but also other species of hominids, were distinguishable from other 
animals by the fact that they too carried out social labour.276 Hominid hunting bands also 
made weapons and tools, cooperated through a division of labour, and distributed the 
products of their productive activity amongst the members of the group in an organised 
way. Hence, Habermas concludes, the concept of social labour is suitable for ‘delimiting the 
mode of life of the hominids from that of the primates; but it does not capture the 
specifically human reproduction of life’.277 
 Instead, Habermas argues, humans are distinguishable from other animals in that 
they are the first known species on the planet to have developed forms of linguistic 
communication that enable them to constitute modes of social organization based on multi-
dimensional role-taking. While other animals are locked in modes of social interaction in 
which every member of a group is assigned ‘one and only one status’, humans can 
linguistically establish common norms of social regulation and behavioural expectation that 
permit the same individual to possess more than one social role.278 Hence, human existence 
is characterized by the possibility of linguistically establishing a system of social roles which 
is based on intersubjective recognition of expectations of behaviour, and not purely on the 
affirmation of individual status through contingent personal characteristics; such as physical 
strength and the capacity to physically overwhelm and punish others. In this context, 
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Habermas considers that, throughout the long-term history of the species, the 
‘linguistification’ of social life progressively integrated the formation of human motives for 
action in the ‘symbolic world of interaction’.279 
 With the development of linguistically mediated social interactions, learned and 
symbolically transmitted forms of behaviour became, for the first time, the predominant 
mode of evolution of the species. While the evolution of other animals continues to be 
predominantly shaped by biological mechanisms, and the hominid stage of development 
was shaped by two mechanisms – biological and sociocultural evolution – that worked 
together through the simultaneous development of the brain and forms of proto-language, 
in the human stage sociocultural evolution came to assume the predominant role in the 
development of the species, far outpacing biological evolution.280 This predominance of 
sociocultural over biological evolution explains how the diversity of human modes of life can 
be manifested in the context of a single biological species, and how human learning 
processes have outpaced those of other animals on the planet.  
 In light of this analysis, Habermas concludes that the ‘specifically human’ form of life 
only emerges historically with the development of language and, as such, Marx’s emphasis 
on productive activity has to be complemented by an analysis of the role of language in the 
long-term process of human development.281 Habermas thus argues for the need to 
reconstruct Marx’s approach; a project he understands as taking ‘a theory apart and putting 
it back together again in a new form in order to attain more fully the goal it has set for 
itself’.282 Fundamental for this reconstruction is the awareness that whereas  
 Marx localized the learning processes important for evolution in the dimension of 
(…) technical and organizational knowledge (…) in short of productive forces, there 
are good reasons to assume that learning processes also take place in the 
dimension of moral insight, practical knowledge, and the consensual regulation of 
action conflicts.283 
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Hence, Habermas proposes a two-track model of social evolution that comprehends it as 
occurring, simultaneously, in two dimensions: ‘purposive-rational action’ and 
‘communicative action’.284  
 Purposive-rational action refers to two main aspects of social behaviour. On the one 
hand, it refers to the empirical efficiency of technical means and, on the other hand, to the 
choice between suitable means directed towards the accomplishment of any given 
objective. While the former refers to technological development at the level of the forces of 
production, the latter refers to organizational choices regarding the best means for the 
realisation of such goals as organizing the labour force in the productive process. As such, 
collective learning at the level of purposive-rational action signifies a ‘heightening of 
productive forces’ through the development and application of ‘technical-organizational 
knowledge’.285  
 Communicative action is defined, in contradistinction with purposive-rational action, 
as the linguistic establishment of mutual understandings about social norms that integrate 
behavioural expectations and define social roles. While purposive-rational action is 
predominantly concerned with the ‘truth’ of validity claims, – i.e. with the adequacy of 
knowledge claims about the empirical conditions of the labour process and how those 
permit the further development of the forces of production – communicative action is 
predominantly concerned with the ‘rightness’ of social norms, i.e. with the intersubjectively 
and linguistically established acceptability of social norms. Collective learning at the level of 
communicative action thus entails the development of ‘moral-practical knowledge’ which, 
embodied in social norms, expresses the common dominant understandings regarding 
prevalent social roles and behavioural expectations.286  
 From the perspective of our inquiry into the problem of orientation, Habermas’s 
critique of Marx can be read as clearly pointing to the need to complement Marx’s focus on 
productive activity – purposive-rational action in Habermas’s conceptual apparatus – in a 
more comprehensive means of orientation which traces the influence of other social 
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processes, such as linguistic communication and the development of social norms, in the 
history of the species. In particular, Habermas shows that the constitution, cohesion and 
development of human societies cannot be explained only from the perspective of the 
development of human control over nature and the forms of class competition and conflict 
which are associated with it. Rather, it also requires an understanding of how these 
relations of mutually interdependent competition can be subject to greater conscious and 
collective regulation on the part of human beings through the development of knowledge of 
a moral-practical sort and its embodiment in social norms and behavioural expectations. As 
such, Habermas complements Marx’s awareness of the importance of human relations with 
nature in the history of the species with a recovery of the Kantian link between the 
development of human self-control and control over social processes. As Habermas 
observes, while purposive-rational action is connected with the development of people’s 
control over external nature, communicative action involves not only an extension of 
collective control over social processes, but also an extension of human control over 
individual ‘internal nature’, in the sense of self-regulation of internal motives of action and 
behavioural patterns.287 In this manner, Habermas’s work can be read as opening the way 
for the production of an orientating framework aimed at a more comprehensive 
understanding of how the interplay between the three dimensions of human controls 
shapes the long-term process of human development.288 
 However, as the following sections of this chapter demonstrate, Habermas develops 
this analysis on the basis of an abstract theory of social evolution and a theoretical 
distinction between the logic and the dynamics of human development. As we argue in 
greater detail in the last section of the next chapter, this theoretical approach leads him to 
also recover the shortcomings of Kant’s critical theory, in the form of a transcendental 
answer to the anticipatory dimension of orientation and an explanatory model of the history 
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of the species which is both linear and teleological. In this manner, Habermas’s work is 
instructive for our inquiry not only because it opens the way for a more comprehensive 
analysis of the triad of controls but also because it demonstrate how this analysis needs to 
be carried out on a materialist and emergentist basis, focused on a study of the empirical 
process of human historical development, in order to effectively attain a more cosmopolitan 
perspective on the human condition. Otherwise, if based on an abstract theory of social 
evolution like Habermas’s, it remains locked in a more involved and time-bound perspective 
which continues to confuse the path of Western modernity with the universal path of the 
species’ history.    
 In the next section, we interpret Habermas’s theory of social as an answer to the 
explanatory dimension of orientation. In particular, we focus on Habermas’s argument that 
it is collective learning processes in the domain of communicative action, rather than the 
development of the forces of production, that function as the main ‘pacemaker’ of social 
evolution.289 In this context, we discuss Habermas’s notion that the embodiment of moral-
practical knowledge in a society’s institutions and social norms constitutes one of the main 
dynamics shaping human social development by defining the ‘principle of social 
organization’ of human societies and establishing their ‘range of possibility’.290 The principle 
of social organisation is thus understood as determining a society’s possible range of 
institutional change, its adaptive capacity to contingent problems, and the extent to which 
available productive forces can be socially utilized and their further development 
stimulated.291 Hence, it circumscribes the possible growth of the forces of production, and 
only when that principle changes, can new technical-organizational knowledge be 
implemented to promote their further innovation. Consequently, Habermas argues that a 
more adequate critical approach to the long-term process of human development requires a 
theory of social evolution capable of explaining the development of moral-practical 
knowledge and its embodiment in social institutions and norms. Only on that basis, 
Habermas maintains, can a critical theory be developed that overcomes Marx’s over-
emphasis on productive activity, i.e. on purposive-rational action.292  
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2. Communicative action and social evolution 
 
As noted above, Habermas’s theory of social evolution is based on a theoretical distinction 
between the logic and the dynamics of human development which, he argues, enables a 
more intelligible understanding of its logical structure without, however, assuming that this 
structure is necessarily reproduced in the actual course of historical events. The theoretical 
purpose of this distinction is made particularly clear in Habermas’s article ‘History and 
Evolution’. There, Habermas argues that the limitations of philosophical history, such as the 
one produced by Kant, arise from the attempt to ‘transpose’ it into the actual ‘writing of 
universal history’, interpreting human historical development ‘as if’ it reproduces the linear 
and teleological model proposed by the theory of social evolution.293 Instead, Habermas 
maintains that a more adequate approach is to understand the theory of social evolution 
not as a representation of the actual course of human historical development, but rather as 
an expression of the logic of development of ‘universal competences’, such as structures of 
consciousness and learning processes.294 A theory of social evolution should thus capture 
the universal logical pattern of emergence and development of human competences 
without, however, assuming that this logic is reproduced in the historical course of events 
characterising the species’ history. As such, Habermas argues, sociological considerations 
are not ‘called for’ in a theory of social evolution, because ‘they fall short of the level of 
abstraction on which the structural conditions of possibility of learning processes relevant to 
evolution must be given’.295  
 It can be argued that Habermas is here clearly striving for the development of a 
theoretical approach which enables him to attain a more detached perspective on the 
human condition and patterns of change, which abstracts from empirical history and its 
chaotic, conflictual and contradictory character between more particularistic points of view. 
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Habermas’s argument implies that more involved and historically-embedded analyses can 
only indicate the existence of ‘innovative potential’ at certain historical junctures, but 
cannot ‘explain’ the formation of that innovative potential, i.e. why the emergence of 
certain human competences occurs and why their development follows a certain direction 
and not another. According to Habermas, such an explanation requires a more abstract 
ascertainment of the universal ‘developmental logic of collectively shared structures of 
consciousness’, which makes possible to ‘non-arbitrarily identify the essential constitutive 
structures’ of human societies.296  
 Furthermore, these more abstract evolutionary theoretical explanations, even when 
applied to the study of particular historical junctures – such as the transition to archaic high 
cultures or the transition to the modern era – not only need no historical analysis to support 
them, but they cannot be turned into ‘history proper’.297 As Habermas argues, in the 
framework of evolutionary social theory  
 ‘these transitions must be conceived as abstract transitions to new learning levels 
(which can perhaps be visualised as stages of development in the educational 
process of the human race) but they cannot, without endangering the categorical 
framework and thus also the explanatory power of theory, be translated back into 
the achievements of actors and reinterpreted into a history that is borne by 
actors’.298 
According to Habermas, evolutionary social theory cannot thus be understood as expressing 
the ‘macro-history’ of a ‘generic subject’.299 Rather, by recognising that the ‘bearers of 
evolution’ are human societies themselves and the human subjects integrated in them, it 
occupies the position of an abstract model of the ‘rationally reconstructible pattern’ of the 
logic of development of human competences. If this evolutionary logic is ‘separate from the 
events with which the empirical substrata change, we need assume neither the univocity, 
nor continuity, nor necessity, nor irreversibility of the course of history’.300 The theory 
expresses only the ‘logical’ sequence of stages of human competences, in accordance with 
the rationally reconstructible pattern of development of ‘anthropologically deep-lying 
general structures’ which emerged in the phase of hominization and determine the 
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conditions of human social development.301 Such sequence of stages describes the ‘logical 
terrain’ in which the emergence and development of human competences occurs, as well as 
the general direction that it assumes, but ‘whether or when new structural formations 
develop depends on contingent circumstances’ which cannot be captured by the theory.302 
In this manner, Habermas can be read as attempting to produce a more detached 
assessment of the predominant dynamics and social processes shaping the history of the 
species which overcomes the more involved points of view of historically-embedded 
perspectives such as Marx’s, without falling into the limitations of abstract philosophical 
history by assuming that the logic of historical evolution actually portrays the course of 
historical events. Habermas’s theory of social evolution thus strives to retain Kant and 
Marx’s search for a more intelligible understanding of the patterns of historical change 
while avoiding the shortcomings of both the philosophy of history and the philosophy of the 
subject which affect both of their critical approaches.303  
 As this section and the next demonstrate, when interpreted in the context of our 
inquiry into the problem of orientation, Habermas’s theory of social evolution fulfils an 
orientating function regarding both its explanatory and its anticipatory dimensions. On the 
one hand, it provides orientation regarding the conditions of emergence and development 
of human competences; in particular, it can be applied to trace the logic of the 
developmental pattern of the human powers of control throughout the history of the 
species. On the other hand, it also enables an ascertainment of the conditions of human 
freedom in accordance with the logic of development of human competences and the way 
in which these enable human societies to solve developmental problems which exhaust 
their adaptive capacities. Habermas’s theory of social evolution can thus be seen as 
providing orientation regarding the immanent potential that has been historically produced 
                                                          
301
 Habermas, J. ‘History and Evolution’, p. 42.  
302
 Habermas, J. ‘History and Evolution’, p. 42.  
303
 According to Jørgen Pedersen, Habermas’s theory of social evolution is based on a distinction between the 
developmental logic that societies ‘can follow’ and the logic they actually ‘do follow’. The latter ‘depends of 
various empirical factors’, whereas the former is ‘universal’. Habermas’s thesis is that development does not 
‘necessarily take place in a concrete society’, but if such development should take place, ‘it follows a certain 
logic’. This enables Habermas to claim that social evolution ‘possesses an element of universality’, and that any 
society that develops will do so ‘according to a reconstructed developmental logic’. As such, all developing 
societies must ‘move in the same way’ in relation to different stages that are ‘hierarchically ordered’. As 
Pedersen concludes, to Habermas, the evolutionary logic of social development is thus ‘universal’, but there is 
‘no given necessity as to how a given society will develop’ historically, and it is this position that distinguishes 
Habermas’s approach from a philosophy of history, where this connection of necessity is made. See: Pedersen, 
J. ‘Habermas’s Method: Rational Reconstruction’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 38: 4 (2008) p. 474ff. 
128 
 
for an expansion of human beings’ conscious and collective control over their conditions of 
existence.   
 Throughout the rest of this section we address Habermas’s theory of social evolution 
from the perspective of its engagement with the explanatory dimension of the problem of 
orientation, while the next section focuses on its anticipatory dimension. The rest of this 
section is divided into two subsections. First, we analyse Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action which strives to identify the logic of development of human 
communicative competences, structures of consciousness and moral-practical knowledge. 
As seen in the first section, these universal competences are directly connected with the 
development of the human powers of self-control and collective control over social 
processes. In the second subsection, we address how Habermas connects his analysis of 
communicative action with his overall theory of social evolution, by focusing on his 
conception of the developmental logic of the embodiment of moral-practical knowledge in 
social institutions and norms, through which human societies evolve between different 
principles of social organisation.  
 
2.1. Communication and moral development 
 
In the book ‘Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action’, Habermas develops his 
theory of communicative action, through which he explains the logic of development of 
moral-practical knowledge with particular reference to Kohlberg’s work and his attempt to 
explain the acquisition of universal competences at the level of individual moral 
development.304 Like Habermas, Kohlberg is not focused on understanding the empirical 
processes through which the stages of moral development are manifested, but instead with 
providing an analysis of the ‘internal logical’ pattern of this development.305  
 As we saw in the first section, Habermas considers that communicative action entails 
collective learning processes that produce moral-practical knowledge, which is embodied 
both at the level of individual perspectives and world-views and at the level of social norms 
and social institutions, and which expresses different stages of development of people’s 
common understandings regarding their social roles and acceptable behavioural 
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expectations. Following Kohlberg’s analysis of moral development, Habermas argues that 
the development of communicative action and moral-practical knowledge follows three 
main logical stages: the pre-conventional, the conventional and the post-conventional. In 
the pre-conventional stage, human subjects obey social norms out of fear that not obeying 
them might entail sanctions imposed by a higher authority. At this stage, the rightness of 
social norms is assessed on the extent to which these are the product of an external 
authority that has the power to compel the behaviour of others. In the conventional stage, 
human subjects obey social norms out of personal loyalty and belonging to the particular 
social groups which enact them. At this stage, the rightness of social norms is assessed as 
being an inherent property of those norms, as expressions of a social group’s culture and 
tradition. Hence, it is expressed in doing one’s duty in society, upholding the social order, 
maintaining the welfare of society, and conforming to existent social roles by following peer 
behavioural expectations. In the post-conventional stage, human subjects become capable 
of stepping back from the perceived inherent legitimacy of authority and their personal 
group loyalties to assess the acceptability of social norms in accordance with principles 
which have been deliberatively established to hold universal validity. At this stage, social 
norms thus lose their quasi-natural validity and require justification from universalistic 
points of view. Their rightness is assessed in accordance with the extent to which they 
embody universal principles whose universal acceptability needs to be assessed in processes 
of communicative deliberation involving all persons likely to be affected by them.306 
 Our reinterpretation of Habermas’s work as an engagement with the problem of 
orientation shows how each of these stages represents an increase in the level of 
detachment in people’s modes of orientation towards each other and their societies. 
Progressively, people acquire the capacity to step back more and more from parochial and 
ethnocentric points of view and come to evaluate social norms not in accordance with their 
embodiment of more particularistic traditions and world-views but according to whether or 
not they are compatible with universalistic values. Effectively, the post-conventional stage 
can be characterised as expressing a fundamental cosmopolitan orientation in people’s 
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perspectives to the extent that the rightness of social norms comes to depend on whether 
or not these can be accepted by all who stand to be affect by them. In this context, we can 
argue that Habermas’s analysis of the logical development of moral-practical knowledge 
recovers Kant’s link between the development of people’s self-control and that of control 
over social processes. It does so to the extent that it recognises that as human beings learn 
how to tame their personal loyalties and forms of emotional attachment to particularistic 
communities, they are able to attain a more detached and cosmopolitan perspective on the 
basis of which more universal social norms can be developed and consensualized between 
people which allow them to bring under greater conscious control the social processes in 
which they are enmeshed and the unplanned effects that might arise from them.   
 As we address in the next subsection, according to Habermas, these different stages 
of development of moral-practical knowledge are embodied not only at the level of 
individual perspectives and structures of consciousness but also in the social norms and 
institutions of their societies. As such, Habermas argues that parallel stages of development 
can be found at the level of human societies, in the form of different principles of social 
organization, as societies draw upon, and institutionally embody, the moral-practical 
knowledge that is made available at the level of their individual members’ world-views in 
order to expand their adaptive capacity to contingent or unforeseen developmental 
problems.  
 
2.2. The logic of social evolution 
 
 As mentioned above, according to Habermas, individuals and societies are the real bearers 
of collective learning processes, which implies that it is often the case that their 
perspectives and consciousness structures express higher stages of development of moral-
practical knowledge than those which are embodied in the social institutions and norms of 
their societies.307 Hence, in order to rationally reconstruct the several stages of social 
development, Habermas suggests a distinction between: a) individual world-views and 
structures of consciousness and b) social institutions and norms. With such distinction in 
mind, he proposes a model of the history of the species that places the long-term process of 
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evolution of human societies in an ascending scale of logical stages of development. From 
the perspective of our inquiry, Habermas’s theory of social evolution can thus be 
understood as addressing the explanatory dimension of orientation by capturing the 
developmental logic of human societies and how, as they move through each of these 
different stages, they exhibit increasingly more detached and cosmopolitan orientations, 
their social norms assume a more universal character, and their individual members 
progressively express a higher capacity for conscious control over both their internal 
inclinations and emotional attachments and the social processes which arise from their 
social interdependence. 
 Habermas distinguishes four main stages of social evolution: Neolithic societies, 
early civilisations, developed civilisations, and European or Western modernity. Neolithic 
societies are characterized by a) conventional world-views expressed in mythology and the 
compelling power of tradition and religion; and b) pre-conventional legal regulations of 
conflicts by an authority focused on the assessment of action consequences and 
compensation for resultant damages. Early civilisations express a) conventional world-views 
still present in the compelling power of religion and tradition, which now serve also 
legitimation functions for the occupants of positions of authority; and b) conventional legal 
regulations tied to the figure of the ruler who administers and represents justice. 
Furthermore, the regulation of conflicts undergoes a transition from compensations to 
punishment for the violation of social norms. Developed civilisations are characterized by a) 
post-conventional world-views that question the inherent validity of tradition and religion; 
and b) conventional morality that detaches from the person of the ruler and becomes 
embedded in social norms that, while dependent on tradition and religion, are systematized 
in a codified system of law. European or Western modernity is characterized by a) post-
conventional world-views grounded in universal principles intersubjectively assessed on the 
basis of processes of linguistic deliberation and consensualization; and b) post-conventional 
morality separated from general, formal, rationalized law which embodies social norms that 
are considered legitimate to the extent that they derive from universalistic principles.308  
 The most distinctive feature of the modern stage of moral-practical knowledge is 
thus the disengagement which becomes possible from structures of authority and personal 
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group loyalties in a manner that opens the way for individual human beings to attain a more 
detached perspective, capable of integrating the points of view of other people who might 
find themselves not only within but also outside each individual’s particular political 
community. Habermas’s ascertainment of the logical stages of social development can thus 
be read as indicative of the progressive universalisation of people’s modes of attunement 
towards the development of increasingly more cosmopolitan perspectives which, at the 
modern stage, become inherently connected with the globalisation of human 
interdependence, constituting both a condition and a response to the lengthening chains of 
interconnection between people, but also the basis, at the level of individual personality 
structures, for the development of post-national social norms which encompass increasingly 
wider groups of interdependent human beings and which enable them to exercise a greater 
degree of conscious control over their social bonds.  
 However, according to Habermas, modernity does not represent a pinnacle of 
human development. On the one hand, individual world-views and consciousness structures 
still express influences of pre-conventional and conventional forms of respect for authority 
and group loyalties, which frequently clash with the post-conventional orientation towards 
universalistic principles. On the other hand, as Habermas observes, future stages of 
development of moral-practical knowledge might be attained which cannot yet be 
envisioned and which would demand a rational reconstruction of the logical developmental 
pattern of communicative action.309  
 At this point in the argument, Habermas notes that while it is possible to identify the 
logical sequence of stages of social evolution, this sequence itself does not explain the 
mechanisms through which a society evolves between stages. In order to provide an 
account of such mechanisms, Habermas further complements his theory of social evolution 
                                                          
309
 In Linklater’s assessment, Habermas’s account of modernity simultaneously holds that modernity reveals 
‘substantial progress’ in understanding the possibilities and need for dialogue in social reproduction, as well as 
in overcoming practical obstacles to its embodiment in actual political life, while recognising Weber’s thesis 
about the dangers of intensified domination and curtailment of human self-determination associated with the 
rationalisation process that accompanies modernity. Hence, while agreeing with Weber that Marx ignores how 
the socialisation of the means of production might not produce freedom but rather an intensification of 
dominating techniques of administration, Habermas also observes that the cognitive potential held in modern 
post-conventional world-views and consciousness structures opens the way for a more self-determined 
organisation of society on the basis of democratic processes of deliberation of social norms and behavioural 
expectations. In this manner, Habermas strives to capture the ambiguous and dialectical character of human 
development and its expression in modernity. See: Linklater, A. The Transformation of Political Community, pp. 
120-123 and Habermas, J. The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, p. 333ff. 
133 
 
with an interpretation of processes of social learning that borrows conceptually from 
Parsons and Niklas Luhmann’s work on systems theory. Integrating systems theoretical 
concepts in his theory of social evolution enables Habermas to combine, within a single 
theoretical framework, his two-track model of human development, simultaneously 
encompassing learning processes at the level of purposive-rational action and at the level of 
communicative action.310  
 Systems theory leads Habermas to conceive of human societies as social systems 
that, at any moment in time, are at a certain stage of evolution which, expressed in their 
principle of social organisation, defines their degree of adaptive capacity to contingent 
problems. Within such a stage, individual subjects undergo collective learning processes at 
both the level of purposive-rational and communicative action which entail the 
development of new stages of technical-organizational and moral-practical knowledge. 
While the latter is embodied in individual world-views and consciousness structures, the 
former is applied to the growth of the forces of production, but only within the limited 
range defined by the prevalent principle of social organization. According to Habermas, the 
moral-practical knowledge present in individual perspectives represents a ‘cognitive 
potential’ that can be socially used to expand a society’s adaptive capacity, to the extent 
that it is ‘institutionally embodied’ in a manner that changes the prevalent principle of social 
organisation.311 As such, Habermas observes that the principle of social organization that 
defines the stage of evolution of a society frequently lags behind the cognitive potential that 
has been acquired by its members.  
 The existent principle of social organization thus becomes a barrier to social 
evolution whenever ‘system-threatening problems’ arise which exhaust the boundaries of 
social adaptive capacity that it establishes. These developmental problems can be triggered 
by the endogenous dynamics of the social system, or by exogenous factors related to the 
environment of the social system, in the form of either its relations with external non-
human nature or with other social systems. When such problems are posed, societies can 
evolve by institutionally embodying the cognitive potential, in terms of moral-practical 
knowledge, that is already present in their members’ world-views and consciousness 
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structures.312 Such institutional embodiment represents the development of a new principle 
of social organization and the establishment of a new stage of social evolution. This new 
principle widens the range of possibility of a particular society, increases its adaptive 
capacity to contingent problems and permits the further implementation of available 
technical-organizational knowledge at the level of the forces of production. The new 
principle of social organization then constitutes the new boundary condition within which 
new processes of collective learning can occur at the level of both purposive-rational and 
communicative action.313 In this manner, Habermas’s theory of social evolution can be seen 
to recover Marx’s analysis of the dialectical movement of human history. However, he does 
it on a theoretical basis which overcomes Marx’s reductionist emphasis on the predominant 
causal role of learning processes at the level of purposive-rational action by recognising the 
concomitant role of learning processes at the level of communicative action in the transition 
of human societies between different stages of development. This more comprehensive 
analysis, we argue, opens the way for Habermas’s capacity to account for how the 
development of human societies and people’s perspectives and world-views is shaped not 
only by the material conditions of human existence but is also fundamentally intertwined 
with the development of processes of linguistic deliberation of social norms and the 
development of decision-making processes at the level of social institutions.   
 In this context, and as we address in greater depth in the next chapter, the global 
interdependence of the species can be understood as posing a fundamental developmental 
problem to societies whose social institutions and basic forms of attunement still embody a 
conventional stage of moral-practical knowledge and thus exhibit a more involved and more 
particularistic perspective on the human condition, marked by the emotional elevation of 
the nation and their group-identity as the highest value and their main standpoint of 
orientation when relating with the rest of the world. These societies exhibit a principle of 
social organisation which lags behind the reality of human global interconnection and which 
poses a fundamental challenge to the extent that it prevents them from more consciously 
regulating the long chains of social interdependence with which they are bound. In 
particular, they are unable to detach from their more parochial points of view in a manner 
that allows them to attain a more cosmopolitan perspective which encompasses the 
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perspectives of other societies with which they are mutually dependent and on the basis of 
which they can participate in inter-societal deliberative processes envisioning the 
development of post-national social norms that enable all the participant societies to bring 
under greater conscious control the global patterns of their shared interdependence. 
Habermas’s theory of social evolution can thus be understood as an orientating framework 
providing guidance to people regarding not only the logical patterns of human development 
and the developmental problems that arise in its context, but also how these problems 
might come to be solved through the social embodiment of the more advanced stages of 
moral-practical knowledge that might already be available at the level of individual world-
views as a result of collective communicative learning processes.  
 According to Habermas, his theory of social evolution thus permits a reconstruction 
of Marx’s critical approach in a manner that overcomes its over-emphasis on production. By 
combining, in a single theoretical framework, an explanation of the logic of development of 
both purposive-rational action and communicative action it preserves Marx’s insights 
regarding the role of productive activity in human development while opening the way for a 
recovery of the analysis of Kantian themes such as the role of linguistic communication, 
moral development, the constitution of political communities, and their cross-border 
interactions and encounters in the long-term history of the species. Furthermore, Habermas 
argues that his theory of social evolution, with its clear distinction between the logic and the 
dynamics of human development, is capable of providing a model of the logical 
developmental structure of social evolution without having to interpret human history as 
necessarily following its sequence of linear progressive stages. As such, in Habermas’s view, 
it overcomes both the philosophy of history and the philosophy of the subject which 
characterise Kant and Marx’s work. Finally, Habermas also argues that, despite the abstract 
character of his theory of social evolution, it preserves the essence of Marx’s critical theory 
in the sense that it remains materialist and historically-oriented. It remains materialist 
insofar as ‘it makes reference to crisis-producing developmental problems in the domain of 
production and reproduction’.314 And it remains historically-oriented to the extent that it 
‘seeks the causes of evolutionary changes in the whole range of contingent circumstances 
[of societies]’.315   
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 However, as we argue in the last section of the next chapter, despite Habermas’s 
assertions to the contrary, his theory of social evolution actually locks him in a linear reading 
of the empirical history of the species which expresses a more involved and time-bound 
perspective than the cosmopolitan position to which he aspires. As such, Habermas’s theory 
of social evolution not only pushes him away from Marx’s materialist and emergentist 
approach and its potential for a multi-linear and open-ended conception of human 
development but also, as we discuss in the next section, leads him to recover a 
transcendental answer to the anticipatory dimension of orientation and to reinstate a fixed 
conception of the conditions of human self-determination.  
 
3. Recovering Kant 
 
In this section we continue to address Habermas’s theory of social evolution, but rather 
focusing on what type of engagement it implies with the anticipatory dimension of the 
problem of orientation. In particular, we argue that it leads Habermas to recover a Kantian 
transcendental ascertainment of how human beings might come to exercise a greater 
degree of conscious and collective control over their conditions of existence in the context 
of globe spanning networks of human interdependence.  
 According to Habermas, his recovery of transcendentalism is capable of not only 
overcoming the problems connected with Kant’s critical approach but also what he 
considers to be Marx’s ‘lack of clarity’ regarding his normative criteria.316 In Habermas’s 
view, Marx limits himself to ‘criticize immanently’ the normative content of the ruling 
bourgeois world-views of his day which entails disclosing how their ideals of freedom and 
equality cannot be historically actualized in the context of capitalist society.317 It is 
Habermas’s argument that such an approach has become increasingly impossible to 
maintain given how bourgeois consciousness became ‘cynical’ and its ideals have ‘gone into 
retirement’ in the context of modern capitalism which, increasingly, has less need to hide its 
quest for capital growth under the cover of the supposed universality, freedom and equality 
of its social relations. In this manner, Habermas observes that Marxian immanent critique is 
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faced with the unavailability of any norms or values that might enable its critique of 
capitalism.318   
 However, in light of our interpretation of Marx’s work presented in chapter three, 
we can argue that Habermas’s reading of Marx’s engagement with the anticipatory 
dimension of the problem of orientation is inadequate. As we have shown, Marx’s 
normative standpoint of orientation arises from his materialist and emergentist approach to 
human development and implies a historically-embedded and processual assessment of the 
immanent potential, gathered at each historical juncture, for the expansion of human 
beings’ conscious control over their conditions of existence. As such, Marx’s approach not 
only overcomes the need for a transcendental standpoint of normative orientation but also 
exhibits a significantly more detached perspective than that which Habermas attributes to 
it. In particular, Marx’s normative orientation regarding the expansion of human self-
determination is not limited to the time horizon of bourgeois modernity, but rather assumes 
a more detached perspective which enables him to support different modes of production 
as expressive of human freedom in accordance with the potential that has been gathered 
for its manifestation at different moments in the history of the species. Consequently, – and 
despite Marx’s linear theory of history ultimately undermining the potential of his answer to 
the anticipatory dimension of orientation – we argued that Marx’s non-transcendental 
assessment of the conditions for the expansion of human conscious control opens the way 
to a grand narrative that guards against the reproduction of linear and teleological models 
of human development. In this context, we can argue that Habermas’s reading of Marx does 
not follow this line of argument but rather remains framed in his assessment regarding the 
need for an abstract theory of social evolution which avoids what he perceives as the 
incapacity of historically-embedded perspectives to provide an understanding of the 
universal structure of development of human competences. As such, his answer to the 
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anticipatory dimension of orientation must also be read in the context of this goal as 
entailing the need for universal standards of orientation on the basis of an ascertainment of 
the ideal conditions of human freedom and their logical development. This position, 
however, takes Habermas back to a form of Kantian transcendentalism and moves him away 
from Marx’s historically-grounded, emergentist and materialist approach, and its potential 
for an answer to the problem of orientation which, as we argued in chapter three, exhibits a 
more adequate involvement–detachment balance. 
 In the book ‘Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action’, Habermas argues that 
communicative action entails linguistic interactions between people directed towards the 
achievement of mutual agreements regarding the validity claims advanced by participants in 
dialogue319. With the purpose of analysing how Habermas’s work can be read as addressing 
the problem of orientation we focus here mainly on his analysis regarding claims about the 
rightness of social norms, in the sense of the possible universalisation of shared agreements 
about the acceptability and legitimacy of social norms regulating interpersonal relations and 
mutual behavioural expectations.320 In this context, Habermas makes an important 
distinction between ‘communicative’ and ‘strategic’ action. Whereas in the former each 
actor seeks to rationally compel the others to agree with his or her validity claims on the 
basis of the force of the better argument, in the latter, each actor seeks to influence the 
behaviour of others by means of the ‘threat of sanctions or the prospect of gratification’ in 
order to cause the interaction to continue as he or she desires.321 Habermas considers that 
strategic action is constantly ‘distorting’ communicative action by establishing forced 
agreements between people based on social relations of power and domination that 
prevent the collective, consensual and self-determined regulation of social norms and 
conflicts.322 Moral-practical learning, in Habermas’s assessment, entails the progressive 
differentiation of communicative and strategic action and the substitution of the latter by 
the former as the predominant mode of assessing the rightness of social norms. Hence, at a 
post-conventional stage of development of moral-practical knowledge, the rightness of 
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validity claims can only be secured on the basis of intersubjective communication that 
permits the free agreement of all those involved in the deliberation process, decoupled 
from considerations regarding their respective social positions and intersubjective relations 
of power, which become perceived as distortions of the deliberative process.323 The 
distortion of strategic action can thus be understood as the influence of more parochial and 
involved points of view which block the attainment of more cosmopolitan perspectives on 
the basis of which people might consensualize more universal social norms enabling the 
collective regulation of the social processes which they constitute. As such, Habermas’s 
discussion of the interplay between communicative and strategic action clearly points to the 
need, under conditions of human global interdependence, of people’s perspectives 
matching the more universal character of their interconnectedness through the attainment 
of post-conventional world-views and an expansion of the influence of communicative 
action in the regulation of social relations.  
 Post-conventional world-views appear as particularly adequate modes of mutual 
attunement in this context given their inherent understanding that, in order to be valid, 
social norms have to be the product of deliberative processes which respect a set of a priori 
presuppositions that entail the attainment of a truly cosmopolitan perspective. Habermas 
identifies these presuppositions as being the following:  
 Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a 
discourse; everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever; everyone is 
allowed to introduce any assertion whatever in the discourse; everyone is allowed 
to express his attitudes, desires and needs; no speaker may be prevented, by 
internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down above.324 
In empirically contingent historical processes of deliberation these ideal presuppositions are 
constantly distorted by strategic action associated with more parochial, ethnocentric and 
overall involved points of view; however, they remain the transcendental preconditions of a 
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truly valid common agreement and of the rightness of social norms.325 The development of 
communicative action thus entails the progressive disclosure of these transcendental 
presuppositions in individual perspectives and consciousness structures, and opens the way 
for the attainment of more cosmopolitan points of view on the basis of which people can 
better attune to the realities of their global interdependence and how to collectively bring 
them under a greater degree of conscious control.326  
 According to Habermas, the transcendental presuppositions of communicative 
action which are disclosed at a post-conventional stage of development can be codified in 
the form of a maxim, a ‘universalisation principle’ which establishes that for a norm to be 
valid ‘all affected [by this norm] must accept the consequences and side effects that its 
general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests 
(and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities of 
regulation)’.327 In true Kantian fashion, the principle of universalisation – also known as the 
‘all-affected principle’ – constitutes a transcendental normative standpoint of orientation 
which establishes the preconditions of human self-determination in the form of a set of 
procedural principles that the deliberation of social norms has to embody in order for these 
norms to represent a truly universal agreement and thus enable human beings to collective 
and consciously control their own conditions of existence by living under the law they give 
themselves as the law of their freedom. It presupposes the ideal projection of a ‘universal 
communication community’ which includes all beings capable of reason and which 
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overcomes particularistic points of view by implying the ‘universal exchange of 
perspectives’.328  
 In this context, it can be argued that Habermas effectively recovers Kant’s categorical 
imperative and idea of the kingdom of ends in the form of the all-affected principle and the 
projection of a universal communication community found in the transcendental 
presuppositions of communicative action. However, according to Habermas, he does so with 
an important difference. The fact that communicative action is orientated towards 
consensual agreements as the result of deliberative processes implies that the idea of a 
universal communication community must serve as a ‘guiding thread’ for the actual 
empirical ‘setting up’ of discourses that have to be carried through ‘in fact’, i.e. that have to 
be empirically and historically actualized. Unlike Kant’s categorical imperative, the 
transcendental preconditions of communicative action cannot be satisfied by a ‘monological 
mock dialogue’ but demand the actualization of historical conditions that approximate the 
transcendental ideal. Hence, to the all-affected principle, Habermas adds a second principle, 
that of ‘discourse ethics’ that states that ‘only those norms can claim to be valid that meet 
(or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a 
practical discourse’.329 Discourse ethics thus shifts the emphasis ‘from what each can will 
without contradiction to be a general law, to what all can will in agreement to be a universal 
norm’.330 
 In light of our inquiry, Habermas’s notion of discourse ethics can thus be said to 
connect the possibility of collective and conscious control over human global 
interdependence with the progressive historical actualization of deliberative processes that 
approximate the ideal communication community and with the development of post-
conventional world-views and consciousness structures that attain increasingly more 
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cosmopolitan perspectives on the human condition and reduce the distortion of strategic 
action in social relations. Furthermore, it points to the fact that, concomitant with this 
universalisation of perspectives, there are also parallel processes of individuation and 
growing autonomy of human subjects, as their evaluation of rightful or morally correct 
behavioural expectations becomes shaped not so much by the social norms of their 
particular communities, but by what can be consensually agreed to as valid in processes of 
intersubjective deliberation encompassing increasingly wider communities of human beings. 
Hence, individuals de-centre their perspectives and learn to think from the point of view of 
others, in the process opening up their internal system of behavioural motivations to 
reflexive awareness which enables them to exercise a greater degree of conscious control 
over their own behaviour and consciously decide on what is acceptable and valid, instead of 
simply following the dominance of custom and tradition. Internal motive formation is thus 
opened up to conscious assessment, and to a validity test in light of universal principles 
discursively established. In this context, Habermas thus talks about a progressive 
‘moralisation of action’ which accompanies the historical actualization of discourse ethics.331  
 As such, Habermas can be understood as establishing a direct connection between 
the historical actualisation of the principles of discourse ethics, the development of self-
control over individual behavioural expectations and emotional attachments to particular 
communities and the development of collective control over the social processes shaping 
the conditions of existence of globalised humanity.332 If these observations are combined 
with Habermas’s awareness that collective learning processes at the level of purposive-
rational action also lead to a growth of human forces of production that translates into a 
higher degree of control over non-human nature, we can see how the combination of the 
progressive development of the forces of production with the actualization of discourse 
ethics in social institutions and norms open up the historical possibility for an expansion of 
human self-determination at the three fundamental dimensions of human existence: 
external non-human nature, social processes, and internal human nature.333  
 By reading Habermas’s work in the context of our inquiry into the problem of 
orientation we can argue that his notion of discourse ethics constitutes a transcendental 
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answer to its anticipatory dimension in at least two ways. First, it projects a universal 
universal communication community which defines the optimal conditions under which 
human beings can acquire greater collective and conscious control over their conditions of 
existence and thus fully express their capacity for self-determination. And second, by 
defining those ideal conditions it orientates people towards their actualization in history 
through the assessment – carried out with the help of the explanatory dimension of 
Habermas’s theory of social evolution – of the cognitive potential that different human 
societies have gathered in their members’ structures of consciousness and world-views for 
the further actualisation of discourse ethics.   
 As already mentioned, Habermas argues that discourse ethics, despite implying a 
recovery of Kantian transcendentalism avoids the shortcomings connected with Kant’s 
critical approach. We can mention two fundamental ways in which discourse ethics is 
different from Kant’s transcendental categorical imperative. First, Kant’s idea of the 
kingdom of ends and its associated vision of a world federation of free republics advances a 
significantly more substantive and concrete conception of the ideal conditions of freedom. 
Habermas’s discourse ethics and projection of an ideal communication community is 
distinguishable by being focused instead on the procedural aspects that any cosmopolitan 
arrangement of world society, whatever form it takes, has to embody in order to secure the 
conditions of human self-determination. As such, discourse ethics can be said to embody a 
more detached perspective than Kant’s projection of the ideal institutional apparatus for 
the regulation of human global interdependence.334 And second, Kant considers that the 
categorical imperative and the idea of the kingdom of ends are universally valid as an 
orientating standpoint across space and time and that their ascertainment depends on the 
capacity of individual human beings to rationally self-control their more animalic inclinations 
and on the constitution of social orders direct towards the development of reason, both of 
which are innovations that are theoretically open to all human societies given that human 
beings are more or less the same everywhere. Habermas’s discourse ethics, on the other 
hand – and expressing the influence of Marx in his work – is substantially more oriented to 
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the developmental character of human beings, recognising that the ascertainment of its 
principles are not accessible to human beings everywhere, but depends on long-term 
collective learning processes that people have to undergo and on the acquisition of a post-
conventional stage of development at the level of their world-views and consciousness 
structures.  
 Furthermore, to these differences, Habermas adds another two. On the one hand, he 
argues that on the contrary of Kant’s categorical imperative discourse ethics does not entail 
a dualism between the ideal conditions of freedom and the historical dimension of human 
existence. Given that the transcendental presuppositions of communicative action are 
always inherent in deliberative processes conducive to common agreements they have a 
fundamentally pragmatic dimension which avoids such forms of dualism. On the other hand, 
he observes that discourse ethics rejects Kant’s monological ideal role-taking and substitutes 
it with the requirement of an empirical public discourse that approximates as much as 
possible the transcendental preconditions of communicative action in order to test the 
actual universality of validity claims.335 
 However, Habermas’s arguments regarding his capacity to recover Kantian 
transcendentalism without reproduction its shortcomings appear less compelling in light of 
our engagement with the problem of orientation and our interpretation of Kant’s work in 
chapter two. First, Habermas’s approach is still clearly permeated by a dualism between the 
transcendental ideal of discourse ethics and the dimension of contingent history where 
strategic action and historical events distort the actualisation of its principles. The projection 
of an ideal universal communication community to be approximated in empirical processes 
of deliberation thus fulfils the same orientating role in Habermas’s approach, and establishes 
the same type of dualism, as does the transcendental idea of the kingdom of ends in Kant’s 
work. Second, as we noted in chapter two, the monological perspective where ideal role-
taking takes place in the isolated mind of the rational subject applies only to Kant’s 
consideration of pure rational beings. In his political writings, when dealing with the long-
term process of human development, it is clear that Kant, similarly to Habermas, envisions a 
progressive historical actualization of the transcendental conditions of freedom through the 
establishment of institutionally guaranteed processes of intersubjective communication and 
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consensualization which diminish the influence of relations of power and of more 
particularistic points of view in the deliberation of common agreements regarding the 
universal acceptability of social norms. Finally, third, despite Habermas’s discourse ethics 
exhibiting an awareness of the developmental character of the universalisation of people’s 
perspectives, this awareness is still framed by a theory of social evolution which conceives of 
this process as entailing a linear sequence of stages. As we argue in the last section of the 
next chapter, despite Habermas’s argument that his analysis of the developmental logic of 
moral-practical knowledge is not intended as an account of the actual course of human 
history, it still constitutes the theoretical lenses through which it is observed and thus still 
entails the same type of danger that affects Kant’s work of theoretically dismissing 
alternative forms of human self-expression which do not follow its linear and teleological 
model of the species’ history.  
 So far in this chapter we have addressed how Habermas’s work and in particular his 
theory of social evolution can be read as an answer to both dimensions of the problem of 
orientation which entails a more comprehensive assessment of the role of the interplay of 
the triad of controls in the history of the species. In particular, we noted that Habermas is 
capable of complementing Marx’s analysis of the linkage between human control over 
nature and over social processes with an awareness of the role assumed in this context by 
the development of human self-control over people’s behavioural expectations and its 
connection with social processes such as the development of social norms, state formation, 
and world politics. In the next section, we consider of how this more comprehensive 
framework fulfils an orientating function regarding both the developmental challenges that 
face modern societies under conditions of global interdependence and the immanent 
potentials these gather for an extension of the human powers of self-determination. 
 
4. Civilisation and reification 
 
Following Habermas’s distinction between the logic and the dynamics of human 
development, the previous three sections addressed Habermas’s work from the perspective 
of his engagement with the logical level of analysis. In this section, we turn to an analysis of 
the dynamics of human development. In particular, we focus on the intra-state level of 
analysis, addressing Habermas’s texts regarding the development of the human conditions 
146 
 
of existence and of people’s capacity to exercise conscious control over them in the context 
of national welfare states. Then, in the first three sections of the next chapter, we move this 
discussion to the level of world politics.  
 As already mentioned, Habermas’s theory of social evolution can be understood as a 
means of orientation on the basis of which human beings at different moments in history 
can better understand their conditions of existence and how to expand their powers of 
conscious control over them. In this context, Habermas’s work entails a characterisation of 
the dynamics of human development as being predominantly shaped by the interplay 
between civilisation and reification. On the one hand, civilisation refers to the expansion of 
human beings’ capacity to bring unplanned social processes under greater control. Human 
societies become more ‘civilised’ as they institutionally embody moral-practical knowledge 
that permits them to approximate the transcendental ideal of a universal communication 
community and reduce the distortion of strategic action in processes of communicative 
interaction between people. Historically, this process is expressed in the progressive 
diminution of social relations based on power, violence and domination, as a result of the 
growing influence of deliberatively consensualized social norms in the regulation of 
individual behavioural motivations, of state functioning, and of productive activity. On the 
other hand, reification refers to the loss of human beings’ control over social processes as a 
result of the unplanned interweaving of human actions in the context of long chains of 
mutual competitive interdependence. It thus entails the continued predominant of strategic 
action in social relations and the growing distortion of communicative action.336   
 We can thus observe that Habermas’s conception of civilisation reveals a more 
detached perspective than Marx’s, to the extent that civilisation is not understood in a static 
and essentialist manner – as representing a stage which some human groups reach and 
which distinguishes them from the ‘barbaric’ and the ‘uncivilised’ – but rather as a long-
term and species-wide process that moves along a continuum in accordance with the higher 
or lower degree of development of the triad of human controls.337 This more technical 
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usage of the concept in Habermas’s work is closer to Kant’s, and can be understood as 
expressing Habermas’s attempt to attain a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human 
condition and to orientate people away from more involved and time-bound points of view 
which fulfil self-congratulatory purposes. By conceived civilisation in this more detached 
manner, Habermas is inherently promoting a transformation in people’s modes of 
attunement towards each other which is more in line with their global interdependence, in 
so far as it highlights their participation in the long and collective struggle of the species to 
learn how to tame the determining forces that have shaped human existence on the planet.  
 It is important to note that Habermas only starts to describe the dynamics of human 
development as a civilising process in his later work, most clearly in ‘The Crisis of the 
European Union: A Response’. However, our reading of his earlier writings in this section is 
also shaped by this conception for two main reasons. First, given the importance that the 
notion of civilisation assumes in Habermas’s later work, by applying it in the analysis of his 
earlier writings we can better underline the connection between Habermas’s earlier 
considerations on human development at the intra-societal level and his later reflections on 
world politics. And second, given the importance that the concept assumes in our analysis of 
the works of Kant and Marx, it permits us to better compare Habermas’s critical approach 
with those of the other two authors.  
 In order to understand Habermas’s conception of the dynamics of human 
development as involving a constant interplay between civilisation and reification, we need 
to analyse his distinction between ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ which, according to Habermas, 
constitutes a structural feature of the species’ history. Throughout the rest of this section we 
discuss Habermas’s analysis of this interplay at the intra-societal level in order to establish 
the basic conceptual apparatus which allows us, in the next chapter, to address Habermas’s 
work on world politics from the point of view of our inquiry into the problem of orientation. 
 In ‘The Theory of Communicative Action’ Habermas conceives of human societies as 
necessarily structured by processes of communicative interaction between their members. 
The symbolic world established by human communication, into which every human being is 
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born, is described as a ‘lifeworld’.338 According to Habermas, the collective learning 
processes that enable the development of moral-practical knowledge at the level of 
individual perspectives and consciousness structures entail a progressive ‘rationalisation’ of 
people’s lifeworlds.339 For example, the transition from a conventional to a post-
conventional stage of moral-practical knowledge in the modern age means that social norms 
can no longer secure their validity on the basis of tradition but only on the basis of 
consensual and deliberatively achieved agreements between communicative actors.340 As 
such, the previously unquestioned power of tradition is substituted by communicative action 
as the main basis for social integration. The symbolic lifeworld of each society, in which 
human life and social interactions are enmeshed, thus loses its ‘quasi-natural’ validity and is 
‘rationalised’, in the sense of requiring justification and legitimation on the basis of 
communicative processes of deliberation.341 As Habermas observes, the more 
communicative action takes over from tradition the functions of validation of social norms 
and behavioural expectations, the more the transcendental principles of discourse ethics 
gain empirical influence in real communication communities.342 As such, principles of 
democratic will-formation and universalistic principles of law come to be progressively 
embodied in modern states.343 To Habermas, this institutional embodiment expresses the 
progressive civilisation of human societies, in the sense that social institutions and norms 
become increasingly regulated by processes of communicative deliberation which permit 
people to exercise a greater degree of collective and conscious control over their conditions 
of existence.344  
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 However, Habermas also observes that the ‘freeing’ of communicative action from 
tradition, associated with the development of post-conventional world-views, also forces 
the ‘separation of action oriented to success from action oriented to mutual 
understanding’.345 Hence, modern societies are characterized by a differentiation between 
those areas which are integrated on the basis of communicative action and those in which 
processes of deliberative consensualization are still fundamentally distorted by strategic 
action. Following this distinction, Habermas argues that in highly complex modern societies 
– characterised by an advanced division of labour and by highly intricate relations of 
interdependence between people with specialised social functions – the task of social 
integration cannot occur purely on the basis of communicative action. The time-consuming 
aspect of processes of communicative deliberation as well as the constant danger of not 
reaching common agreements threatens the reproduction of certain social areas. This is 
particularly the case in areas like human productive activity and control over non-human 
nature, which depend on rapid decision-making and coordination of specialised activities.346 
Consequently, Habermas argues that the transition of social integration to communicative 
action also constitutes a developmental problem to modern societies.347   
 In Habermas’s view, the solution to this problem can already be found in the 
cognitive potential gathered by post-conventional world-views and the distinction these 
establish between communicative and strategic action. In order to ensure the reproduction 
of highly complex societies, communicative action needs to be unburdened from certain 
tasks of social integration. This can be accomplished to the extent that the integration of 
certain social areas continues to be carried out on the basis of strategic action; for example, 
the worker and employer relation in the context of a capitalist enterprise. Habermas thus 
suggests that modern societies need to be regulated by a principle of social integration that 
permits communicative action to carry out tasks of social integration in areas such as the 
validation of social norms, the socialisation of individuals, or cultural reproduction, while 
strategic action carries out tasks of social integration in the areas of material reproduction 
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and administration of the state.348 The historical expression of this principle of organisation, 
according to Habermas, is found in modern democratic welfare states. These possess a clear 
demarcation between, on the one hand, a capitalist economy and a state bureaucratic 
apparatus integrated on the basis of strategic action and which fulfil functions of material 
reproduction and state administration and, on the other hand, a lifeworld constituted by a 
public sphere and private households integrated on the basis of communicative action 
which fulfils functions of communicative validation of social norms, socialisation of 
individuals and cultural reproduction.349  
 As Habermas observes, in the social areas integrated by strategic action relations 
between people are structured predominantly on the basis of power and money. Power and 
money function as social resources which possess inherent non-communicative validity and 
exert influence over individual behavioural expectations, compelling people to comply with 
certain social roles. For example, in the context of a capitalist enterprise, relations on the 
basis of money paid to workers in the form of wages compel them to fulfil certain roles in 
the context of the production process, and enable their employers to integrate their 
specialised activities in a particular manner, conducive to the fulfilment of the objectives of 
the enterprise. Relations of power and money thus replace linguistic communication with a 
‘system of rewards and punishments’ that secures the integration of individual actions 
without the need for processes of communicative deliberation.350 Hence, in the social areas 
where strategic action takes over functions from communicative action, the linguistically 
structured lifeworld is pushed away to form their external environment; consequently, these 
areas assume an increasingly autonomous character in relation to lifeworld contexts and the 
communicative processes that structure them.351 
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 As these social areas become more autonomous from the lifeworld of each society, 
they also escape the collective control of communicative processes of deliberation, which 
now can only influence them indirectly, by establishing the normative boundary conditions 
for their operation. Hence, Habermas argues that the transfer of social integration over to 
strategic action ‘appears from the lifeworld perspective both as reducing the costs and risks 
of communication and as conditioning decisions in expanded spheres of contingency’.352 The 
differentiation between those social areas integrated on the basis of strategic action and 
those integrated on the basis of communicative action expresses a progressive ‘decoupling’ 
of systemic, autonomous, contexts from the communicative lifeworld.353  
 In this context, Habermas notes that the autonomy of systems from the lifeworld of 
each society is a long-term process that accompanies the evolution of the species.354 In tribal 
societies at a pre-conventional stage of social evolution, systemic contexts appear 
predominantly in the form of the system of personal and material exchange of spouses and 
ritual items between different tribes. At this stage, these systems are still enmeshed in the 
lifeworld of each particular tribe, defined by tradition and religion, and in which there is still 
no differentiation between strategic and communicative action. The differentiation between 
systemic contexts and the lifeworld of each society only starts to appear in politically 
stratified class societies at a conventional stage of social evolution. Here, occurs a 
decoupling of political authority from the prestige of leading descent groups to the extent 
that political power starts to derive from the disposition over judicial means of sanction and 
the control of the monopoly over the means of violence, thus becoming crystallised around 
a new system, the state. At the same time, markets for goods arise under the conditions of 
greater pacification established by the state with monopoly control over the means of 
violence, and start to become integrated on the basis of money relations. At this stage, the 
economic system thus begins to be differentiated from the state system, but is still 
fundamentally dependent on state power for its functioning. However, despite the growing 
differentiation of the economic and the state systems from the lifeworld, these do not yet 
become autonomous systemic contexts, nor is there a fundamental differentiation between 
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strategic and communicative action. To the extent that the conventional stage of social 
evolution secures social integration on the basis of tradition, systemic contexts remain 
enmeshed in the traditionally structured lifeworld of each society. 
 Finally, in modern societies at a post-conventional stage of social evolution, the 
differentiation between strategic and communicative action permits the autonomy of 
systemic contexts from the lifeworld of each society. The economic system becomes a 
capitalist market economy predominantly integrated on the basis of money, which develops 
its own dynamics in conditions of relative freedom from lifeworld normative expectations, 
while the state bureaucratic apparatus becomes a system predominantly integrated on the 
basis of relations of power. These systemic areas not only assume increasing autonomy from 
the lifeworld of each society and its communicative processes of deliberation, but also react 
back upon it in an attempt to secure the required conditions for their reproduction. To 
illustrate this argument, Habermas reinterprets Marx’s critique of capitalism in light of his 
own theory of social evolution to demonstrate how an autonomous capitalist economic 
system constantly strives to submit increasingly larger areas of society to integration on the 
basis of strategic action as a way to improve its own conditions of reproduction. This means, 
for example, the privatization of public sectors such as health and education, or the 
transformation of legal frameworks to reflect capitalist systemic needs, such as the 
reduction of labour costs and of social protections to workers.355 This systematisation of the 
lifeworld through the subsumption of an increasing number of social areas to integration on 
the basis of relations of power and money necessarily implies a growing distortion of 
processes of communicative deliberation by strategic action, which undermines the validity 
and self-determined character of social agreements and norms. In this manner, society is 
increasingly reified, a process characterised by human beings’ collective loss of control over 
their conditions of existence which, increasingly, become shaped not by deliberative 
processes of consensualization, but by relations of power and money and the unplanned 
dynamics that arise from them.356 
 In this context, Habermas’s analysis points to an ‘indissoluble tension’ between 
reification and civilisation that characterizes the long-term process of human 
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development.357 On the one hand, the growing integration of society on the basis of 
communicative action permits a process of civilisation characterised by the expansion of 
human beings capacity to bring social processes under conscious control. On the other hand, 
communicative action also needs to be unburdened from the task of social integration in 
some social areas which is accomplished through their integration on the basis of strategic 
action. As such, the reification of society becomes a basic need of social reproduction at a 
certain stage of human development. However, while the lifeworld is released from the task 
of communicative integration through reification, it also needs to resist the complete 
reification of society to the extent that it represents a loss of communicative control over 
social development.358 Furthermore, as we discuss in the next chapter, Habermas notes that 
this tension only increases in the context of globe spanning webs of human 
interdependence, as systemic contexts tend to ignore the frontiers of welfare states and 
break down the distinction between domestic and international politics, as is exemplified by 
the progressive interweaving of national economies in the context of a world capitalist 
market.  
 By reading the above exposition of Habermas’s analysis of the dynamics of human 
development at the intra-societal level as an answer to the problem of orientation, it can be 
argued that Habermas is seeking to provide orientation regarding not only the historical 
potential for the expansion of people’s powers of self-determination which is opened up by 
the development of modern societies and post-conventional world-views, but also the 
constraints and limitations that this expansion necessarily encounters and has to respect. 
This is particularly evident in Habermas’s conclusions concerning the development of 
democracy in ‘Between Facts and Norms’. There, Habermas observes that despite the 
systemic character of capitalist economies and the bureaucratic apparatus of modern 
states, the post-conventional perspectives of modern citizens obliges states to at least 
partially embody the principles of discourse ethics in their institutions in the form of a 
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democratic elections system, of parliamentary politics, and of a system of law which is 
responsive to them. These institutions, in Habermas’s view, function as the main channels 
through which deliberative publics can influence the systemic contexts of the economy and 
the state’s bureaucracy. This influence is expressed in the form of processes of deliberative 
and public discussion in the public sphere of each state, which assess the validity of social 
norms and of the functioning of the state system, and which are channelled, in the form of 
communicative power, into the state’s institutions where they influence parliamentary 
politics and are transformed into legislative decisions and administrative power.359 
Consequently, the lifeworld of each society can have a democratic influence over the state, 
leading it to enact laws that protect the lifeworld from reification and which serve as a 
medium to establish greater communicative control over systemic contexts, namely, by 
normatively defining the boundary conditions for the operation of the capitalist economy 
and the state’s bureaucratic system.360  
 However, Habermas also observes that the realistic need for the reification of some 
social areas so as to release communicative action from the task of ensuring the complete 
integration of society implies that deliberative publics can never exercise complete 
communicative control over the whole of social integration and that some areas, such as the 
economy and the bureaucracy, have to remain outside the lifeworld in the form of more or 
less autonomous systems integrated on the basis of strategic action through the mediation 
of power and money.361 Consequently, it is Habermas’s argument that ‘democratic 
movements emerging from civil society must give up holistic aspirations to a self-organising 
society, which undergirded Marxist ideas of social revolution’.362 At the most, the lifeworld 
of each society can have only an ‘indirect effect’ on systemic contexts, through its influence 
in the enactment of the social norms circumscribing the functioning of the capitalist 
economy and the state.363  
 As such, we can argue that Habermas’s theory of social evolution and its analysis of 
modern welfare states, when interpreted as an orientating framework, seek to attune 
people to not only to the possibility, but also to the barriers to the expansion of their powers 
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of conscious control over the three dimensions of human existence. Habermas appears to 
abandon Marx’s vision of bringing under control the totality of social relations of a globally 
interdependent species, and rather seeks to attain a more detached perspective that 
recognises that the inherent complexity of modernity makes more totalizing political 
projects unsustainable not only because they are impractical, but because they might reveal 
themselves dangerous for social reproduction. In this context, we can thus consider that 
Habermas’s work points to the fact that a more adequate means of orientation under 
conditions of human global interdependence needs to recognise both the potential and the 
limits of human conscious control, and rather than advance political visions of a fully self-
determined future, needs to orientate people regarding how a more adequate balance can 
be struck between reifying and civilising trends in human development.364 As we argue in the 
next chapter, from the perspective of Habermas’s theory of social evolution, this balance can 
be achieved on the basis of the actualization of the cognitive potential of post-conventional 
world-views through the institutionalisation of the principles of discourse ethics at both the 
state level and at the level of world politics, in the regional and global associations of states 
regulating the long webs of human interdependence.365  
   
Conclusion 
 
Our reading of Habermas’s critical approach in this chapter leads us to argue that his theory 
of social evolution can be understood as an attempt to develop a more adequate means of 
orientation which overcomes Marx’s shortcomings in the form of an over-emphasis on 
human productive activity and a too linear connection between the development of human 
conscious control over nature and the universalisation of people’s perspectives. In particular, 
an analysis of Habermas’s work framed by our inquiry implies at least three conclusions 
regarding the problem of orientation. First, a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human 
condition requires a greater awareness of the role of the interplay between the different 
dimensions of the triad of controls in the species’ history. Second, this implies the need for a 
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theoretical framework that combines Kantian and Marxian themes by identifying the link 
between social processes such as the development of the forces of production, social norms, 
state formation and world politics in the development of the human powers of conscious 
control. In particular, Habermas highlights the central place that deliberative processes of 
consensualization of norms assume in the development of people’s self-control, control over 
nature and control over social processes. And third, Habermas’s critical approach also points 
us to how a more detached orientating framework must not only identify the immanent 
potential for an expansion of human self-determination but also recognise and attune 
people towards the necessary limits to the exercise of their powers of control. This implies 
not only maintaining Marx’s awareness about the need to more consciously control the 
human capacity for control, but also recognise, from a less involved point of view, that the 
complexity of the human condition is bound to make impossible totalising projects 
envisioning the complete self-determination of the species, and that a more realistic 
assessment of the human conditions of existence rather implies a constant balancing act 
between planned and unplanned social processes.  
 At the end of this chapter, we noticed that this balance implies a constant tension 
between reifying and civilising trends in the long-term history of the species, and that this 
tension is magnified in the context of the globe spanning webs of human interdependence 
which blur the distinction between the intra- and inter-societal politics. In the next chapter, 
we further develop this argument through an analysis of Habermas’s work on world politics. 
There, we argue that Habermas’s proposal for the constitutionalization of world society can 
be read as providing an orientating framework regarding how human beings might attain a 
better balance between planned and unplanned social processes and thus extend their 
conscious control over their conditions of existence and the globalisation of the species. 
Furthermore, we also address the shortcomings Habermas’s work and what these teaches us 
about the inadequacy of a theory of social evolution as an answer to the problem of 
orientation.  
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Chapter Five 
Jürgen Habermas 
The political constitution of world society 
 
At the end of the previous chapter we addressed Habermas’s argument that the latest stage 
in the global interweaving of the species intensifies the tension between civilisation and 
reification verified in modern welfare states. In this chapter, we continue to address 
Habermas’s work from the point of view of our inquiry into the problem of orientation to 
argue that his writings on world politics can be read as providing an orientating framework 
regarding how a more adequate balance can be struck between planned and unplanned 
social processes by actualising the cognitive potential present in the post-conventional 
world-views and consciousness structures of modern citizens. In particular, we address 
Habermas’s proposal for the political constitution of world society as a reconstruction of 
Kant’s proposal for perpetual peace which tries to express a more cosmopolitan perspective 
on the human condition on the basis of which people can better attune to the reality of 
their global interconnection.   
 Furthermore, at the end of this chapter we also turn to a discussion of the 
shortcomings that can be identified in Habermas’s critical approach and what these imply 
for the development of a more adequate means of orientation.  We argue that despite 
Habermas’s capacity to produce a more comprehensive analysis of the role of the triad of 
basic controls in human development, he relies on a theoretical framework which, 
ultimately, is incapable of providing a more detached perspective on the conditions of 
existence of globalised humanity and function as a more cosmopolitan orientating 
framework. In particular, we note that the distinction between the logic and the dynamics 
of human development which structures Habermas’s theory of social evolution, as well as 
its recovery of a transcendental ascertainment of the conditions of human freedom, not 
only recovers the dualism between history and morality which undermines Kant’s critical 
approach, but poses, despite Habermas’s claims to the contrary, a linear and teleological 
interpretation of human historical development. We thus conclude that an answer to the 
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problem of orientation based on a theory of social evolution like Habermas’s is incapable of 
actualising the potential that we identified in chapter three in Marx’s materialist and 
emergentist approach for the production of a model of the species’ history that captures its 
multi-linear and open-ended character. Instead, its falls back upon a modernist form of 
theorising which reveals a more involved perspective and remains unable to escape the 
society and time bound horizon of Western modernity. This conclusion leads us, in chapter 
six, to argue that the beginning of a more adequate approach to the problem of orientation 
can be found outside the critical theoretical tradition, in Elias’s process sociology, whose 
materialist and emergentist approach to human development, focused on the sociological 
study of the empirical dynamics of the long-term history of the species, constitutes an 
alternative to Habermas’s reconstruction of Marx’s critical theory.  
 The present chapter is divided in three main sections. First, we address Habermas’s 
observations on how human global interweaving produces a developmental problem to 
welfare states that undermines the degree of democratic control that their citizens are 
capable of exercising over systemic contexts. Second, we discuss the orientating function of 
Habermas’s proposal for the political constitution of world society regarding how human 
beings can more consciously regulate the networks of their social interdependence and 
struck a better balance between the civilising and the reifying trends which accompany the 
latest stage in the global integration of the species. And finally, in the third section, we 
consider how our analysis of Habermas’s work throughout these two chapters informs our 
inquiry into the problem of orientation.  
 
1. Global interdependence and human control 
 
According to Habermas, the growth in human interdependence enables social areas 
integrated on the basis of strategic action to escape the democratic control of deliberative 
publics in welfare states, effectively abolishing the distinction between intra- and inter-
societal processes and disturbing the balance between civilisation and reification in favour 
of the latter. This discussion sets the stage for our analysis, in the second section, of 
Habermas’s proposal for the political constitution of world society as an orientating 
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framework regarding how this balance can be changed through an extension of the 
communicative control of the citizens of modern welfare states to the level of world politics.   
 In ‘The Postnational Constellation’, Habermas argues that the liberalisation of 
financial markets and capital movement integrates national economies into a global 
capitalist market that escapes the national control of welfare states.366 With the growing 
intricacy of the global networks of capital flows, the autonomous systemic dynamics of 
capitalism are unleashed from the boundary conditions established by national democratic 
publics and become capable of developing of their own accord in conditions of greater 
autonomy. The capacity to freely move capital across the webs of the world economy 
means that, increasingly, important areas of society are submitted to relations on the basis 
of money as the main means of social integration.367 This enables multinational companies 
to withhold investment in certain states or social areas – blocking access to important 
sources of revenue through taxation – unless states undergo reforms that make their 
internal conditions more adequate to the needs and interests of capitalist corporations. In 
particular, states are increasingly compelled to compete with each other in making 
themselves more attractive to global business interests, namely, through the privatisation of 
areas such as health and education, the reduction of workers’ salaries, the extension of 
working hours, and a combination of increased taxes for citizens with a reduction of 
corporate taxes.368 These policies imply that states’ bureaucracies and governments, in 
responding to the imperatives of global capitalism, become predominantly a channel for the 
reification of national lifeworlds and for the distortion of their citizens’ capacity to exercise 
democratic control over their conditions of existence.369 Perceived as such, state 
representatives lose the democratic support of their citizens and face a combination of a 
legitimacy crisis with a public debt crisis, given the lack of funds to maintain the state’s 
social functions.370  
 Furthermore, accompanying the growing intricacy of global economic networks are 
the cumulative processes of worldwide expansion of migration flows and, with them, the 
global dispersion of cultures, fashions and world-views, as well as epidemics, organised 
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crime and terrorism.371 As such, welfare states find themselves ‘enmeshed in the 
dependencies of an increasingly interconnected world society’ whose systemic contexts 
‘effortlessly bypass territorial boundaries’.372 They become bound together in relations of 
shared vulnerability to the unplanned processes arising out of the global networks of human 
interdependence in their various dimensions. 
  Growing global interdependence thus creates a developmental problem that 
exhausts the adaptive capacity of welfare states and shifts the balance between civilising 
and reifying trends in human development. In light of Habermas’s theory of social evolution, 
such a situation demands the development of a new principle of social organisation for 
welfare states and world politics which expands states’ adaptive capacity and recovers 
people’s ability to exert democratic control over the systemic contexts that have now 
become global.373 Habermas’s analysis thus highlights how, for the first time in the history 
of the species, people face the need to learn how to become detached from the more 
involved and parochial points of view of their self-regarding political communities in order 
to produce a new principle of social organisation which matches the condition of human 
global interdependence.374 This new principle should ensure the institutional embodiment 
of a more cosmopolitan perspective both at the state level and at the level of regional and 
global associations of states, on the basis of which forms of post-national democracy can be 
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developed which ensure not only a greater degree of inter-state cooperation, but also the 
extension of the communicative power of deliberative publics to world politics in a manner 
that extends peoples’ powers of conscious control over the unplanned dynamics of global 
systemic contexts. Effectively, such a principle of social organisation would promote the 
projection, beyond states’ boundaries, of the civilising process which has already been 
taking place in the context of welfare states.  
 However, Habermas’s writings on world politics, especially those concerned with the 
Iraq War, can also be read as indicating that more involved and society bound perspectives 
continue to block the path towards the development of more cosmopolitan forms of 
orientation amongst human beings. In particular, his observations on the hegemonic 
behaviour of the United States of America and its competition with other emergent and 
resurgent great powers, such as China or Russia, point to a permanence of behavioural 
patterns in world politics which intensify rather than address the developmental problem 
posed by global interdependence.375 The continued reliance of the great powers on their 
military, technological and economic superiority to create a global order compatible with 
their more ethnocentric interests constitutes an expression of the historical possibility for 
the emergence of what Habermas calls an ‘imperial alternative’ to the collective regulation 
of the global web of humanity.376 According to Habermas, the most likely future outcome of 
this alternative is the progressive emergence of a ‘Schmittian’ global order, characterized by 
the ‘alarming prospect of competition among hemispheres’.377 In his view, such a global 
order would, in effect, undermine the possibility of collective control over the process of 
globalisation, as the unplanned dynamics arising out of great power competition would 
push people and states into patterns of interaction not intended by any of them, and with 
potentially harmful implications for all the participants.378  
 In this context, Habermas’s project for the political constitution of world society can 
be understood as an attempt to attain a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human 
condition which orientates people as to how they can detach from the more involved points 
of view of their societies locked in competitive struggles and rather promote a 
transformation of world politics which expands people’s collective capacity to regulate the 
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unplanned dynamics of their global interdependence. As we argue in the next section, this 
project is presented in its most developed version in the book ‘The Crisis of the European 
Union: A Response’ which deals with how the long-term process of civilisation which has 
been developing at the state level can continue at the level of world politics.379 In particular, 
Habermas can be read as arguing that a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human 
condition must underline international efforts to pacify relations between states and 
regulate their anarchic competition for power. Furthermore, such pacification is a 
fundamental condition for the development of a new principle of social organisation for 
world politics which entails the establishment of post-national procedures and institutions – 
as well as new forms of solidarity between human beings organised as different state 
societies – on the basis of which a higher degree of democratic control can be exercised 
over global systemic dynamics.380  
 
2. The political constitution of world society 
 
In essays such as ‘Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred Years’ Historical Remove’ 
and ‘Does the Constitutionalization of International Law Still Have a Chance?’, Habermas 
characterises his project for the political constitution of world society as a reconstruction of 
Kant’s project for perpetual peace in light of the innovations that have occurred in the legal 
domestication of state power since Kant’s time.381 He argues that Kant adopts the proposal 
for a non-coercive and voluntary League of Nations as a ‘surrogate’ to the ideal 
transcendental model of a world federation as a consequence of Kant’s realistic recognition 
that states would not accept any compromise of their absolute sovereignty.382 However, in 
Habermas’s assessment, the League of Nations concedes too much autonomy to state 
sovereignty and ignores the possibility of controlling the arbitrary power of states through 
the reinforcement of the inherent legitimacy and compelling character of international law 
via the extension of the democratic influence of deliberative publics to the level of world 
politics.383 In particular, Habermas observes that the process of legal domestication of state 
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power through international law, and in particular the innovations that have occurred at the 
level of international criminal law since Kant’s time, open the way for an alternative model 
to Kant’s League of Nations. They demonstrate that, even in the absence of a supranational 
monopoly of violence ensuring the application of international law, states frequently and 
voluntarily comply with it as a consequence of their recognition of its inherent legitimacy as 
an embodiment of not only inter-state strategic agreements but also of principles which are 
assumed to hold universal validity to all human beings and which have already been the 
result of a long historical process of consensualization within and between republican 
states. At the level of world politics there thus occurs what Habermas calls a ‘decoupling’ of 
law and state power.384 
 In this context, Habermas refers to the United Nations (UN) charter which, while 
recognising the principle of ‘sovereign equality’ in Article 2, also grants the organisation, in 
Article 7, the right to intervene in states in the name of international security or, more 
recently, the protection of the human rights of citizens of failing states or who are subject to 
the threat of criminal governments.385 According to Habermas, the charter thus implies not 
only that member-states of the UN have come to grant the Security Council the 
‘competence to protect the rights of their citizens against their own governments’, but also 
that it is becoming increasingly more adequate to describe the world organisation as ‘a 
community of states and citizens’.386 In Habermas’s assessment, these innovations in 
international law and its applicability show that it is possible to curtail the autonomy of 
state sovereignty – and even open the way for international intervention envisioning the 
protection of human rights – without a world state. Instead, the domestication of world 
politics can be achieved through a reinforcement of the legitimacy of international law by 
making its constitution dependent not only on decision-making processes between 
sovereign states but also on deliberative consensualization between world citizens.387  
 Following these observations, Habermas argues that a non-coercive and voluntary 
League of Nations is not the only alternative to a world federation of states.388 Rather, the 
cosmopolitan condition envisioned by Kant can be achieved through the political 
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constitution of world society in the form of a multi-level political organisation which 
encompasses all possible levels of human interdependence and which, while lacking the 
character of a world state, is ‘embedded within the framework of a world organisation with 
the power to impose peace and implement human rights’.389 Habermas proposes that 
different competencies should fall into each of these levels. Hence, the supranational level 
of the UN should be circumscribed to functions of securing peace and promoting human 
rights while the intermediate transnational level should address ‘global domestic problems’ 
such as the regulation of the capitalist global economy and the protection of non-human 
nature.390 As Habermas notes, at the present historical juncture only great powers such as 
the United States of America, Russia or China have the necessary capacity to operate at the 
transnational level and establish continental regimes regulating economic, social and 
environmental policies in their respective areas of the globe. Consequently, in order to 
further give shape to this politically constituted world society, states in the various regions 
of the world would have to unite to form continental regimes ‘on the model of the 
European Union’.391 Moreover, each of these levels needs to be regulated by international 
norms which are constituted on the basis of deliberative processes involving both the states 
and the citizens who stand to be affected by them. In this manner, Habermas guarantees 
that they possess the required legitimacy to curtail the arbitrary autonomy of state 
sovereignty and that the national lifeworlds of each state are able to extent their 
communicative control over systemic contexts, such as the global economy and the inter-
state system, which have escaped the regulatory capacity of welfare states. Habermas’s 
proposal for the political constitution of world society thus inaugurates a new principle of 
social organisation for world politics on the basis of which the developmental problem 
posed by human global interdependence can be solved.  
 From the point of view of our inquiry into the problem of orientation, Habermas’s 
writings on world politics can thus be understood as striving to achieve a more 
cosmopolitan perspective which matches the reality of human global interdependence and 
which is capable of promoting a growing detachment in peoples’ points of view away from 
the more parochial interests of their self-regarding political communities. It strives to 
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orientate people towards a more adequate assessment of both the potentials and the limits 
for the expansion of human self-determination, and to a better understanding of what 
transformations human political institutions need to undergo in order for the species to 
achieve a truly cosmopolitan condition which enables human beings to alter the balance 
between planned and unplanned social processes and thus extend their capacity to 
consciously regulate their conditions of existence.  
 The next two subsections are dedicated to a more in-depth discussion of how 
Habermas’s proposal for the political constitution of world society fulfils this orientating 
function. The first subsection is focused on Habermas’s work on the European Union – 
which, according to him, should serve as the model for the constitution of regional 
associations of states that fulfil the tasks attributed to the transnational level of the multi-
level world society – while the second subsection addresses his proposal for the reform of 
the United Nations.  
 
2.1. The European model 
 
According to Habermas, the political constitution of world society requires that states in the 
various regions of the world enter into continental associations which carry out functions 
regarding the regulation of the social, economic and environmental conditions of human 
existence in their respective areas of the globe. These continental unions must be based on 
the model of the European Union given that it is the longest existent effort at extending the 
civilising process initiated within states to the international level.392 As Habermas observes, 
this civilising effort has been developed in order to not only pacify the inter-state relations 
of a continent ‘drenched in blood’ but also to develop decision-making and steering 
capacities beyond the state level, which enable European states to collectively exercise a 
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greater degree of collective control over both the systemic dynamics of inter-societal 
relations and of the capitalist world economy.393  
 However, Habermas also notes that this civilising process is far from finished insofar 
as the pacification of inter-state relations and the development of European decision-
making institutions have not been matched by their concomitant democratization.394 
Decision-making processes at the level of the EU continue to be shaped predominantly by 
strategic action, i.e. by relations of power between states that escape the influence of 
national public spheres while producing decisions that have a profound effect in the 
conditions of existence of the populations of each state. Hence, Habermas claims that 
European law, while enabling the self-regulation of the European system of states, 
frequently lacks legitimacy in the eyes of European citizens, given how it violates the ‘all-
affected principle’ of discourse ethics, in the sense that it is not constituted by deliberative 
processes of consensualization between all those who stand to be affected by it.395 In 
Habermas’s assessment, the present character of the EU is thus better described as a form 
of ‘executive federalism’, in which the European Council, composed of representatives of 
each state, enacts measures that are implemented at the national level through 
governmental majorities that disempower national parliaments and escape the control of 
deliberative national publics.396 As such, national state systems can use European 
institutions to escape the regulation of national public spheres, and recover a degree of 
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systemic autonomy from the normative constraints of national lifeworlds. Habermas thus 
sees the EU as a highly contradictory social formation. On the one hand, it has contributed 
to the pacification of European inter-state relations and to the development of European 
institutions with the capacity to extend legal and democratic control over systemic contexts 
which have overcome national boundaries. But, on the other hand, these same institutions 
reinforce the autonomy of state power vis-à-vis national lifeworlds and diminish the level of 
collective democratic control that people are capable of exercising over it. The EU thus 
appears as an arrangement for exercising a ‘kind of post-democratic, bureaucratic rule’.397 
 However, Habermas also observes that the development of European institutions 
and the legal pacification of the continent have established the historical conditions for the 
possibility of extending democratic decision-making to the transnational level of world 
society. Such an extension would permit the constitution of a European ‘transnational 
democracy’ that further approximates the actualization of the ideal universal 
communication community of discourse ethics by institutionally embodying the all-affected 
principle.398 The main difficulty facing the democratization of the EU, Habermas argues, is 
that except for a still weak European Parliament, democratic institutions of decision-making 
continue predominantly tied to the state level. In this context, Habermas recalls the 
argument advanced by authors such as Dieter Grimm, according to whom the 
democratization of the EU is impossible given the absence of a common European identity 
that could create bonds of solidarity between European citizens and permit them to form a 
single constitutional subject. As Habermas observes, this argument – characterized as the 
‘no demos thesis’ – ‘is based on the assumption that only a nation united by a shared 
language, tradition, and history can provide the necessary basis for a political 
community’.399 Nonetheless, the no demos thesis can be contested in light of Habermas’s 
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theory of social evolution by noting that the post-conventional world-views of the citizens of 
modern states already hold the cognitive potential to overcome the nation as the main 
principle of social organisation for the constitution of political community.400  
 As seen in the previous chapter, Habermas considers that post-conventional 
perspectives make the validity of social norms dependent on the extent to which these 
derive from universal principles that have been constituted in deliberative processes of 
consensualization involving all those who stand to be affected by them. This deliberative 
character of the validity of law, according to Habermas, implies a decoupling in people’s 
perspectives of law and decision-making processes from the background of shared national 
traditions. From a post-conventional point of view, decision-making processes concerning 
common problems ‘are addressed in light of principles of justice rather than in terms of the 
fate of the nation’, given how people’s ‘emotional fixation’ moves from the national state to 
the deliberatively constituted law.401 Increasingly, civic solidarity can be defined not by 
belonging to a shared national state, but instead by a common allegiance to deliberatively-
achieved constitutional principles embodied in law.402 Habermas calls this post-conventional 
emotional connection with the principles of law, ‘constitutional patriotism’.403  
 Constitutional patriotism can thus be understood as a fundamental aspect of the 
new principle of social organisation for world politics to the extent that it guarantees the 
possibility of the historical emergence of new and more detached forms of attunement 
between people, characterised by an expansion of solidarity beyond the frontiers of a 
particular nation. Habermas’s observations on constitutional patriotism thus serve an 
orientating function to the citizens of European states towards the potential that is already 
immanent in their post-conventional world-views for the development of more 
cosmopolitan perspectives on the basis of which a European-wide civic solidarity can be 
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developed which unites individuals from different states on the basis of a shared allegiance 
to the principles of European law, which they collectively recognise as legitimate and valid if 
these principles are derived from deliberative processes of decision-making involving all of 
those that stand to be affected by them.404  
 In this context, Habermas argues that the European Union can already be 
understood as partially actualizing the cognitive potential of modern post-conventional 
world-views. This is particularly expressed, Habermas observes, in the December 2007 
Lisbon treaty which recognises both the national peoples (represented by their states), and 
the citizens of the EU as its constitutional subjects.405 In Habermas’s view, the Lisbon treaty 
thus confirms de jure what the EU has historically denied de facto; i.e. that the legitimacy of 
European law arises from its constitution involving both the citizens and the member-states 
of the union. Consequently, Habermas argues that the transformation of the EU into a 
transnational democracy can be brought about if the union turns its legal notion of a ‘dual 
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constitutional subject’ into an institutional reality.406 As Habermas observes, the 
institutional apparatus required for the actualization of this dual constitutional subject 
already exists, in the form of European citizenship and institutions such as the European 
Parliament and the European Council. What is required is that these institutions embody the 
cognitive potential present in post-conventional world-views by establishing a European-
wide ‘two-track’ decision-making process, which enables individuals, both in their quality of 
European citizens and of citizens of their respective national states, to participate – 
respectively in the Parliament and the Council – in the constitution of European law.407  
 This scenario implies that the ‘same persons’ would embody these two roles in 
‘personal union’.408 As such, individuals would need to be aware that they are required to 
adopt ‘different justice perspectives’ depending on which of the two decision-making tracks 
is involved. What counts as a ‘public interest’ in deliberative processes which they 
undertake as citizens of a state would change into a ‘particularistic interest’ in deliberative 
processes which they undertake as European citizens.409 This tension, Habermas observes, 
arises from the dual character of the decision-making process, and would have important 
consequences for the democratic character of the European Union. On the one hand, the 
fact that European law would derive from deliberative processes of decision-making 
involving the citizens of the European Union would ensure its democratic legitimacy and 
reinforce its compelling power to regulate inter-state relations, even in the absence of a 
European monopoly over the means of violence. Furthermore, it would also expands the 
degree of control that European citizens would be capable of exercising over the systemic 
contexts affecting the European continent – be it those of inter-state relations or those of 
the capitalist market – to the extent that the European law regulating those contexts would 
be an expression of democratic deliberative processes instead of only the outcome of the 
strategic calculations of national states. On the other hand, the fact that the dual 
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constitutional subject of the EU would be composed not only by European citizens but also 
by the states of the Union means that European law would not be able to subordinate the 
national constitutional laws and modes of life of each state. Each state would be capable of 
safeguarding its own internal legal and normative framework by ensuring that European law 
satisfied the standards of civil liberties that have already been historically achieved at the 
national level.410 Hence, European law would embody both the more cosmopolitan 
perspectives of European citizens, and protect the difference of the several cultural biotypes 
of each one of the national peoples of the Union.411  
 Habermas can thus be read in this context as striving to develop a means of 
orientation on the basis of his theory of social evolution which not only achieves but also 
promotes a more adequate involvement–detachment balance in people’s perspectives. In 
particular, he seeks to orientate human beings as to how the cosmopolitan potential of their 
post-conventional world-views can be actualised in a manner that enables them to bring 
under greater control the dynamics of their global interdependence, while still preserving 
the more particularistic expressions of human difference embodied in their respective 
political communities. In this manner, Habermas can be seen here as striving for a more 
adequate response to the problem of orientation, capable of achieving a truly cosmopolitan 
perspective on the human condition that encompasses both the unity of the species and the 
diversity and multiple forms of human self-expression and self-determination. However, as 
we argue in the last section of this chapter, despite Habermas’s work highlighting the need 
for such a perspective and how political organisations built on the basis of the notion of a 
dual constitutional subject might point the way for its actualisation in world politics, still, his 
theory of social evolution locks him in a linear and teleological conception of human 
development which ultimately undermines his capacity to maintain this perspective and the 
adequacy of his theoretical framework as a means of orientation.   
 According to Habermas, the transformation of the European Union into a 
transnational democratic association of states and citizens would constitute a ‘further step’ 
in the political constitution of world society and in the extension of the civilising process to 
the level of world politics by enabling deliberative publics to acquire a greater degree of 
collective and conscious control over the systemic dynamics of inter-state and global 
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economic relations which have escaped their control within welfare states.412 
Democratically-constituted European law would be the means through which European 
citizens might circumscribe the international behaviour of states within normatively 
acceptable and deliberatively consensualized boundaries, in a manner that would open the 
way for the further pacification and regulation of  the unplanned social processes arising 
from anarchic inter-state competition. Moreover, it would ideally enable European citizens 
to also tame global capitalism by establishing legal boundaries delimiting the operation of 
transnational markets on the continent, and by developing European social measures to 
protect both citizens and states from the unplanned dynamics of capitalist development.413  
 In relation to this last point, Habermas mentions the possibility for the future 
development of continent-wide social policies that substitute the social security functions 
previously undertaken at the level of welfare states, and which envision the elimination of 
the ‘fault lines’ separating rich and poor nations as well as the progressive ‘uniformity’ of 
living standards between countries.414 This uniformity could further reinforce European civic 
solidarity, especially if coupled with the progressive development of a European public 
sphere complementing the representation of European citizens and states in the decision-
making institutions of the EU. According to Habermas, an European public sphere would 
constitute the arena in which European citizens could engage in deliberative processes 
regarding European law and the development of the European project which would lead 
people to take each other’s points of view in a manner that might reinforce their capacity to 
attain a more detached perspective on their conditions of existence and develop forms of 
mutual emotional identification and civic solidarity which overcome the frontiers of their 
particular political communities. In Habermas’s view, an European public sphere does not 
need to substitute national public spheres, but would rather complement them by being 
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developed through the ‘opening up’ of national public spheres to each other. This would 
involve a greater coverage, by news outlets, of European issues in national public spheres, 
but also more ‘reports on the political positions and controversies that the same topics 
evoke in other member states’.415  
 However, as we discuss in the next subsection, Habermas considers that regional 
organisations constituted according to the model of an European Union transformed into a 
transnational democracy can only enable the expansion of human self-determination in 
relation to global social processes if framed at the supranational level by a world 
organisation responsible for imposing peace and promoting respect for human rights.  
  
2.2. The cosmopolitan condition 
 
According to Habermas, the civilising function of democratic legal control over systemic 
contexts across national borders derives its impetus from a ‘paralysing constellation’ in 
world politics.416 The globalisation of human interdependence has led to the ‘exhaustion’ of 
the adaptive capacity of human beings organised as states to answer the developmental 
problems posed by global inter-state competition and capitalism, which have developed 
‘beyond the control of even the most powerful states’.417 As such, transnational efforts at 
democratic legal regulation such as those of the European Union need to be complemented 
by a world organisation operating at the supranational level which integrates regional 
attempts for an expansion of human control over global systemic dynamics.418  
 In this context, Habermas notes that such a supranational organisation is 
fundamental for the attainment of a truly cosmopolitan condition which politically matches 
the reality of human global interdependence and enables human beings to bring under 
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greater collective and conscious control the unplanned social processes which arise from 
their species-wide interconnection. Essential in this context, Habermas observes, is that this 
world organisation operates a 'transition’ of international law to cosmopolitan law.419 As we 
saw in chapter two, Kant’s proposal for a League of Nations places cosmopolitan law as a 
complement to international law, in the sense that it regulates state interactions with 
individuals possessing the status of world citizens, and it is constituted by decision-making 
processes between the member-states of the League. Habermas comes instead to argue 
that cosmopolitan law should supersede international law by being constituted through 
decision-making processes involving not only states but also world citizens, in their role as 
constitutional subjects of the world organisation. This dual constitutionalization of 
cosmopolitan law, Habermas argues, would grant it a higher degree of democratic 
legitimacy than current international law and thus reinforce its compelling power next to 
states in a manner that might not only diminish their arbitrary power over post-national 
legal frameworks but also reinforces the legitimacy of the international organisation to 
intervene in states which violate cosmopolitan law by threatening peace or committing 
crimes against human rights. As such, Habermas argues that in the same manner that 
international law should be transformed into European law in the context of the EU by being 
constituted by both its member-states and European citizens, so too it must be transformed 
into cosmopolitan law in the context of the United Nations. World politics would thus 
transition to a true cosmopolitan condition, as the world organisation would enact norms 
that would be the product of processes of deliberative consensualization between the 
world’s states and world citizens, and thus historically approximate the actualisation of the 
principles of discourse ethics and its projection of an ideal universal communication 
community.420 The UN would have to institutionally embody, at the supranational level, the 
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two innovations that characterize the transnational level of the EU, and are made possible 
by the cognitive potential present in modern post-conventional world-views and 
consciousness structures. On the one hand, it would have to ensure the compliance of 
member states with cosmopolitan law even though the monopolies over the means of 
legitimate violence remain at state level. And, on the other hand, it would have to 
institutionally embody a dual constitutional subject, composed of both world citizens and 
national peoples (represented by their respective states, or by other representative entities, 
such as NGO’s, in the case of sub-state or stateless peoples).421 The civilising effect of 
Habermas’s envisioned constitutionalization of world society thus relies heavily on a 
combination between states’ self-restraint and voluntary respect for a cosmopolitan law 
with reinforced legitimacy, the pressures of world public opinion and inter-state relations, 
and the capacity of the world organisation to intervene in states that threaten this 
cosmopolitan condition. Fundamental in this context is the development of more 
cosmopolitan orientations both at the state level and at the level of individual personality 
structures that better attune people to the long chains of interdependence in which their 
actions are enmeshed and underline practices of deliberative consensualization of the 
universal principles and behavioural expectations that should be observed in their context. 
These more detached orientations would promote less ethnocentric political communities 
and reinforce greater self-restraint on part of states as well as enable their citizens to step 
back from their more involved attachments to the nation-state to evaluate, support or 
condemn their states’ behaviour in accordance with more universalistic standards.     
 According to Habermas, the decoupling of law and state power can already be 
discerned in the current institutional framework of the United Nations while the 
actualisation of a dual constitutional subject requires the attribution to every single human 
being on the planet of the status of world citizen and the constitution, parallel with the 
General Assembly, of a world parliament composed of their elected representatives.422 
Habermas maintains that the world parliament would not transform the United Nations into 
a world republic, but would reinforce the democratic legitimacy of cosmopolitan law by 
making world citizens, alongside with states, one of its two constitutional subjects. 
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Furthermore, in the same manner as what would occur at the level of an EU transformed 
into a transnational democracy, cosmopolitan law would not subordinate national state law 
or modes of life. On the one hand, member states, as the second constitution-founding 
subject, would be able to protect their internal orders from cosmopolitan law that did not 
meet the standards of civil liberties that have already been historically achieved at the state 
level.423 On the other hand, the lack of a supranational monopoly over the means of 
violence means that the world organisation would have to rely on ‘national monopolists’ in 
the fulfilment of its tasks, including those envisioning the implementation of coercive 
measures in order to sanction the violation of cosmopolitan law.424 According to Habermas, 
the need for the world organisation to rely on member-states in this manner not only 
confirms the decoupling between law and state power that characterizes the political 
constitution of world society but also further ensures the protection of the autonomy of 
states through the maintenance of the monopoly over the means of violence at the state 
level. Habermas’s proposal for the political constitution of world society at the 
supranational level thus exhibits once again an attempt to produce a means of orientation 
which achieves an involvement–detachment balance that simultaneously actualises the 
cosmopolitan attunement of world citizens with post-conventional world-views, while 
protecting and safeguarding the difference of their more particularistic cultural self-
expressions and more involved emotional attachments to their historical political 
communities.425    
 In this context, and as already mentioned, Habermas argues that the world 
organisation must restrict itself to the tasks of maintaining peace and protecting human 
rights, leaving decision-making processes related to economic, social or ecological problems 
to the transnational level of world society.426 The restriction of the UN to this narrow set of 
core functions derives from Habermas’s argument that issues related to economic, social or 
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ecological problems, while expressing a ‘shared abstract interest’ of all human beings, 
necessarily imply answers that relate to particular conceptions of the ‘good life’.427 These 
are issues whose answers involve the self-affirmation of particular cultural and political 
identities and, as such, while admitting of collective answers between people who share 
common cultural characteristics – as part of their collective history and belonging to a 
particular region of the globe – they are not liable to be addressed by truly universal 
decisions arising from global processes of deliberation between world citizens.428 
Consequently, these issues should be dealt with at the transnational level, where 
continental unions of states in the same cultural areas can potentially come closer to 
common agreements on preferable ‘ways of life’.429 However, the same judgement does not 
apply to issues of world peace and human rights. In Habermas’s view, these issues express 
an a priori general interest shared by the world’s population ‘beyond all political-cultural 
divisions’ in the avoidance of violence and in the expression of solidarity with ‘everything 
that has a human face’.430 These issues thus have an inherently universal character, to the 
extent that shared human vulnerability to war and violence is a common feature of the 
species. As such, their discussion is liable to produce truly cosmopolitan answers, arrived at 
through global processes of consensualization of norms involving world citizens and all the 
states into which humankind is divided. The world organisation, Habermas argues, must 
thus restrict itself to these issues that admit of universally shared human interests.  
  The universal, species-wide, character of the core functions of the UN also means 
that the world organisation has different legitimacy requirements than the transnational 
level of continental unions. As Habermas argues, given that ‘negative duties to refrain from 
justifiable human rights violations and wars of aggression are rooted in the core moral 
contents of all the major world religions and in the cultures they have shaped’, global civic 
solidarity amongst world citizens can be based on these shared convictions and does not 
require a deeper collective commitment to a common conception of the ‘good life’, as 
occurs at the transnational level.431 Consequently, the democratic assessment of the 
deliberative decision-making processes of the world parliament can be based only on the 
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‘expression of the, in essence morally justified, ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the supranational application 
of presumptively shared moral principles and norms’.432 So, while the legitimacy of law at 
the transnational European level demands not only a dual constitutional subject but also the 
permanent discussion of transnational issues in a European public sphere, the weaker 
legitimacy requirements of cosmopolitan law do not demand the formation of a permanent 
global public sphere. They simply require the thematic and temporally circumscribed 
constitution of a global public ‘sparked intermittently by this or that major event without 
achieving structural permanence’.433  
 Our analysis of Habermas’s writings on the political constitution of world society 
clearly reveals the orientating function of his theory of social evolution when applied to the 
study of the dynamics of human development. It shows how this theory can be understood 
as a means of orientation that guides both Habermas’s explanatory analysis of the 
developmental problems posed by human global interdependence and his anticipatory 
answer regarding how to institutionally embody the cognitive potential of the post-
conventional perspectives of modern citizens in the political institutions of world society in a 
manner that ensures the further historical actualisation of the principles of discourse ethics 
and its ideal projection of a universal communication community. In this context, we can 
argue that Habermas is attempting to attain a more cosmopolitan perspective which 
recognises and protects human difference and thus achieves a more adequate involvement–
detachment balance that avoids the reproduction of modernist myths and their legitimation 
of relations of domination and exclusion associated with more parochial and ethnocentric 
points of view. However, as the next section shows, despite Habermas’s efforts in this 
direction, his theory of social evolution is ultimately revealed as a barrier to his capacity to 
maintain this cosmopolitan perspective and undermines the adequacy of his work as an 
answer to the problem of orientation.  
 
3. Orientation in history 
 
Throughout this and the previous chapter we have highlighted several aspects of 
Habermas’s work which show us how a more adequate means of orientation might be 
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produced which is capable of attaining a more cosmopolitan perspective regarding the 
conditions of existence of globalised humanity and how people might develop a greater 
degree of collective and conscious control over them. In particular, we have highlighted 
Habermas’s capacity to combine Kantian and Marxian themes in a single grand narrative in 
order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the role of the triad of controls in 
the species’ history. Moreover, our analysis also pointed to the way in which the political 
constitution of world society based on processes of deliberative consensualization of social 
norms at all levels human interdependence might orientate people to the attainment of 
more detached and less parochial world-views which are protective of difference and of 
more involved emotional attachments to particular political communities.   
 However, throughout these chapters we also observed that Habermas’s writings 
reveal significant shortcomings which highlight why a more adequate answer to the 
problem of orientation cannot rely on a theory of social evolution and its distinction 
between the logic and the dynamics of human development. In this section, we return to 
these arguments with reference to two critiques of Habermas’s work which are particularly 
instructive for our purposes. First, we return to Hutching’s analysis of the problem of 
orientation to focus on her critique of Habermas and argue that his recovery of a 
transcendental answer to the anticipatory dimension of orientation reproduces the 
problems, already addressed in chapter two, connected with Kant’s critical approach. And 
second, we complement this argument with reference to Honneth and Joas’s critique to 
argue that Habermas’s reliance on a linear and teleological conception of the 
developmental logic of human competences constitutes an inadequate explanatory model 
of the species’ history which is fundamentally incapable of reconnecting back to actual 
historical events. These two lines of argument ultimately express how Habermas’s 
reconstruction of Marx’s critical approach through a theory of social evolution is not only 
unable to actualise the latter’s immanent potential for a non-transcendental, multi-linear 
and open-ended model of human development but also throws Habermas back upon a 
modernist form of theorising which undermines his work as an answer to the problem of 
orientation.   
 As indicated in chapter four, Habermas recovers a Kantian type of transcendental 
answer to the anticipatory dimension of orientation in the form of discourse ethics and its 
ideal projection of a universal communication community. According to Habermas, 
180 
 
discourse ethics avoids the problems connected with Kant’s own transcendental approach 
in at least two ways. First, it does not imply a dualism between ideal and empirical history. 
And second, it is not a monological standpoint but derives from intersubjective practices of 
deliberative assessment of validity claims. However, we also argued in that chapter that 
Habermas’s claim to have overcome the shortcomings of Kant’s approach should be 
questioned, a position shared with Hutchings in her work on the two authors.434  
 Hutchings considers that Habermas’s transcendental normative approach becomes 
particularly problematic when he seeks to assess the possibility for the actualization of 
discourse ethics in the actual course of human historical development. According to 
Hutchings, Habermas seeks to avoid the pitfalls of Kantian philosophical history which only 
manages to close the gulf between the dimension of empirical history and the moral idea of 
the kingdom of ends by reading historical development ‘as if’ it is progressing towards the 
actualization of the ideal condition of freedom.435 As we saw in chapter four, Habermas 
strives to avoid a similar approach through a theoretical distinction between the logic and 
the empirical dynamics of human historical development. In this manner, Habermas’s 
theory of social evolution provides a logical framework of the several stages of development 
of moral-practical knowledge and social evolution that express the progressive disclosure of 
discourse ethics in people’s world-views and social formations. This framework does not 
intend to be a portrayal of actual historical processes, but to simply orientate the analysis of 
empirical history in order to assess particular historical junctures for both their degree of 
approximation to the ideal communication community and for the cognitive potential they 
gather for its further actualization. 
 However, Hutchings notes that the distinction that Habermas relies on to overcome 
Kant’s philosophy of history, between the logic and the dynamics of history, raises ‘some 
problems of its own’.436 In particular, the abstract logical framework of social evolution is 
incapable of justifying its own status as a means of orientation; if there is no guarantee that 
history will follow its logical direction how then can it be justified that it should provide the 
orientating standard on the basis of which the analysis of the dynamics of history should be 
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conducted?.437 As such, like with Kant’s philosophy of history, Habermas’s choice for the 
theory of social evolution as the framework through which to analyse empirical history 
depends only on the philosopher’s subjective judgement. Furthermore, Hutchings argues, 
Habermas’s attributed status to his theory of social evolution reproduces the relation 
between morality and history which is present in Kant’s work. It relies ‘on a particular 
relation between the empirical (…) and the moral (…) in which the latter is carried through, 
but also shapes, the former’.438 The most problematic consequence of this relation is that 
historical analysis becomes necessarily oriented by an abstract and unilinear conception of 
the ‘moral’ path of social evolution, which claims universal validity. This means that, even 
though Habermas expressly recognises the multi-linear path of the empirical dynamics of 
human history, his analysis of the long-term process of human development is necessarily 
orientated by a unilinear and teleological conception of what is the ‘progressive’ sequence 
of stages that must be empirically reproduced in order to approximate the moral ideal of 
discourse ethics. Hence, Habermas’s work, when read as a means of orientation, necessarily 
implies an evaluation of some human societies as more ‘mature’, ‘progressive’ or ‘morally-
adequate’ than others, which are considered ‘immature’, ‘morally backward’ or even 
‘failed’.439 Incidentally, modern Western democratic societies, which constitute Habermas’s 
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‘home for thought’, are identified as being those which embody the so far highest stage of 
social and moral development and, consequently, as being the ‘most grown up’ parts of the 
world.440 This has important implications for Habermas’s conception of human development 
in a long-term perspective, in the sense that it limits the range of possible ‘moral’ paths of 
development to the ‘temporal trajectory’ that has been undertaken by Western modernity, 
which serves as the ‘model’ of approximation to a moral condition that should be 
reproduced by other societies and cultures which still lie in the ‘past’ of modern Western 
‘maturity’.441 As Hutchings observes, Western political time becomes interpreted as ‘world-
political time, the time that drives or leads (or must be treated as if it drives or leads) 
historical development’.442  
 As much can be understood from Habermas’s writings on world politics and in 
particular from his claim that the European Union provides the model which other 
continental unions should follow in order to approximate a condition of greater 
actualization of the cognitive potential of modernity, measured in the post-conventional 
world-views and consciousness structures of modern Western citizens. As such, even 
though Habermas’s writings on world politics show a deep concern with attaining a 
cosmopolitan perspective which recognises and protects the plurality of the human 
condition – as is evidenced by his proposal for political institutions with a dual constitutional 
subject and his insistence on leaving issues of economic, social and environmental problems 
to the transnational level of a multilevel world society given the existence of different 
cultural and ethical conceptions of the ‘good life’ – his normative horizon continues to 
reveal a more involved perspective, circumscribed by Western modernity and the ‘moral’ 
path of historical development it has undergone and which is expected to be emulated by 
other regions of the globe.  
 The second part of our critique of Habermas follows closely from the first. In their 
book Social Action and Human Nature, Honneth and Joas analyse Habermas’s argument that 
his theory of social evolution, with its distinction between the logic and the dynamics of 
human development, ‘no longer has to assume the burden of proof for an actually existing, 
gradual process of social progress (…) but only has to demonstrate the logical necessity of 
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successive stages of development of socio-cultural formations’.443 As seen in the previous 
chapter, Habermas’s answer to the explanatory dimension of orientation, through which he 
attempts to capture the structure of human historical development, relies on an analysis of 
the developmental logic of social evolution in the form of a sequence of stages of 
development of moral-practical knowledge at the level of individual world-views and 
consciousness structures and their embodiment in social institutions as different principles 
of social organisation through which societies adapt to historically posed developmental 
problems.  
 However, Honneth and Joas argue that ‘a theory of social evolution that makes use 
of this pattern of explanation has completely detached itself from the real historical process 
which it is supposed to help structure’.444 It does so to the extent that it must ‘abstract’ 
from the events and experiences of social groups in order to ‘penetrate historical 
happenings’ and get at the ‘cognitive infrastructure’ of historical development.445 
Habermas’s analysis of the long-term process of human development thus becomes 
oriented to ‘finding historical evidence’ that substantiates the hypothesis of the ‘logical’ 
framework of social evolution.446 A consequence of this approach is that the researcher 
‘loses sight of historically innovative action that expresses itself in social movements 
without responding directly or intentionally to a [developmental] problem threatening 
society’.447 Hence, the ‘actual history’ of human societies and social movements becomes 
‘insignificant’ when compared with the ‘logical sequence’ of the stages of social 
evolution.448 Honneth and Joas thus accuse Habermas’s theory of social evolution of having 
become ‘so remote’ from ‘real historical happenings’ that it can hardly be ‘translated back’ 
into an analysis of the actual historical dynamics and social processes shaping human 
development.449 It is incapable of ‘linking back’ to the unique experiential situations of 
human beings with ‘the purpose of supplying practical orientation for acting subjects’.450   
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 Hutchings, Honneth and Joas’s critiques highlight how Habermas’s theory of social 
evolution locks him in a linear and teleological model of the species’ history through the 
lenses of which he addresses the empirical process of human historical development. From 
the point of view of our engagement with the problem of orientation, this means that 
despite Habermas’ expressed concern with the preservation of human difference the fact 
remains that his analysis is oriented by a stages-like conception of moral and social 
evolution that inherently characterises as ‘backward’ or ‘failed’ those forms of human self-
expression and paths of human development that do not follow his orientating scheme. 
Consequently, Habermas’s work reveals a more involved perspective than that to which he 
aspires; a perspective which remains bound to the historical and normative horizon of 
Western modernity. When regarded as an answer to the problem of orientation, 
Habermas’s approach can thus appear to resonate with people belonging to the political 
communities who have undergone the developmental process that serves as Habermas’ 
reference point, but it cannot serve an orientating function for other sections of humanity 
or for people striving to attain a more cosmopolitan perspective. In fact, it can actually be 
perceived as not only privileging a particularistic and ethnocentric point of view but also 
legitimizing practices of domination and exclusion in the name of cosmopolitanism and the 
self-determination of the species. In this manner, Habermas is unable to reach a more 
adequate involvement–detachment balance in his work, on the basis of which he attains a 
more cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition which is protective of difference 
and that provides a more adequate answer to the problem of orientation which guards 
against a reproduction of modernist grand narratives.   
 In this context, it can still be argued that Habermas’s envisioned actualisation of the 
principles of discourse ethics at the level of world politics through the institutionalisation of 
deliberative processes of consensualization of cosmopolitan law which ultimately 
encompass the whole species would ameliorate the more involved perspective that is 
advanced by his work by enabling the creation of dialogic communities oriented not only to 
identify what is universally shared between human beings but also to the manifestation and 
preservation of difference. However, the incapacity of his theory of social evolution to 
reconnect back to historical events means that Habermas remains unable to provide an 
orientating framework regarding the empirical potential for the actual setting up of these 
deliberative processes. Missing such a sociologically-oriented analysis Habermas is left with 
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an abstract model of the ideal path of human development which only provides a selective 
analysis of history, orientated towards the corroboration of its own theoretical 
expectations. Hence, even though against his stated purpose, the self-legitimation of 
Habermas’s critical theory comes to rely on the reproduction of the type of Kantian 
philosophical history which he seeks to avoid. 
 Our analysis of Habermas’s work reveals how he is ultimately unable to carry out a 
reconstruction of Marx’s critical approach that constitutes a more adequate answer to the 
problem of orientation. On the one hand, while Habermas shows a greater awareness of the 
role of the triad of controls in human development, he does not use it to further develop 
Marx’s non-transcendental answer to the anticipatory dimension of orientation and rather 
returns to a Kantian transcendental approach. On the other hand, he loses sight of the 
immanent potential of Marx’s materialist and emergentist approach for a multi-linear and 
open-ended model of the species’ history and instead adopts a linear and teleological 
theory of social evolution that recovers Kant’s more idealist approach. As such, despite 
Habermas’s recovery of Kantian themes that were lost in Marx, he also reproduces Kant’s 
shortcomings in a manner that ultimately undermines his capacity to attain a more 
cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition. 
 This conclusion leads us to argue that, with Habermas, critical theory comes at 
something of an impasse regarding its capacity to answer the problem of orientation. In 
fact, our analysis in this and the preceding chapters might lead us to ask if such an answer is 
even possible and a more adequate grand narrative can be developed that better attunes 
people to the challenges of their global interconnectedness, or if any attempt in this 
direction is condemned to reproduce modernist myths and totalising projects. However, we 
can also argue our analysis has highlighted several aspects of the works of Kant, Marx and 
Habermas that might point us in the direction of how a more adequate means of orientation 
can be developed which attains a more cosmopolitan perspective that recognises and 
preserves human difference and is thus better protected against the reproduction of 
modernist grand narratives. In particular, we can argue that a more adequate answer to the 
problem of orientation would have to gather the following characteristics: 1) it would have 
to be based on a materialist and emergentist approach to human development which is 
capable 2) of providing a non-transcendental answer to the anticipatory dimension of 
orientation and 3) an explanatory model of the history of the species which captures its 
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multi-linear and open-ended character. This could be achieved by 4) providing a more 
comprehensive understanding of the role of the triad of controls in the long-term process of 
human development through 5) an analysis of the interplay between social processes such 
as the development of the forces of production, social norms, state formation and world 
politics which 6) recognises the role of both inter-group competition and cooperation on the 
basis of deliberative processes of consensualization in the development of the human 
powers of self-determination.  
 The challenge still remains, however, of how these characteristics can be brought 
together in a single grand narrative concerning the long-term history of the development 
and globalisation of the human species. In the next chapters we try to answer this question. 
There, we take a detour away from critical theory to address Elias’s process sociology from 
the perspective of our inquiry. In particular, we follow Elias’s argument that the fund of 
knowledge which is available to human beings about the long-term process of human 
development is still insufficient to provide adequate guidance regarding how people might 
bring under greater control the social processes which shape their conditions of existence. 
This position leads Elias to develop a sociological approach to human development which, 
rather than seek for the structure of history on the basis of which he can provide orientation 
as to how people can make more of their history under conditions of their own choosing, is 
instead engaged in an attempt to capture the main features of the species’ history and the 
way in which these are variously manifested in multiple developmental paths which are 
becoming increasingly intertwined at the global scale. Elias can thus be said to take a detour 
from the anticipatory dimension of orientation to rather focus on its explanatory dimension. 
Our analysis of Elias’s work in the next chapter leads us to argue that his process sociology 
points us in the direction of how a more adequate explanatory framework can be developed 
which captures the multi-linear and open-ended character of human development and 
enables the attainment of a more detached perspective on the human condition.  
 However, we also argue that Elias’s postponement of an engagement with the 
anticipatory dimension of orientation undermines process sociology’s capacity to address 
the more pressing challenges arising from human global interdependence. As such, in the 
last chapter of this study we advance our final argument that a more adequate answer to 
the problem of orientation depends on the future production of a higher synthesis between 
process sociology and critical theory which is capable of developing a more cosmopolitan 
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orientating framework on the basis of which people might better understand the long-term 
term development of the global networks of interdependent humanity and the immanent 
potential that has been historically gathered for their conscious regulation.  
  
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have addressed Habermas’s writings on world politics in order to 
highlight how these update Kant’s proposal for a League of Nations in a manner that reveals 
the fundamental role that the political constitution of world society and the extension of 
processes of deliberative consensualization beyond the state level might have for the 
further expansion of human self-determination. However, we have also discussed how 
Habermas’s reliance on a theory of social evolution which establishes a theoretical 
distinction between the logic and the dynamics of history reveals several shortcomings 
which are instructive regarding what might be required from a more adequate answer to 
the problem of orientation. At the end of the chapter we have advanced several criteria 
which arise from our analysis of Kant, Marx and Habermas’s works and through which a 
more cosmopolitan means of orientation might be developed which better guards against 
the reproduction of modernist myths. In the next chapter, we turn to a discussion of Elias’s 
process sociology which, we argue, points the way as to how this orientating framework 
might be developed.  
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Chapter Six 
Norbert Elias 
A detour via detachment 
 
The previous four chapters analysed the ways in which Kant, Marx and Habermas’s works 
can be read as addressing the problem of orientation. Each author can be said to strive for 
the production of a grand narrative which exhibits an involvement–detachment balance 
that is able to attain a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition while 
recognising its own placement in the overall flow of human history and providing 
orientation regarding the immanent historical potential for a further expansion of human 
beings’ capacity to collectively bring the processes shaping their lives under greater 
conscious control. Furthermore, as our analysis has shown, the search for this involvement–
detachment balance is also expressed in the manner in which the critical authors have 
developed their conceptions of what a cosmopolitan perspective entails. Hence, we moved 
from Kant and Marx’s conceptions of cosmopolitanism which place greater emphasis on the 
attainment of a universally shared perspective on the human condition, to consider 
Habermas’s more nuanced conception of cosmopolitanism which entails the attempt at 
finding a balance between a more universal perspective on the long-term development of 
the shared conditions of global existence of humankind and the recognition and respect for 
the diversity of forms of human self-expression. As such, the critical theoretical 
engagements with the problem of orientation analysed so far can also be read as expressive 
of a collective learning process in attaining a more adequate involvement–detachment 
balance in their respective conceptions of cosmopolitanism, characterised by the 
development of a growing awareness about the need to avoid the reproduction of 
modernist forms of theorising that hide more parochial points of view in a manner that 
supports practices of exclusion of difference and the legitimation of forms of domination 
between different parts of humankind.  
 However, our analysis of the critical authors has also shown how they have all been 
unable to attain this balance in their respective perspectives, as again and again their work 
ends up reproducing, in one way or another, these modernist myths. Hence, both Kant and 
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Habermas’s transcendental approach to the problem of orientation leads them to develop a 
theory of history which is uncoupled from the actual course of human events and rather 
serves as a linear and teleological model which interprets the history of the species as if it 
were progressing towards the actualization of their transcendental ideals. On the other 
hand, although Marx’s materialist and emergentist approach opens the way for a multi-
linear and open-ended conception of the species’ history, his over-emphasis on control over 
nature and on relations of production undermines this potential as well as the adequacy of 
his non-transcendental assessment of the historical conditions of human freedom.  
 Nonetheless, despite the critical authors not presenting us with a more adequate 
answer to the problem of orientation, their works are also instructive as to how this answer 
might come to be found in the future. In particular, they have highlighted the fundamental 
role that grand narratives necessarily play in addressing the problem of orientation, as well 
as the costs of producing theoretical frameworks that either uncouple themselves from the 
actual course of human history or which are reductionist in their attempt to find a single 
factor shaping the whole history of the species. In this context, and continuing our image of 
an inter-generational dialogue between different authors wrestling with the problem of 
orientation, it can be noted that an attempt to provide a more adequate answer to this 
problem is not limited to critical theory.  
 As we argued in the first chapter of this study, Elias’s process sociology can also be 
read as being engaged in a similar endeavour to that of the critical authors, even though his 
approach contrasts with theirs in some important aspects. In particular, we can argue that 
Elias specifically addresses the explanatory dimension of orientation and has little to say 
about the anticipatory dimension which frequently assumes a central place in critical 
theorising. Elias’s argument in this context is that the fund of knowledge about the history 
of the species is still insufficient to allow a more adequate answer regarding how human 
beings might come to make more of their history under conditions of their own choosing; 
consequently, inquiries regarding the anticipatory dimension of orientation must be 
postponed until more reliable knowledge has been gathered which in the future might help 
people better understand what global arrangements are required to more consciously 
control their conditions of existence without producing new forms of exclusion and 
domination between them.  
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  In this chapter, we argue that Elias’s process sociology can constitute the basis for 
the development of a more adequate orientating grand narrative which is able to achieve a 
more cosmopolitan perspective that recognises and preserves the plurality of the human 
condition. In particular, Elias advances what can be considered as a materialist and 
emergentist approach to human development which actualises a multi-linear and open-
ended model of the species’ history that is based on a comprehensive understanding of the 
role of the triad of controls in its context and how it is manifested through social processes 
such as the development of individual personality structures, state formation and inter-state 
conflict. Elias’s writings capture these social processes through concepts such as ‘symbol 
emancipation’; ‘civilising processes’; ‘involvement–detachment balance’; ‘double-bind 
processes’; ‘monopoly mechanism’ or ‘functional democratisation’ which are intended to 
embody the predominant features of human development and how these are manifested in 
different ways in the various developmental paths that different human groups have 
undertaken throughout history and which are becoming increasingly intertwined at the 
global scale. In this manner, Elias’s work avoids more reductionist, linear and teleological 
models of the species’ history focused on understanding its structure and its logical or ideal 
path. Our analysis of Elias’s process sociology thus leads us to argue that he seeks to provide 
a new theoretical language on the basis of which a more comprehensive understanding of 
the human condition can be attained that better avoids a reproduction of the problems of 
modernist grand narratives and promotes more detached and cosmopolitan self-images at 
the level of peoples’ perspectives which might underline the development of modes of 
orientation that are better attuned to the conditions of global interdependence of the 
species.451 To the extent that Elias is successful in this endeavour, we can argue that his 
work proves indispensable for the development of a more adequate answer to the problem 
of orientation and as such, can be considered a fundamental alternative to Habermas’s 
reconstruction of Marx’s critical approach which, at least to a certain extent, better achieves 
what Habermas set out to do. 
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 However, we also argue that Elias’s overall tendency to postpone an engagement 
with the anticipatory dimension of orientation also means that process sociology cannot be 
understood as a substitute to critical theory. His refusal to advance more concrete answers 
regarding how human beings might bring under greater control pressing developmental 
problems posed by the unplanned social processes arising from human global 
interdependence and that threaten the historical maintenance of the conditions of 
sustainability of the planet’s biosphere or of complex human societies might appear over-
cautious, even in light of his argument regarding the lack of a sufficient knowledge fund 
about human development. As such, in the next chapter we advance the argument that a 
more adequate answer to both dimensions of the problem of orientation requires a higher 
synthesis between process sociology and critical theory. One which is capable of achieving a 
more adequate involvement–detachment balance to the extent that it is based on an 
orientating framework which, simultaneously, provides a more cosmopolitan perspective on 
the human condition that captures the multi-linear and open-ended character of the 
species’ history, while providing an historically-embedded and processual assessment of the 
immanent potential gathered at different moments in history for an expansion of human 
beings’ capacity to more consciously regulate the global networks of human 
interdependence. Given the validity of Elias’s argument regarding the availability of reliable 
knowledge about human development, this synthesis is necessarily a work in progress that 
requires a constant interplay between the more detached analysis of different society-
specific developmental paths and their increased global interweaving and the more involved 
assessment of its implications in terms of the potential for human beings’ conscious control 
over their conditions of existence. As such, and given that the breath of such a task 
necessarily overcomes the time and length limitations of this study, the next chapter, rather 
than provide a final answer regarding how this synthesis might be achieved, limits itself to 
an analysis of Elias’s work that highlights some critical themes that can be found in its 
context, in an attempt to create theoretical bridges with critical theory on the basis of which 
this synthesis might be produced in future research projects.  
 In this chapter we focus on an exposition of those elements of Elias’s work which are 
most relevant for our present inquiry. Our discussion is divided into two main sections. First, 
we address Elias’s critique of Marx’s work in the context of which we analyse his argument 
regarding the need for a detour via detachment oriented to increase the fund of reliable 
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knowledge about human development by focusing on the empirical and sociological analysis 
of human history and its main developmental patterns. Second, we address how this 
explanatory detour leads Elias to produce an analysis of the role of the triad of controls in 
the species’ history that captures the interweaving between various social processes at the 
level of human beings’ relations with internal human nature, with external non-human 
nature and with the networks of human interdependence in a manner that avoids the 
reproduction of linear and teleological grand narratives. The analysis of the triad of controls 
in this chapter is predominantly focused on intra-societal relations, while the first section of 
the next chapter addresses how Elias’s process sociology orientates his study of world 
politics and the global interweaving of the species.   
   
1. Marx and the involvement–detachment balance 
 
In this section we address Elias’s critique of Marx’s work in order to discuss his proposed 
detour via detachment as a fundamental step in the production of a more adequate means 
of orientation. Elias’s position is that Marx’s writings are particularly expressive of the 
problems associated with critical theory and its premature attempt to ascertain how human 
beings can lead a more self-determined existence, which is carried out on the basis of a still 
insufficient fund of knowledge about the predominant dynamics and social processes 
shaping the species’ history. In Elias’s view, this undermines the critical authors’ capacity to 
achieve a more detached perspective on the human condition and locks them in more 
involved points of view that might actually reinforce the unplanned and conflictual 
character of social processes rather than contribute for their conscious regulation.   
 Elias’s engagement with Marx can be seen throughout his writings; however, he 
presents his most comprehensive analysis in the essay ‘Karl Marx as sociologist and political 
ideologist’.
452 There, Elias develops a critique of Marx’s work on the basis of what he sees as 
the highly ambiguous character of Marx’s engagement with the study of human historical 
development. According to Elias, on the one hand, Marx’s analysis of human development 
and class relations is highly ‘processual’ and reveals fundamental insights on the ever 
changing character of human beings and their mutual relations of power, conflict, 
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cooperation and interdependence throughout history.453 But, on the other hand, Marx also 
constantly ‘freezes’ his conception of the ever changing character of class relations, to 
present the particular structure of class relations of his own time as the expression of a 
universal stage of human development, leading to a predetermined and necessary future 
outcome.454 In Elias’s view, the ambiguous character of Marx’s approach can be explained 
by the fact that Marx, for ‘political reasons’ wishes to ‘present the working class at the stage 
of development of his own time in absolute terms as the eternal, unchanging working class 
– until all classes disappear’.455 
 According to Elias, Marx’s ambiguity is due to his high level of emotional attachment 
to nineteenth century class struggles which leads him to constantly conflate his more 
detached analysis as a sociologist with his more involved role as a political ideologist of the 
working class. As such, while ‘Marx the sociologist sees the developmental character of class 
structures clearly enough (…) as a political ideologist, he constantly covers up what he 
perceives as a scientist’.456 Presenting the nineteenth century European, and mainly English, 
class relations as a universal stage, to which the long-term process of human development 
inevitably leads to in accordance with the laws of economic development, fulfils an 
important role in the ideological and political struggles between the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie in which Marx was involved. However, it also leads Marx to frequently lose sight 
of the analytical potential inherent in his materialist and emergentist approach for a more 
adequate understanding of the actual dynamics shaping his own historical period, its future 
trends of development, and the overall history of the species. In particular, Marx’s 
politically-motivated projection of nineteenth century class relations as a universal stage in 
human development leads him to a more involved perspective, which is locked in the social 
and temporal horizon of Western modernity and which makes Marx constantly lose sight of 
the open-ended and multi-linear character of human development as well as fail to 
recognise how ongoing changes in the balance of power between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat – as a result of the class struggles in which he himself is engaged – open up the 
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possibility for different social futures rather than revolution and the abolition of all 
classes.457 
 Consequently, according to Elias, when addressing Marx’s work, we must strive to do 
so in a manner that permits to identify the ‘fundamental theoretical insights’ that Marx 
contributes to the development of a more adequate theoretical framework regarding the 
human condition and the long-term process of development of the species while, at the 
same time, ‘distancing’ ourselves from the ‘ideological trench warfare’ that leads Marx to 
constantly pose the Western pattern of class relations as  universal.458 Elias’s critique of 
Marx thus captures the main challenges inherent in the problem of orientation and the main 
shortcomings with how it is addressed in the context of Marx’s work. It notes how Marx 
strives to achieve a more detached perspective through a focus on the role played in the 
history of the species by human control over non-human nature and on the relations of 
production that arise in its context. However, Elias also argues that Marx is ultimately 
unable to sustain this degree of detachment. His commitment to class politics and to the 
expansion of the proletarians’ capacity to control their conditions of existence – as the 
historical class representative of globalised humanity – leads Marx to a more involved 
perspective, based on a linear theory of history, which frames the long-term process of 
human development in the particular concerns and point of view of his own time period. 
 According to Elias, this involvement makes Marx lose sight of the role of other social 
processes beyond the relations of production and the control of nature in the overall history 
of the species.459 In particular, Elias argues that it leads Marx’s critical approach to be 
structured around a thesis which considers that ‘social groups to which greater power 
changes accrue in relation to other groups exploit this relative superiority of power 
optimally, without any other idea than their own advantage’.460 These groups can only be 
‘hindered’ in their ‘unrestricted exploitation’ of their advantages if the development of the 
social ‘balance of power’ permits other groups to have greater power chances, so that they 
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can ‘disempower’ the former.461 In Elias’s view, this conception of power relations shapes 
Marx’s analysis of capitalism, in which he sees the bourgeois class carrying out the 
‘unrestricted exploitation’ of the proletariat as a result of the power advantages that it 
possesses over the later given its position in the network of human interdependencies 
created by capitalist relations of production. Furthermore, this same conception leads Marx 
to the conclusion that the only way to ‘disempower’ the bourgeois class is through the 
usage of the power chances that accrue the proletariat, as a result of its numerical 
superiority, in a ‘physical struggle’ against the bourgeoisie as previously the ‘bourgeois-led 
masses’ had done in their struggle against princely and aristocratic holders of power.462 So, 
Elias considers that, to Marx, revolution is the ‘means of power of the socially weaker in the 
struggle against economic violence’, which is ‘the means of power of the socially stronger 
groups in industrial societies’.463  
 However, according to Elias, Marx’s observation that the monopolisation of 
economic means of power represents the ‘primary source of social power’ is expressive of 
his involved perspective on human development. It is the analysis of someone whose 
analytical horizon is shaped predominantly by the historical period and place in which he is 
writing, when the monopolisation of physical violence by the state has been so consolidated 
in Western European societies that it is possible to identify economic violence as a 
distinguishable type from physical violence.464 At that particular historical juncture, Elias 
observes, the main source of uncontrolled dynamics affecting human development appears 
no longer to be physical violence between people but instead economic violence, and the 
main question facing human beings living in Western European societies – especially those 
who possess less power-chances – becomes how greater collective and conscious control 
can be exercised over the monopolies of economic power that are formed by the free 
competition of capitalist enterprises in the global market.  
 In Elias’s view, Marx’s involved perspective of the ideological and political struggles 
of the nineteenth century between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is expressed in his 
projection of the particular problems connected with economic violence in that period to his 
analysis of the whole course of human development. As such, at the centre of his work 
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appear the problems connected with the development of economic forms of violence, the 
formation of economic monopolies of power, and the question of how greater control can 
be exercised over the unplanned dynamics arising from economic competition.465 
Consequently, Elias argues that even though Marx advocates the use of physical violence as 
a tool of social transformation, his analysis does not extend to a ‘more exact exploration of 
the monopolisation of physical force as one of the social sources of power potentials’.466 
Otherwise, Marx could not have failed to recognise that the distinction between these two 
forms of violence is a fairly recent historical development and that, for example, ‘in the 
struggles of feudal warrior houses, (…) [what] we distinguish as physical or military force 
and economic force acted together more or less as one’.467  
 Marx’s more involved approach thus leads to a lack of engagement with the role of 
the monopolisation of physical violence in the process of human development. In particular, 
it makes him pay less attention to the extent to which the capitalist mode of production and 
its specific class structure depend on the internal pacification of society guaranteed by the 
state and its regulation of economic activity and of competition between classes through 
the enactment of social norms backed by a monopoly over the means of violence. As such, 
Marx’s conception of power struggles between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat always 
assumes that these are ‘governed solely by the exploitation of the existing power 
differentials and unregulated by any norms agreed to and recognised by both sides’.468 In 
this manner, Elias’s critique of Marx shares Habermas’s argument regarding how Marx’s 
emphasis on production needs to be complemented by a greater consideration of the role 
of social norms and state formation in the process of human development. However, as the 
previous chapter has shown, Habermas’s attempted solution implies a substitution of 
Marx’s one-sided focus by a theory of social evolution which is incapable of reconnecting 
back to historical events and the way in which these are shaped by particular relations of 
power and competition embedded in shifting networks of mutual interdependence between 
people. Consequently, Habermas’s critical approach is no less one-sided than Marx’s, 
placing the embodiment of moral-practical knowledge in social institutions at the centre of 
its analysis and downplaying the historical development of power dynamics between human 
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groups. In this context, Elias’s makes an observation about contemporary social theory 
which can also be applied to Habermas’s reconstruction of Marx’s critical approach. 
According to Elias, ‘if Marx placed at the centre of his model of society the unregulated 
power struggles of groups unchecked by any norms’, other social theories – within which 
Habermas’s theory of social evolution can be included – ‘usually place the integrating norms 
themselves at the centre of their image of society (…) [leading] the problem of power 
differentials, and the nature of social power in general, to play at best a marginal role’.469 
 Moreover, Elias observes that while the ‘relatively high’ degree of regulation of 
power struggles within modern Western welfare states might lead theories of human 
development to focus on this regulation and on the social norms that ensure it, it cannot be 
overlooked that ‘what is regulated by social norms is the resolution of tensions, conflicts 
and trials of strength’.470 As such, in order to understand the development of the human 
powers of control over the dynamics of human relations through collective social norms it is 
essential to remain aware that people ‘do not simply subject themselves to certain norms 
automatically’.471 Rather, social norms develop according to changes in the structure of 
interdependence between human groups, in particular, changes in the balance of their 
respective power differentials.472 Hence, to any theory of human development, such as 
Habermas’s, which fails to account for this connection between social norms and power 
relations, ‘the problem of the conditions under which previously unregulated regions of 
social life, structured solely by power differentials, become accessible to human control, to 
regulation by integrating norms, remains beyond their horizon’.473 Following Elias, it can be 
argued that these theories ultimately express the same shortcomings as Marx’s critical 
approach insofar as they advance a more involved perspective according to which the 
centrality that social norms assume in the context of Western societies is taken as a 
universal feature of the history of the species.  
 Elias’s critique of Marx’s work thus reflects his wider considerations about the 
importance of the involvement–detachment balance in social scientific research. From the 
perspective of our inquiry, it points to how social scientists’ analyses can be undermined in 
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their adequacy and usefulness as a means of orientation by more involved perspectives 
which might block their capacity to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the 
predominant dynamics and social processes shaping human development.474 In particular, 
Elias considers that the lack of a sufficiently reliable fund of knowledge about social 
processes means that premature assessments regarding how human beings might exercise a 
greater degree of conscious and collective control over their conditions of existence 
frequently result in answers that express more involved and parochial points of views and 
which portray them as representative of a truly cosmopolitan perspective, as is exemplified 
with particular clarity by Marx’s work.475 In this context, Elias’s definition of the work of 
social scientists as ‘hunters of myths’ is instructive; it points to the need for more detached 
analyses of the human condition and of the long-term history of the species and its global 
interweaving, which are able to step back from more involved points of view and, in the 
process, avoid the reproduction of modernist myths and all the shortcomings which are 
associated with them.476 As such, Elias’s position can be read as implying that prior to an 
assessment of how to regulate the unplanned processes of human global interdependence 
‘in such a way as to make them less meaningless and less wasteful of lives and resources (…) 
the central tasks of sociological teaching and research [lies] in acquiring a general 
understanding of these forces and in an increase in more reliable knowledge about them’.477 
An initial focus is required on the development of a more comprehensive and detached 
means of orientation regarding the long-term process of human development, which 
postpones an assessment of what this analysis might mean, from a more involved 
perspective, for the prospects of extending human conscious control over social processes 
at particular historical junctures. Elias’s proposal for a more adequate involvement–
detachment balance thus requires an initial ‘detour via detachment’ which pushes to the 
side-lines of social inquiry concerns regarding its normative implications. From the 
perspective of our conceptual framework, Elias thus clearly argues for the need to focus 
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predominantly on the explanatory dimension of the problem of orientation to the detriment 
of an engagement with its anticipatory dimension.478  
 However, Elias also notes that it is frequently difficult for human beings to tilt the 
balance towards detachment in their way of perceiving the world; a difficulty which he 
partly explains by the dynamics of ‘double-bind processes’.479 With this concept, Elias tries 
to capture the social processes according to which the threats and problems posed by 
uncontrolled forces – either natural or social – produce tensions and fears amongst human 
beings which are usually accompanied by highly involved conceptions of themselves, their 
particular predicaments and the world in general. According to Elias, the higher the 
uncontrolled dangers to which people are exposed, the more involved, ego-centric and 
emotionally charged tend to be their perspectives and thus the more difficult it is for them 
to develop a more detached attitude towards their conditions of existence, which permits 
the production of more reliable knowledge about both the human and the non-human parts 
of the universe, on the basis of which they might acquire a better chance to exercise control 
over these threats. As Elias observes, and as we will analyse in greater detail in the next 
section, the double-bind has been partially broken in some sections of humanity vis-à-vis 
non-human nature.480 A historically hard-won detour via detachment in people’s 
engagements with nature has enabled some sections of humanity to self-control their 
emotionally charged involvements when dealing with natural phenomena, and thus develop 
a more detached and less ego-centric perspective on the non-human part of the universe 
which underlined the development of a more reliable fund of knowledge about natural 
processes. This detour has been followed by a secondary re-involvement which, on the basis 
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of this knowledge, has enabled a more adequate answer to the question of how people 
might achieve a greater degree of conscious and collective control over non-human external 
nature.481 The increase in the people’s capacity to control nature has thus permitted a 
reduction of the threat posed by natural forces and, consequently, of the tensions and fears 
caused by them, in a process that further reinforced the development of a more detached 
attitude towards natural phenomena.482  
 However, in a manner similar to Marx’s observations on the connection between the 
development of human control over nature and the historical development of social 
processes, Elias also argues that this ‘same process which has made people less dependent 
on nature has made them more dependent of each other’.483 It has brought about new 
forms of interdependence between human beings from which emerge unplanned social 
processes that pose new sources of insecurity and threat. As such, the double-bind is still 
prevalent at the level of the increasingly global social bonds of humanity, in the context of 
which people, ‘vulnerable and insecure, (…) cannot stand back and look at the course of 
events calmly like more detached observers’.484 Consequently, in Elias’s view, knowledge 
about human social existence, and the general attitude towards its study, is still 
characterized by a balance predominantly shaped by more involved perspectives in 
comparison with knowledge about non-human nature.  
 In the next section, we address how Elias seeks to change this balance by carrying 
out a detour via detachment which focuses his analysis of human development on the 
explanatory dimension of orientation and leads him to produce a grand narrative that 
provides a more comprehensive understanding of the interplay between the different 
dimensions of the triad of controls in the species’ history in a manner that captures its 
predominant dynamics and social processes and how these can assume multiple paths and 
forms of expression. This analysis leads us to argue that Elias’s materialist and emergentist 
approach to the empirical study of human development can be understood as recovering 
the potential found in Marx’s work for an explanatory, multi-linear and open-ended model 
of human history and thus opens the way for a more detached and cosmopolitan means of 
orientation regarding the conditions of existence of globalised humanity and the long-term 
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process of global interweaving of the species, while recognising the fundamental condition 
of human plurality and better guarding against the reproduction of modernist myths.   
 
2. The triad of controls in human development 
 
In this section we discuss how the notion of the triad of controls frames Elias’s process 
sociology in a manner that constitutes the basis for a more adequate answer to the 
explanatory dimension of the problem of orientation. Our analysis is divided into three 
subsections. First, we consider Elias’s notion of ‘symbolic emancipation’ as a turning point in 
the evolutionary process on Earth and in the development of the human powers of control 
over non-human external nature. Furthermore, we also observe how Elias’s work in this 
context highlights the fundamental difference between his developmental approach to the 
study of human historical development and Habermas’s evolutionary approach. Second, we 
move to an analysis of Elias’s conception of civilisation and how it is linked with the 
development of people’s self-control over their more animalic drives and impulses. And 
third, we address Elias’s observations on human control over social processes in connection 
with his notion of civilisation, where we introduce Elias’s concepts of the ‘monopoly 
mechanism’ and ‘functional democratisation’.   
 
2.1. Symbol emancipation and control over nature 
 
As with the critical theorists, Elias is fundamentally concerned with the production of a 
grand narrative on human development which, amongst other things, is able to provide a 
better notion of the distinguishing features of human beings vis-à-vis other animals. Like 
Kant, Marx or Habermas, he considers that an awareness of such distinctions is 
fundamental for a better understanding of the human condition, of how the globalisation 
of the species has occurred, and of which might be the potential future paths of human 
development.  
 In the book ‘The Symbol Theory’, Elias addresses this topic through the lenses of an 
analysis of the role of symbolic communication in the evolutionary process on Earth. 
According to Elias, one of the most striking characteristics of humankind is its high level of 
changeability without incurring biological evolution, a characteristic which he attributes to 
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the fact that, unlike other animals – whose forms of behaviour are predominantly 
‘genetically determined’ – ‘learned variations’ have gained the upper hand in human 
beings.485 While other animals predominantly orientate themselves in the world in 
accordance with a genetically inherited instinctual and behavioural pattern which is 
‘species-specific’, i.e. common to all members of the same genetic species, humans have 
developed a high degree of behavioural malleability which permits their forms of 
communication, their societies and their individual personality structures to undergo a high 
range of changes within the framework of a single biological species.486  It is important to 
highlight that, by identifying such distinctions between humans and other animals Elias is 
not establishing a split between humanity and nature. On the contrary, he can be said to 
share Marx’s materialist and emergentist perspective which understands the development 
of the distinguishing human characteristics within the framework of the evolutionary 
process on Earth and the biological heritage of humankind. In Elias’s view, there are no 
splits between humans and other species; human beings ‘emerge’ from their animal 
ancestors in the course of a continuous process of evolution.487 Even though they are ‘in 
certain respects unique and unlike any other animal on Earth (…) their unique properties 
emerge from, and are fully integrated into, their animal heritage’.488  
 As such, Elias does not conceive of a fundamental division between animals whose 
behaviour is genetically determined, and humans in which it is malleable through 
learning.489 Instead, – and in keeping with his general suspicion of dualisms and 
dichotomous oppositions – he identifies the capacity for learning itself as a product of 
biological factors, and prefers to refer to a balance between genetically determined and 
learning oriented forms of behaviour, which might tilt more or less to one side or the 
other.490 Hence, one can see a tilting of the balance throughout the long-term process of 
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evolution on the planet, with mammals – and, within them, apes in particular – revealing a 
greater capacity for learned behaviour than, for example, insects.491 Humans represent the 
latest phase in this long-term process of evolution in which the balance predominantly tilts 
towards learning oriented behaviour. While in ape societies, forms of behaviour and 
communication, despite local variations acquired through learning within particular groups, 
are still predominantly species-specific, in the case of human beings ‘society-specific’ forms 
of behaviour have acquired predominance.492 That is not to say, however, that genetically 
determined behavioural patterns have disappeared from the human repertoire, as can be 
seen by the examples of the smile, cries of pain, or fight or flee mechanisms; but these play 
an auxiliary role in human communication and behaviour and, in some cases such as smiling, 
have actually come to be under greater conscious control on the part of human 
individuals.493  
 As mentioned above, the predominance of learning in human behavioural 
orientation permits a high degree of variation within the context of a single biological 
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species. We can observe great changes in human societies – for example, from a feudal to a 
capitalist structure – within the time span of a few centuries or less. As Elias observes, 
‘social growth and decay, a long line of integration from one level to another, from tribe to 
empire and from empire to feudal disintegration, can be observed within a time-span that is 
short in terms of biological evolution’.494 As such, in order to differentiate human society-
specific changes and biological species-specific characteristics, Elias draws a distinction 
between ‘developmental’ and ‘evolutionary’ processes. In his view, evolution expresses an 
‘irreversible’ biological process of change, while development represents a ‘reversible’ one 
which takes place without biological changes.495 To illustrate his meaning, he observes that 
‘as products of evolution, mammals readjusting to life in the sea do not transform 
themselves into water-breathing fish’.496 On the other hand, ‘states – and other 
representatives of a relatively late stage of social development which, for one reason or 
another, decline – can transform themselves into social units at an earlier stage of 
development’.497 This does not mean that a declining state is going to transform into exactly 
the type of constituent units whose integration led to its formation in the first place, such as 
tribes. But it ‘reverts’ to an earlier phase of social development, for example, by 
fragmentation into smaller social units with their own monopolistic control over the means 
of violence and in violent competition with each other.498 
 The shift of the balance between learning oriented and genetically determined forms 
of behaviour has thus opened the way for the historical emergence – out of the 
evolutionary biological process which had hitherto shaped life on Earth – of a species 
capable of undergoing reversible developmental and social processes. It has equipped 
human beings with the biological capacity and need to learn from other humans society-
specific forms of behavioural orientation and to undergo processes of development which 
are qualitatively different from evolutionary processes. In particular, Elias observes that 
biological features, such as the vocal apparatus and cortical brain dominance, have 
endowed humans with a species-specific capacity to carry out what he considers to be one 
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of the main turning points in the history of the species and of life on Earth; i.e. to initiate a 
developmental process to which he calls ‘symbol emancipation’.499  
 With this concept, Elias refers to the fact that human communication and learning 
through the production and reception of sound-patterns is not purely genetically 
determined, as in the case of other animal species. Rather, human voice-sounds can be 
patterned in accordance with a learned and society-specific code which makes it possible for 
each member of that society to understand these sound-patterns as symbols for objects and 
phenomena in both the human and the non-human parts of the universe.500 Human beings 
thus possess a capacity to produce symbolically-codified stocks of knowledge about their 
world and conditions of existence which function as means of behavioural orientation which 
can be passed on from generation to generation. The advantages in terms of orientation of 
human symbolic communication and learning become evident when compared with the 
largely unlearned and genetically determined forms of animal communication. While 
unlearned animal signs – whether voice-signals or body-movements – are significantly more 
rigid and tied to momentary situations, human symbols have a comparatively high capacity 
to be detached from space and time bound contexts.501 This means that while animals are 
locked in behavioural patterns which might be adapted to specific situations and 
environments but cannot adapt to new contexts unless they undergo biological evolution, 
human symbolic communication enables human beings to develop learning processes about 
the world which can be symbolically-codified into an ever expanding fund of knowledge. 
This fund of knowledge permits them to constantly learn how to orientate themselves in 
relation to new and changing situations and, furthermore, it can be improved upon from 
generation to generation in order to become increasingly more reliable and adequate as a 
means of orientation that captures the processes constituting their ever-changing 
conditions of existence. As Elias notes, symbolically-mediated orientation through learning 
processes enables a degree of behavioural flexibility which is ‘quite beyond the reach of 
other animals, whose genetic make-up may provide an excellent way of coping with a 
specific situation and yet blocks their ability to cope with the demands of their situation if 
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the task changes in a manner for which a species is not genetically equipped’.502 Elias thus 
refers to human symbolic emancipation as ‘liberation from the bondage of largely unlearned 
or innate signals’.503 It unleashes a potentially unlimited developmental process of learning 
which enables humankind not only to acquire a dominant position vis-à-vis other species on 
Earth but to also become a major factor conditioning the future course of their process of 
evolution.504 Similarly to Marx, Elias thus notes how the long-term process of human 
development has progressively led to the unplanned emergence of human beings unique 
species-capacity to learn how to exercise greater control over the non-human part of the 
universe and shape it to the fulfilment of their needs. 
 In this context, we can also discuss those which Elias understands as the main 
dynamics shaping the development of the human powers of control over nature. In the 
book ‘Involvement and Detachment’ Elias introduces the already mentioned notion of the 
double-bind to refer to the circular movement that can be identified between the 
development of people’s control over non-human nature, the development of their 
capacity to self-control their internal drives and impulses, and the greater detachment in 
their perspectives and symbolically-codified models of natural phenomena. It is Elias’s 
argument that, when threatened by natural phenomena which they cannot control, human 
beings tend to be less able to exercise self-control over their internal drives and affects.505 
Under these conditions, human knowledge production about external nature also tends to 
be more involved and predominantly shaped by ego-centric concerns and by society and 
time bound perspectives. Specifically, Elias observes that when the involvement–
detachment balance in people’s personality structures is significantly tilted towards the 
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former, the human production of symbolically-codified knowledge, on the basis of which 
people orientate themselves in relation to the natural world, exhibits a high level ‘fantasy-
content’.506 It is focused on filling the gaps in human knowledge with forms of magical-
mythical thinking which are more concerned with understanding the meaning of natural 
phenomena for human beings, rather than understanding their underlying processual 
dynamics in themselves.507 As such, a highly involved perspective frequently entails an 
understanding of nature as a world inhabited by spirits whose actions are responsible for 
natural phenomena and are full of meaning and purpose to human beings. The essential 
aim of discovery under these conditions is the acquisition of knowledge about the hidden 
purpose and intentions behind events and their hidden meaning for oneself and one’s 
community.508 Knowledge of these hidden meanings is inscribed in the body of oral and 
written tales, proverbs and prescriptions of a society, which function as means of 
orientation to its members and which pass on from one generation to another frequently 
with shamans, priests or magicians acting as their keepers.509 
 To human beings locked in a double-bind process, whose perceptions of natural 
phenomena are highly involved, the capacity to perceive the world as the product of a 
series of intertwining, unplanned and blind processes which have no inherent meaning and 
are indifferent to human existence is largely inaccessible.510 Not only are people unable to 
detach their perceptions from their ego-centric immediate concerns and the dangers posed 
by uncontrolled natural forces, but also a more detached perspective on the natural world 
does not fulfil their emotional need for meaning. It does not answer the basic questions 
framing their interactions with nature, which are focused not on the search for a causal 
understanding of natural phenomena, but rather on what their meaning is for particular 
individuals and communities.511  
 As Elias notes, the involvement–detachment balance in people’s perspectives of 
non-human nature is fundamentally connected with the development of their powers of 
control over natural processes. Perceiving nature in a more involved and ego-centric 
manner which interprets natural phenomena in terms of intentional agencies that interact 
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with human beings blocks peoples’ capacity to achieve a more decentred perspective, on 
the basis of which they might analyse natural processes and develop symbolic models of 
these phenomena whose focus is not so much on capturing their meaning but rather in 
understanding what they are in themselves, how their development is structured, and how 
they are connected to each other.512 As such, people’s capacity to orientate vis-à-vis non-
human nature in a manner that guarantees a more adequate intervention in natural 
phenomena and enables a greater degree of collective and conscious control over natural 
forces is lower under conditions of relatively high involvement than under conditions in 
which the balance between involvement and detachment, between fantasy-content and 
more decentred and reliable knowledge, has significantly tilted towards the latter.513 People 
caught in double-bind processes thus find themselves locked in a circular movement in 
which the high level of danger posed by uncontrolled natural forces has its counterpart in 
high levels of involvement and fantasy-content in their perspectives of the world and in a 
lower capacity to exercise conscious control over the unplanned natural processes which 
threaten them.514 People experience a high level of ‘affect in knowledge about the dangers 
[which is] heavily charged with fantasy and leads to the constant reproduction of the high 
level of danger and therefore of modes of thought governed more by fantasy than 
reality’.515  
 On the other hand, and as we argued in the first section, Elias also observes that 
some sections of humanity have been able to carry out a historically hard-won detour via 
detachment which enabled them to partially break the double-bind in their relations with 
nature by producing symbolically-codified stocks of knowledge about natural phenomena in 
which the balance between fantasy-content and more decentred knowledge has shifted 
predominantly towards the latter. Oriented by less ego-centric explanatory models of the 
non-human part of the universe, people in these parts of the world have been able to more 
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consciously intervene in natural processes and thus acquire a greater capacity to tame and 
redirect them towards human ends. A higher degree of control over natural processes 
means a reduction of their threats and dangers and a lowering of the tensions they cause in 
human beings which facilitates a further diminution of the role of people’s internal 
emotions and affects in their perceptions of the world, and thus increases their capacity to 
achieve a more detached perspective.516 The untying of the double-bind thus implies 
another circular movement, but now in the opposite direction, one to which Elias refers to 
as the ‘principle of increasing facilitation’.517 
 Elias’s observations on symbol emancipation and the development of the human 
powers of control over nature can thus be read as bringing together fundamental themes 
from Marx and Habermas’s critical approaches. On the one hand, Elias advances a 
materialist and emergentist approach which places the historical process of human 
development in the context of the wider process of evolution on the planet. Like with Marx, 
this conception not only overcomes theoretical dualisms between humanity and nature, but 
also promotes a more detached and less species-centric conception of nature which is 
fundamental for a better understanding of human beings and of both the potentials and the 
challenges which emerge throughout the species’ history. On the other hand, Elias 
overcomes Marx’s reductionist focus on productive activity by sharing Habermas’s 
awareness of the fundamental role of symbolic communication in differentiating human 
beings from other animals and in opening up the possibility of learning processes on the 
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basis of which people come to expand their capacity to more consciously control both the 
human and non-human parts of the universe.  
 Furthermore, Elias brings these two perspectives together on the basis of an 
approach to the history of the species which, from the start, is aware of the plurality of the 
human condition. By highlighting the society-specific character of human learning processes 
and forms of symbolic communication, Elias inherently points to the challenges that are 
posed by the increased global interconnection of a species which is diverse and 
characterised by multiple intertwining processes of development. Though a universal 
characteristic of the species, the society-specific character of human symbolic 
communication, even if a common language is found, also means that people are prone to 
misunderstandings and to frequently violent conflicts on the basis of their diverse 
perspectives and of the various interests that are connected with them.  
 In this context, we can also argue that Elias’s process sociology opens the way for a 
more comprehensive study of phenomena such as the emergence of unplanned processes 
out of human conscious interventions in nature, be it the case of unplanned natural 
processes such as human-made environmental change or of unplanned social processes 
such as the growth of technological destructive capability to the point in which human 
beings are now able to threaten their own existence and the continuation of the 
evolutionary process on Earth. Elias’s analysis points to how these unplanned processes 
might push people back into double-binds in their relations with nature, marked by 
increased threats by uncontrolled natural forces, a heightening of fears and more involved 
perspectives at the level of their personality structures, and a lower chance of bringing 
natural processes under human conscious control. In this manner, Elias’s theoretical 
framework constitutes a more adequate basis on which to analyse not only the constant 
potential for reversibility of social processes and of the human powers of control, but also 
how the very success of the species in self-determining its conditions of existence vis-à-vis 
external nature might lead to the emergence of unplanned processes that undermine its 
achievements.  
 As such, Elias can also be understood as recovering Marx’s awareness of the need for 
learning processes regarding how people can tame the unplanned character of their long-
term process of development and come to more consciously control their own capacity for 
control. From the perspective of our inquiry, we can thus argue that Elias shares the critical 
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authors’ interest in orientating people to the reality, the potentials, the limits and the 
challenges of their global interdependence on the basis of a more detached and 
cosmopolitan perspective. Moreover, he strives to achieve this perspective by bringing 
together a materialist and emergentist approach to the species’ history and an awareness of 
the role of society-specific communicative learning processes in its context, which opens the 
way for a more comprehensive means of orientation which is better equipped to capture 
the multi-linear and open-ended character of human development. 
 In this context, we can contrast Elias’s materialist and emergentist approach with 
Habermas’s theory of social evolution. In Elias’s view, and as we noted above, there is a 
fundamental distinction to be made between irreversible evolutionary biological processes 
and reversible developmental social processes. As we saw in chapter five, Habermas’s 
theory of social evolution with its focus on identifying the developmental logic of human 
development, even though recognising that it does not represent the actual course of 
human historical events, ends up producing an explanatory model of the structure of the 
species’ history which falls into the latter category, insofar as it is based on a stage-like 
sequence of irreversible stages of development of moral-practical knowledge at the level of 
individual world-views and their embodiment in social institutions. As we argued, this 
explanatory scheme loses the capacity to reconnect back to an analysis of empirical 
historical events and how these are manifested through shifting relations of power, conflict 
and interdependence between people in a continuous developmental process which is, at 
all times, potentially reversible. Habermas’s theory of social evolution can thus be said to 
follow an evolutionary framework which is adequate to understand irreversible processes of 
biological change but cannot serve as an adequate orientating framework to analyse 
reversible processes of social change.  
 On the other hand, Elias’s materialist and emergentist approach is inherently based 
on a developmental and empirical analysis which is focused on understanding the order of 
change of human development in the direction of both integration and disintegration and 
thus not only admits of reversibility, but constantly highlights its open-ended and multi-
linear character. In this manner, we can argue that Elias’s process sociology provides the 
theoretical basis for an explanatory model of the species’ history which more adequately 
captures its predominant dynamics and social processes and avoids a reproduction of linear 
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and teleological grand narratives.518 In the next two subsections, we further support this 
argument by linking our discussion of Elias’s analysis of the development of human control 
over nature with his writings on the development of civilisation and of people’s control over 
social processes.  
  
2.2. Self-control and civilisation 
 
Above, we addressed how Elias’s argument regarding the shift in the balance between 
genetically determined and learning oriented forms of behaviour in humankind shares 
important themes with Marx’s materialist and emergentist approach that highlights how the 
biological characteristics of the species have conditioned its process of historical 
development and its capacity to produce its own conditions of existence. Furthermore, we 
also noticed how Elias builds upon this materialist and emergentist approach by integrating 
what can be characterised as a Habermasian notion of the role that control over internal 
human nature plays in the development of the human powers of control over external 
nature and in the historical emergence of the specific form of life and social existence of 
human beings. In this section, we further develop this argument by focusing on how Elias 
recovers not only Habermasian but also important Kantian themes by noting how the 
development of people’s self-control over their internal drives and affects is intertwined 
with the development of the human networks of social interdependence.519  
 According to Elias, humankind’s reliance on learning oriented forms of behaviour 
means that, from an early age, every child has to learn from other people society-specific 
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patterns of self-regulation in order to orientate his or her behaviour vis-à-vis other human 
beings and the non-human natural world. Human social existence is thus dependent on 
people undergoing learning processes regarding how to exercise self-control over their 
more animalic drives and affects – such as those towards anger, aggressive behaviour, or 
sexual desire – in order to be able to live with other people in a manner that does not 
threaten the sustainability of the social bonds that unite them, and in order to collectively 
labour upon non-human nature in a manner that produces the material requirements for 
the satisfaction of their social needs.520 The exact pattern of socially-standardised behaviour 
and personal self-regulation is highly changeable between societies and across time. 
However, no viable human society can exist without it. 
 In this context, and as already noted in chapter one, Elias introduces what can be 
considered as a more detached conception of civilisation.521 In Elias’s work, civilisation 
describes the species-wide process of development of people’s capacity to self-control their 
more animalic impulses; a process which, Elias observes, can assume very diverse and 
society-specific expressions. As such, while civilisation describes a universal characteristic of 
humankind, we cannot speak of a single civilising process which is reproduced everywhere 
in the same manner, but must always bear in mind the existence and interweaving of 
several society-specific civilising processes which can develop in various ways.522 Elias’s 
conception of civilisation thus exhibits a more adequate involvement–detachment balance 
insofar as it promotes a more cosmopolitan orientation towards the universal 
characteristics which are shared by all members of the species while encompassing the 
plurality of humankind and its various modes of self-expression.523  
                                                          
520
 Elias, N. ‘Civilisation’ in Essays II: On Civilising Processes, State Formation and National Identity [Collected 
Works, vol. 15] (Dublin, University College Dublin Press, 2008), p. 3. 
521
 Elias, N. On the Process of Civilisation. 
522
 Elias, N. ‘Civilisation’, pp. 4-5. 
523
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 In Elias’s view, civilisation constitutes one the main social processes shaping human 
historical development, whose study needs to consider both the particularities of different 
civilising processes and how these intertwine and mutually influence one another as the 
networks of human interdependence become lengthier and more intricate.524 His more 
detailed study of civilisation, found in the book ‘On the Process of Civilisation’, is focused on 
the long-term civilising process of Western European societies. His intention in this study is 
not to extrapolate the path that the process of civilisation has followed in Western Europe 
as the universal path of all civilising processes, but rather to highlight some the main 
dynamics conditioning its development, on the basis of which a more detached perspective 
on human civilising processes can then be produced.525 Elias is thus looking not for a 
description of civilisation in the form of a stage-like grand narrative of human development 
which identifies its Habermasian-type of developmental logic, but rather for a theoretical 
framework capable of capturing the predominant characteristics of civilising processes in 
general.526  
 In this context, Elias observes that ‘human beings are not civilised by nature, but 
they have by nature a disposition which, under certain conditions, makes possible a civilising 
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[process]’.527 It is Elias’s argument that the development of the networks of social 
interdependence – whose length and intricacy change in accordance with the development 
of the division of labour and of networks of production and trade within and between 
human societies – constitutes one of the main dynamics shaping the development of 
civilisation. In Elias’s view, as the division of labour increases – itself a process intertwined 
with the development of the human capacity to control non-human nature – human social 
functions become more specialised, and the degree of mutual dependence between people 
also increases. Individuals become more tightly bound to each other in longer and more 
interconnected networks of interdependence in which the satisfaction of their social needs 
depends more and more on specialised social functions carried out by other people.  
 As Elias notes, under conditions of growing interdependence, particular social 
pressures emerge that condition the development of people’s personality structures in a 
specific direction. In particular, he argues that as the networks of human actions become 
more complex, extensive and interdependent, individuals are increasingly put under the 
social pressure to behave in a manner which does not disrupt the chains of mutual actions 
on which all have come to depend.528 Hence, individual human beings are socially compelled 
to attain a more detached perspective of themselves and of their social relations, which is 
attuned to lengthier and more intricate networks of interdependent actions, and thus to 
undergo learning processes regarding how to self-regulate their conduct in a manner 
compatible with the maintenance of these networks of mutual interdependencies in which 
they are enmeshed.529 The development of human interdependence is thus concomitant 
with the development, at the level of people’s personality structures, of more detached 
perspectives on the basis of which they can better attune their behaviour to the reality of 
their interdependence, to the spatially and temporally more distant consequences of their 
actions, and to the social standards of what is deemed socially acceptable behaviour in 
keeping with the conditions of human social interconnection. People come to be subject to 
growing social pressures to conform with the socially established patterns of internal 
regulation of their drives and impulses which, if manifested in a manner that is not 
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compatible with the dominant social standard, might lead to individual social 
degradation.530  
 Consequently, Elias argues that a central characteristic of any process of civilisation 
is that as human interdependence increases, the fear of social degradation is incorporated 
into individual personality structures in the form of a set of internal psychological controls 
that shape the manifestation of people’s drives and inclinations. These socially-instilled 
internal controls are transmitted to children, from their earliest years, through processes of 
education and socialisation within the family and in dedicated social institutions in the form 
of symbolically-codified stocks of knowledge that orientate people’s behaviour and internal 
self-regulation.531 Elias summarises this development by arguing that as the ‘webs of actions 
grow [more] complex and extensive, the effort required to behave ‘correctly’ within them 
becomes so great, that beside the individual’s conscious self-control, an automatic, blindly 
functioning apparatus of self-control is firmly established’.532 Processes of civilisation can 
thus be characterised as an increase of the ‘social constraint towards self-restraint’.533 As we 
address in greater detail in the next chapter, this self-restraint operates more automatically 
or more consciously in accordance with each individual’s personality structure and the 
pattern of his or her particular relations of interdependence. However, whether consciously 
or unconsciously, the direction of this transformation of conduct ‘is determined by the 
direction of the process of social differentiation, by the progressive division of functions and 
by the growth of the interdependency chains into which, directly or indirectly, every 
impulse, every move of an individual becomes integrated’.534  
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 It is important to note that at no point does Elias establish a causal relation 
between the development of human interdependence and that of civilisation. He cannot 
be understood as implying that the growth of human interdependence causes a civilising 
process. Rather, these two dynamics of human development are better understood as 
intertwining and mutually reinforcing processes. If, on the one hand, the growth of human 
interdependence produces the conditions for the development of people’s personality 
structures in a ‘civilised’ direction, on the other hand, the establishment and maintenance 
of longer and more interconnected webs of human interdependence is impossible without 
the development of the capacity of human beings to exercise self-control over their 
internal drives and impulses and the development of more detached perspectives which 
encompass wider groups of people in individual calculations about the consequences of 
one’s actions.535 Moreover, as we addressed in the previous subsection, the very extension 
of the human powers of control over nature which enables the establishment and 
development of wider and more intricate networks of human interdependence is also 
fundamentally connected with people's capacity to develop a more ‘civilised’ pattern of 
self-control on the basis of which they are able to achieve a less emotionally coloured and 
more detached perspective of not only their social relations but also of their relations with 
the non-human part of the universe.  
 Furthermore, according to Elias, developmental processes in the direction of 
civilisation cannot be characterised in purely quantitative terms, as simply implying an 
increase in self-control.536 It cannot be said that people under social conditions in which 
the webs of human interdependence are less developed and the social constraint towards 
self-restraint is lower have less self-control. On the contrary, there are expressions of 
extreme forms of self-control and asceticism in these contexts that might no longer be 
accessible to more ‘civilised’ individuals. Instead, under these conditions, individual 
agencies of self-restraint can be characterised as being less even and less uniform than in a 
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more ‘civilised’ context, and thus more permeable to drives and impulses.537 Hence, people 
in conditions of lower social interdependence are more liable to ‘wild swings’ in their 
behaviour, with ‘extremely strong self-constraints often going hand-in-hand with a capacity 
for the extremely uncontrolled release of drives and affective impulses’.538 However, as the 
webs of human interdependence become tighter and the social constraints towards self-
restraint increase, people’s self-control tends to become more all-round, more uniform, 
and more stable, expressing fewer shifts from one situation to another.539 As such, a 
developmental process in a civilising direction is better characterised not in quantitative 
terms of more or less individual self-control, but instead in a more qualitative manner 
which assesses the evenness and uniformity of the patterns of people’s self-regulation of 
their drives and affects.540 
 When read in the context of our inquiry into the problem of orientation, Elias’s 
study of civilisation points the way to how a more comprehensive understanding can be 
obtained of some of the main dynamics shaping human development. Like Kant and 
Habermas, Elias recognises the interconnection between the development of people’s 
capacity for self-control and the universalisation and greater detachment of their 
perspectives. However, he builds upon this conception by linking these processes with the 
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development of the networks of human interdependence in a specific direction. His 
analysis of civilisation highlights how the development of more cosmopolitan orientations 
at the level of people’s personality structures, which encompass wider groups of human 
beings in individual assessments of the standards that should regulate people’s behaviour, 
is intertwined with the growth and deeper interconnectedness of the relations of mutual 
interdependence between human beings, and with the specific social pressures that arise 
in their context for the exercise of greater self-control over individual drives and impulses. 
 However, it must also be noted that this conception does not lead Elias back to a 
Marxian perspective which establishes a direct causal link between the globalisation of 
human interdependence and the universalisation of people’s perspectives. As we observe 
in the next subsection, Elias avoids this link by highlighting how the development of 
civilisation and the growing detachment in people’s perspectives are intertwined with the 
particular patterns of social relations that characterise the networks of human 
interdependence and with the various positions that individuals and their social groups 
occupy in the asymmetrical relations of power that structure these networks. Furthermore, 
Elias observes that these asymmetries of power are fundamentally connected with the 
development of social processes such as the formation of states and the monopolisation of 
the means of violence. As we argue throughout the rest of this chapter, Elias’s capacity to 
synthesize these various aspects of human development in a single theoretical framework 
constitutes the basis for a more comprehensive means of orientation which is capable of 
attaining a more cosmopolitan perspective that identifies the main dynamics and social 
processes shaping the development of all civilising processes while recognising that these 
dynamics do not follow a linear path of development but can lead to multiple, reversible 
and open-ended expressions of civilisation in accordance with society-specific conditions of 
existence. Following Elias’s analysis of civilisation, the next subsection focuses on its 
intersection with the development of people’s control over social processes. 
 
2.3. Civilisation and social control 
 
In this section we introduce two other of Elias’s process sociological concepts, the monopoly 
mechanism and functional democratisation which, like the notions of involvement–
detachment balance and double-bind processes, are used by Elias to describe universal 
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dynamics shaping the historical development of human beings and structuring the interplay 
between the three dimensions of the triad of controls. With his notion of monopoly 
mechanism Elias builds upon Weber’s conception of the monopoly over the legitimate 
means of violence and Marx’s notion of a capitalist monopoly over economic functions. It 
refers to the monopolisation of control over any source of social power within a certain area 
of human activity by the representatives of one or more social groups. To Elias, a monopoly 
can thus refer not only to the means of physical violence, but also to a monopoly over 
taxation, a monopoly over economic functions, or even a monopoly over means of 
orientation like the one that the Catholic Church exercised for a part of Western European 
history.541 
 The notion of the monopoly mechanism plays a fundamental role in Elias’s analysis 
of the main patterns of the historical development of the human powers of control over 
social processes.542 In this context, Elias can once again be read as bringing together 
fundamental themes of Kant and Habermas’s analyses of the role of state formation and 
the development of social norms in the expansion of people’s capacity to regulate social 
processes. However, he can also be understood to build upon these themes by providing a 
more comprehensive understanding of their interconnection with both the development of 
people’s control over non-human nature and the development of peoples’ patterning of 
self-control in the context of civilising processes.   
 According to Elias, the notion of monopoly mechanism can be summarised in the 
following manner: 
 If, in a major social unit, a large number of the smaller units which, through their 
interdependence, constitute a larger one, are of roughly equal social power and are 
thus able to compete freely – unhampered by pre-existing monopolies – for the 
means to social power (…) the probability is high that some will be victorious and 
others vanquished, and that gradually, as a result, fewer and fewer will control 
more and more opportunities, and more and more units will be eliminated from 
competition, becoming directly or indirectly dependent on an ever-decreasing 
number.543 
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As such, human social relations under conditions of free competition tend to slowly 
‘approach a state in which all opportunities are controlled by a single authority’.544 
 Although Elias develops his notion of the monopoly mechanism in the context of his 
study of the overall direction of state formation in Western Europe, once again, he identifies 
this as a universal dynamic which structures human development when conditions of free 
competition are experienced between different social units vying to achieve control over 
each other in successive ‘elimination contests’, but which can assume different 
developmental paths and historical expressions.545 For example, according to Elias, as the 
monopoly mechanism develops, the situation of free competition is transformed within the 
area of social activity in which the monopoly centre is formed. As an increasingly smaller 
number of social units acquire greater power chances and incorporate the defeated units, 
the system of ‘open opportunities’ that characterises the free competition of their mutual 
interdependent tensions is transformed into a system of ‘closed opportunities’.546 This can 
be interpreted as implying that the monopoly mechanism does not have to necessarily lead 
to the final victory of one social unit over all the others ending in the formation of a central 
monopoly. In fact, such central monopoly can also be formed by the joint agreement of a 
smaller number of competing social units in order to secure the collective regulation of their 
mutual interdependencies and tensions by voluntarily submitting themselves to a set of 
common social norms. Moreover, Elias also observes that the transition to a system of 
closed opportunities can occur at one level of social activity while a situation of free 
competition remains at other levels. For example, while the formation of states implies the 
consolidation of monopoly control over territories with defined boundaries within which 
elimination contests cease to operate, in the absence of a central global monopoly, social 
relations between human groups organised as states can continue to express patterns of 
free competition in which elimination contests predominate.547 
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 In this context, Elias recovers his conception of double-bind processes and applies it 
to the analysis of human social relations in order to highlight the deep interconnection 
between the formation of states with a monopoly over the means of physical violence and 
the expansion of people’s capacity to control social processes. As Elias observes, when the 
means of violence are not yet monopolised by a single centre in a certain area of human 
activity, but are distributed amongst several human groups in free competition, people 
constitute a constant source of threat and danger to one another. Under these conditions, 
the uncontrolled and threatening character of human beings’ conditions of existence imply 
that people’s emotions tend to run wild when faced with the fear caused by other human 
groups and the unleashing of violent aggressive impulses that is required to meet them in 
battle and contain the danger they represent to one’s life, one’s community and one’s 
livelihood.548 As such, people’s perspectives of themselves and their social relations tend to 
present a highly involved character, focused on the point of view of their particular social 
groups and on an interpretation of social phenomena orientated to an understanding of 
their meaning regarding their communities’ survival. Consequently, people’s explanatory 
models of social processes also tend to be highly involved and ego-centric, frequently 
based on evaluative distinctions between friends and enemies and in narratives of the 
mutual threats they pose one another which exhibit a high level of fantasy-content. In 
Elias’s view, people’s lower capacity to self-control their internal drives and impulses when 
living in social conditions of constant mutual threat means that they are unable to achieve 
a more detached perspective of the interdependencies which lock them together in 
relations of mutual antagonism, on the basis of which they could hope to attain a more 
adequate understanding of the social processes in which they are enmeshed and which 
reinforce the double-bind in which they find themselves.549 As such, people remain 
incapable of more consciously intervening in these social processes by collectively self-
restraining the threats they pose one another and thus contributing to a lowering of their 
mutual tensions and an increase in their chances of collectively controlling and diminishing 
the dangers regarding the survival of their respective communities.  
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 In the next chapter, we address how Elias’s conception of double-bind processes is 
applied to his analysis of human social relations in the context of world politics. For now, 
we focus on how Elias considers that the development of state monopolies over physical 
force unties the double-bind in human relations within states by contributing to the 
development of civilisation in a manner that enables an expansion in people’s capacity to 
more consciously control their social processes. According to Elias, on the one hand, the 
internal pacification of a territory where monopoly control over physical force has been 
achieved appears as a fundamental condition for the civilisation of human beings. Firstly, 
because only under such conditions can the networks of human interdependence develop 
to an extent in which the social constraint towards self-restraint becomes a predominant 
compulsion in the moulding of individual personality structures. And secondly, because 
only when people are not under the constant danger of physical violence from each other 
can they escape the double-bind in human relations and develop a greater degree of self-
control over their drives and impulses, in keeping with a substitution of the fear of violence 
from other people for the fear of social degradation in the eyes of others with whom they 
are interdependent.550 On the other hand, a more ‘civilised’ moulding of individual 
personality structures is essential for the constitution and maintenance of monopoly 
structures. Firstly, at the level of the central institutions of the state, the social groups in 
control of these institutions need to possess both a high degree of self-control and a 
sufficient level of detachment in their perspectives of social relations for the successful 
fulfilment of their coordinating functions and regulation of the human web of 
interdependencies.551 And secondly, compliance with the social norms regulating social 
relations, on which the maintenance of the monopoly depends, cannot rely only on 
compulsion through physical force, but also requires a high degree of voluntary self-
restraint on the part of the individuals who carry out their social activities in the area under 
monopoly control; self-restraint which is based on a higher capacity to tame their internal 
impulses in keeping with a more detached perspective of the consequences of their actions 
across the webs of social interdependence on which their social existence depends.552  
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 According to Elias, the combination of the monopolisation of physical force and the 
civilising process that the internal pacification of state societies permits, opens up the 
historical possibility for the formation of institutional centres capable of enacting, and 
guaranteeing the application of, social norms which regulate human social relations and thus 
function as channels through which human beings can acquire a greater degree of conscious 
and collective control over their social processes.553 In this context, Elias observes that, when 
viewed in a long-term perspective, the development of people’s control over social 
processes enabled by the formation of monopoly centres appears to fall into two distinct 
phases structured by the development of the networks of human interdependence and the 
power asymmetries between human groups that are experienced in their context.554 In the 
first phase, the formation of state monopolies over physical violence and taxation frequently 
represents a loss of control chances over their social processes to the many individuals and 
groups who are submitted to the monopoly rule but who do not integrate the groups in 
control of its central institutions. The central monopoly is thus essentially a ‘private’ 
monopoly serving the particular interests of a specific stratum of society and increasing its 
power chances through the control over the networks of social interdependence that its 
central institutions enable.555 In this phase, the webs of human interdependence are 
characterized by great power asymmetries between social groups, with those who are not in 
control of the central monopoly institutions finding themselves a lot more dependent on the 
central rulers than the other way around. At this phase in the development of the monopoly 
mechanism, fundamental questions arise about how to tame the sovereign powers of the 
state and the arbitrary use of its monopoly over the means of violence and taxation for the 
benefit of a restricted number of people at the expense of all the others.  
 However, Elias argues that the historical possibility to answer these questions only 
arises if a second phase is reached in the development of the monopoly mechanism. This 
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second phase depends on whether the webs of human interdependence develop in the 
direction not only of their increased length and intricacy, but also become characterised by a 
lowering of power asymmetries between social groups. Whether or not they develop in this 
direction depends predominantly on the patterns of development assumed by the growth of 
the division of labour and of the expansion of human production and trade. If the division of 
labour develops towards a greater specialisation and consequent mutual dependence 
between social functions, it can lead not only to an expansion of the networks of human 
interdependence but also to their being increasingly structured by a process of functional 
democratisation, defined by a reduction of power asymmetries between people as all come 
to increasingly depend on all the others for both the satisfaction of their social needs and for 
carrying out their specialised social functions which now can only exist if integrated on an 
increasingly tighter and more complex web of mutual interdependencies. If such a process of 
functional democratisation is verified, Elias argues that one of its main consequences is that, 
increasingly, the operation of the central monopoly can no longer be carried out by a single 
stratum in control of its institutions. The central rulers come to have to rely more and more 
on wider strata of society for the maintenance of the monopoly and the carrying out of its 
regulatory functions.556 The process of functional democratisation thus implies not only a 
reduction of power asymmetries between social groups but also a concomitant opening up 
of control chances to wider groups of people who, having so far been excluded from access 
to the central monopoly unless they conquered it by force, become capable of influencing 
the central institutions of the state and their regulation of the whole web of human 
interdependencies.557  
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 Furthermore, Elias observes that intertwined with these processes is the 
development of people’s personality structures in a more ‘civilised’ direction. In Elias’s 
assessment, the expansion and functional democratisation of the webs of human 
interdependence is only possible because it is concomitant with the development of 
civilisation towards patterns of individual self-control characterised by more even and 
uniform internal regulation of people’s drives and impulses and a growing detachment in 
their perspectives of social relations. This greater detachment implies that individuals 
enmeshed in more interdependent networks of humanity acquire the capacity to more 
adequately attune to the reality of their social interdependence and to encompass wider 
groups of people in their individual calculations regarding the consequences of their actions 
and how to regulate their behaviour and the expression of their drives and impulses. Hence, 
the lowering of power asymmetries between people can be said to be accompanied by the 
development of more detached perspectives at the level of individual personality structures 
which imply two fundamental changes in people’s overall modes of orientation towards 
each other and the world. On the one hand, in developing more universal modes of 
attunement to other people across wider networks of interdependent humanity, individuals 
also develop tighter forms of mutual emotional identification with each other that arise from 
their understanding of the degree of their mutual interconnectedness and the consequences 
of their actions on each other’s lives and well-being. On the other hand, people also come to 
be more attuned to the fact that the lowering of power asymmetries not only means that 
they can influence the exercise of social regulation by the central state monopoly, but also 
that the complexity of the web of human interdependencies implies that it can only be more 
consciously controlled in a manner that avoids its more harmful unplanned effects and 
which is more compatible with human needs, if it comes under the collective control of all 
human beings who are enmeshed in its bounds of social interconnection. Progressively then, 
people come to be attuned to the possibility of collectively acquiring greater conscious 
control over their social processes and conditions of existence through deliberative and 
democratic decision-making processes regarding the social norms that should regulate social 
life and individual behavioural expectations and which must encompass all human beings 
who stand to be affected by them. As Elias observes, the lowering of power asymmetries 
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leads people to realise that ‘opportunities that had previously to be won by individuals 
through military or economic force can now become amenable to planning’.558  
 According to Elias, the monopoly rulers can acknowledge the need to democratise 
the central monopoly and impose on themselves the self-restraints and the sharing of 
power with other strata of society which the reduction in power asymmetries entails, or 
they can attempt to preserve their private control of the central monopoly and continue to 
direct its operation only to the satisfaction of their interests and needs and to the increase 
of their power chances. However, in conditions of high social interdependence moving 
towards a reduction of power asymmetries, the later course of action becomes increasingly 
harder to maintain without leading to potentially violent social conflicts in the form of either 
revolutions that force a change in the monopolist holders of sovereign power and a 
widening of monopoly control to other strata, or of civil wars that might push the web of 
human interdependencies into a condition of social degradation and regression to a 
situation in which the maintenance of a central monopoly is no longer possible and the 
social unit becomes divided between smaller groups in violent competition with each 
other.559  
 The second phase of monopoly development is thus characterised by an overall 
movement in the direction of its growing ‘socialisation’, as ‘the privately owned monopoly 
in the hands of a single individual or family comes under the control of broader social strata, 
and transforms itself, as the central organ of the state, into a public monopoly’.560 The 
central sovereign is thus brought under the control of the whole society through the 
enactment of social norms which, guaranteed in their application by the state monopoly 
over the means of violence, regulate the operation of the monopoly itself, and become the 
product of democratic processes of decision-making.561 As such, the control of the state 
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monopoly stops being the unplanned outcome of the ‘vicissitudes of free competition’ 
between different social groups to become instead based on a planned sharing of power 
chances that depends on ‘regularly recurring elimination contests without the force of arms, 
(…) and thus by ‘unfree’ competition’.562 In other words, the control of the state monopoly 
becomes democratic, regulated by clearly defined social norms, circumscribing the 
competition and behavioural expectations between different groups as they strive to 
achieve greater influence over its central institutions.563 The socialisation of the central 
monopoly and its transformation into a public monopoly thus implies that the central rulers 
become public functionaries who operate the state monopoly in the interests of the whole 
of society, as represented in its central democratic institutions. The opportunities and 
power chances provided by the monopoly become allocated less by ‘personal favour and in 
the interest of individuals, but increasingly according to a more impersonal and precise plan 
in the interest of many interdependent associates, and finally in the interests of an entire 
interdependent human figuration’.564  
 Our reading of Elias’s work as an answer to the explanatory dimension of the 
problem of orientation thus leads us to argue that Elias’s process sociology enables a deeper 
and more comprehensive understanding of developmental processes already identified by 
the critical authors as fundamental in the long-term history of the species and in the 
expansion of the human powers of self-determination. Like the critical authors, Elias 
recognises the fundamental role of the growing detachment and universalisation of people’s 
perspectives for an expansion of their capacity to more consciously control social processes. 
However, Elias develops upon this conception by introducing the awareness that the 
development of more detached orientations depends not only on the expansion of the 
human networks of interdependence, as noted by Marx, or on the logic of development of 
moral-practical knowledge, as advanced by Habermas, but also on the patterns of mutual 
power asymmetries between human groups. If the webs of human interdependence become 
wider but remain structured by high levels of power asymmetries, there is a high chance that 
individual personality structures will not become more universally attuned and their 
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personal perspectives will remain bound to the parochial and more involved perspectives of 
their social groups. Under these condition, human beings’ emotional identification does not 
extend to people outside their immediate communities and social relations continue to be 
perceived in a predominantly involved and ego-centric manner, looking for their meaning 
regarding the survival and interests of people’s particularistic communities. On the other 
hand, the development of more cosmopolitan modes of orientation is linked to the lowering 
of power asymmetries between people, on the basis of which more universal forms of 
attunement and identification can develop and more detached and less ego-centric 
perspectives can orientate people in conceiving of their social relations in terms of blind 
unplanned social processes arising out of the interweaving of human actions and which can 
only come under greater conscious control if this control is ultimately exercised by the whole 
web of interdependent humanity. Elias’s process sociology can thus be understood to 
provide a more comprehensive approach to the study of the predominant dynamics and 
social processes shaping human development and circumscribing the development of more 
cosmopolitan perspectives at the level of people’s personality structures.  
 Moreover, we can also argue that this more comprehensive approach constitutes the 
sociological basis for the study of the historical emergence of the more universalistic forms 
of attunement and moral sentiment which are identified in Kant and Habermas’s works. 
Effectively, Elias opens up the possibility for the development of a sociology of morals which 
captures the universalisation of people’s moral orientations on a historical and sociological 
basis which is no longer focused on a transcendental assessment of the ideal conditions of 
morality and freedom or on the logic of their development, but rather on an identification of 
the material and social conditions under which particular forms of moral attunement arise 
historically.565 As such, rather than looking for a transcendental and universal conception of 
morality on the basis of which to evaluate its historical expression, Elias’s process sociology 
can be said to be more concerned with understanding the historical processes through 
which moral development itself is possible and what it implies. We can thus argue that Elias 
advances a materialist and emergentist approach to these topics which recognises that more 
universalistic modes of orientation, and the disclosure of moral principles such as those of 
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Habermas’s discourse ethics, do not depend on their transcendental ascertainment but 
rather that these principles emerge historically in accordance with the patterns of 
development of human interdependence, the asymmetries of power between human beings 
and the development of people’s personality structures.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we addressed Elias’s process sociology to argue that it opens the way out the 
impasse that has been reached with critical theory’s engagement with the problem of 
orientation. We have shown how Elias’s detour via detachment leads him to develop a 
materialist and emergentist approach to human development which can be understood as 
providing a higher synthesis between Marxian, Kantian and Habermasian approaches. Elias’s 
study of human development in a long-term perspective was thus identified as providing the 
basis for not only a more comprehensive understanding of the role of the interplay between 
the different dimensions of the triad of controls in the species’ history but also for an 
explanatory model of human development which captures its multi-linear and open-ended 
character in a manner that better avoids the reproduction of modernist myths. As such, we 
have argued that Elias’s process sociology points us in the direction of what needs to be 
done in order to develop a more adequate means of orientation regarding the history of the 
species and the development of the human powers of control, which enables the attainment 
of a more cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition while recognising and 
protecting the fundamental plurality of humankind.  
 In the next chapter, we return to these themes to observe how Elias applies his 
process sociological approach to the study of world politics and argue that it provides the 
basis for a more comprehensive assessment of the predominant social processes shaping 
the globalisation of the species and the development of more detached perspectives on the 
basis of which people can more adequately orientate towards their global interconnection. 
However, we also note that Elias’s focus on the explanatory dimension of orientation and 
his constant postponement of an engagement with the more involved assessment of how to 
actualise the immanent potentials gathered at each historical juncture for an expansion of 
the human powers of self-determination means that, by itself, process sociology is incapable 
of answering both dimensions of the problem of orientation. While constituting a more 
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adequate framework for an answer to the explanatory dimension of orientation, process 
sociology remains unable to address how people can come to exercise a greater degree of 
conscious control over the pressing challenges that arise from human global 
interdependence in the form of, just to name a few, environmental change, the danger of 
nuclear inter-state conflict or mass movement of refugee populations. These observations 
leads us to argue that the development of a more adequate orientating framework – 
capable of addressing both dimensions of the problem of orientation and attune people to 
the reality of their global interdependence and to the potentials and limits it implies 
regarding their more conscious control of their conditions of existence – ultimately depends 
on the production of a higher synthesis between process sociology and critical theory, 
capable of recovering the critical authors’ more involved normative commitment to the 
expansion of human self-determination on the basis of Elias’s more detached, multi-linear 
and open-ended model of the species’ history.  
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Chapter Seven 
Towards a synthesis 
 
In this chapter, we continue our reading of Elias’s work from the perspective of our inquiry 
into the problem of orientation by addressing his application of a process sociological 
approach to the study of world politics. In this context, we introduce two other Eliasian 
concepts, ‘we–I balance’ and ‘we-images’, that reinforce our argument regarding Elias’s 
capacity to open the way for a more adequate explanatory model of the history of the 
species. In particular, we note that Elias is capable of developing a more cosmopolitan 
perspective on the conditions of existence of globalised humanity, while maintaining an 
awareness of the plurality of the species that avoids a reproduction of the type of modernist 
myths that affect the works of the critical authors. 
 However, we also note that, despite the potential of Elias’s process sociology for the 
development of a more adequate answer to the explanatory dimension of orientation, still, 
it does not constitute a substitute to a critical engagement with the problem of orientation. 
Although Elias conceptualises the relation between involvement and detachment as a 
balance, his awareness of the dangers inherent in premature answers which, based on a still 
insufficient and unreliable fund of knowledge, address the question of how human beings 
can exercise more control over their conditions of existence, leads him to constantly 
postpone the completion of his detour via detachment through a secondary re-involvement. 
One which, on the basis of his multi-linear and open-ended model of human development, 
provides a more adequate answer to the anticipatory dimension of orientation by addressing 
how people might come to further expand their capacity for self-determination and what 
principles should orientate them in attaining a more conscious regulation of their networks 
of global interdependence. Elias’s writings on world politics are particularly expressive of this 
tension. They are focused on providing a more reliable assessment of the conditions shaping 
the globalisation of the species and the development of more cosmopolitan perspectives at 
the level of people’s personality structures in a manner that recognises how these processes 
are the outcome of the interweaving of multiple paths of human development and society-
specific forms of civilisation. However, Elias constantly avoids translating this more detached 
analysis of the conditions of existence of global humanity into a more involved assessment 
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of what historical potentials these social processes gather for the expansion of human beings 
capacity to more consciously navigate the future stages of the global integration of the 
species.  
 This analysis of Elias’s work leads us to conclude that a more adequate answer to the 
problem of orientation requires the production of a means of orientation that expresses an 
involvement–detachment balance which is capable of maintaining the tension between the 
search, on the one hand, for a more detached and cosmopolitan perspective on human 
historical development and the conditions of existence of global humanity and, on the other 
hand, a more involved interpretation of its meaning for the contemporary concerns of the 
species and the assessment of the conditions under which human beings might come to 
exercise greater control over their future development. As such, we argue that Elias’s 
process sociology can help us move in the direction of this more adequate answer to the 
problem of orientation not by acting as a substitute of critical theoretical engagements with 
the study of human development and world politics, but rather if brought into a higher 
synthesis with critical theory which is capable of simultaneously sustaining Elias’s detached, 
multi-linear and open-ended explanatory model of human development, and produce a 
more involved anticipatory assessment of its implications for the future development of the 
human powers of control. Such a synthesis would thus constitute a more adequate means 
of orientation on the basis of which human beings could attain a more cosmopolitan 
perspective on their conditions of existence which not only recognises and protects the 
plurality of the species, but also enables people to better understand themselves, their long-
term process of development and how they might come to make more of their history 
under conditions of their own choosing. 
 It lies outside this study’s time and length limitations to pursue such a synthetic 
endeavour. As such, the purpose of this chapter is rather to take the first steps in 
establishing the theoretical basis for the future pursuit of this project. In order to fulfil this 
objective, the present chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first section, we 
address Elias’s work on world politics, where we focus on an analysis of double-bind 
processes and the monopoly mechanism at the level of human inter-state relations. This 
analysis leads us to a discussion of some of the limitations of process sociology’s emphasis 
on detachment, in the context of which we make a case for a higher synthesis between 
process sociology and critical theory. In the second section, we carry out a reading of Elias’s 
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work from a critical theoretical perspective which highlights some common themes 
between process sociology and critical theory that point us in the direction of how this 
synthesis might be achieved. In particular, we argue that Elias’s multi-linear and open-ended 
model of human development opens the way for a recovery of Marx’s non-transcendental 
engagement with the anticipatory dimension of the problem of orientation in a manner that 
enables a more adequate assessment of the historical potential, gathered at the level of 
world politics, for an expansion of people’s capacity to bring their conditions of existence 
under a greater degree of conscious and collective control.  
 
1. World politics in a process sociological perspective 
 
In this section we address Elias’s reflections on world politics. We focus our analysis not only 
on the already discussed conceptions of monopoly mechanism and double-bind processes, 
but also introduce two other core concepts of Elias’s work: the ‘we–I balance’ and ‘we-
images’. In this context, we reinforce our argument regarding how process sociology opens 
the way for a more adequate answer to the explanatory dimension of orientation in so far as 
it provides a more comprehensive analysis of the multi-linear and open-ended character of 
human development at the level of world politics that captures the conditions shaping the 
globalisation of the species and how global relations between human survival units are 
shaped by the interplay between the different dimensions of the triad of controls. 
Furthermore, this section also establishes the basis for the discussion of the limitations of 
Elias’s emphasis on detachment and the need to carry out a higher synthesis between 
process sociology and critical theory which permits a more adequate answer to the problem 
of orientation.  
 This section is divided into two subsections. First, we address Elias’s conception of 
the interplay between the we–I balance and we-images in his analysis of the development of 
regional and global associations of states. Second, we analyse the relation between double-
bind processes and the monopoly mechanism in Elias’s study of world politics.   
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1.1. The ‘we–I balance’ in post-national associations of states 
 
In the previous chapter, we addressed Elias’s conception of the monopoly mechanism as one 
of the predominant dynamics shaping human historical development. In that context, we 
noted Elias’s argument that the formation and subsequent functional democratisation of 
monopolies of force and taxation at the state level implies a reduction of free competition 
between human groups and enables a greater degree of collective control over the 
conditions of human existence inside states. In this section, we address how Elias extends his 
analysis of the monopoly mechanism to world politics and argues, in a manner which echoes 
the realist position in International Relations, that the absence of a global monopoly of force 
implies that relations between states continue to be predominantly defined by free 
competition and elimination contests.566 As such, the monopoly mechanism remains the 
predominant dynamic shaping relations between different human survival units and pushing 
them into unplanned and uncontrolled conflicts with each other.567 However, as we 
demonstrate in this section, Elias also moves significantly beyond the realist position by 
framing his analysis of world politics in his conception of civilising processes, and thus tracing 
the interplay between the changing patterns of power asymmetries and relations of 
interdependence between states and the development of their citizens’ personality 
structures.568 
 According to Elias, especially since the end of the Second World War, and in keeping 
with the expansion of human networks of production and trade and the growing global 
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division of labour, there has been a predominant tendency for the formation of regional and 
global associations of states with a view to exercising greater collective regulation over the 
dynamics of human global interdependence.569 As Elias’s notes, the formation of these 
supranational organisations can be understood as expressing an early stage in the 
development of supranational monopolies. Furthermore, such supranational associations 
represent not only the unplanned outcome of elimination contests between survival units, 
but are also the result of a planned pooling of sovereignty between different states, as a 
strategy to acquire a greater degree of collective and conscious control over their conditions 
of interdependent existence.570  
 In this context, Elias returns to his previous analysis of the dynamics of development 
of the monopoly mechanism to argue that the formation of higher monopoly centres, 
beyond the state level, implies an initial loss of power and control chances for the individuals 
caught up in these processes and the social units which they integrate. He observes that in 
the transition between the tribal and the state level the same dynamic implies that, as 
different tribes come to integrate a higher level monopoly over physical violence and 
taxation in the form of a state, the power resources of tribal authorities are reduced in 
favour of those of the state authorities571. Hence, individuals who, in previously self-
governing tribes, had a greater capacity to participate in, and influence, decision-making 
processes at the tribe level, now find themselves at a greater distance from the social 
centres of power and losing their control chances over the central decision-making 
processes. Similarly, the integration of sovereign states in regional and global associations of 
states also expresses a progressive shift of power from the state level to the continental and 
global levels.572 The power chances that individuals have in parliamentary democracies to 
collectively control their conditions of existence inside the state is increasingly eroded by 
decision-making processes taking place at the level of emerging supranational institutions, 
over which they have little influence.573  
 Furthermore, Elias observes that one of the main dynamics shaping the development 
of the monopoly mechanism at the level of world politics is the interplay between, on the 
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one hand, the global patterns of interdependence and power asymmetries between human 
survival units and, on the other hand, the development of people’s personality structures 
and forms of mutual identification. In this context, Elias introduces his twin concepts of we–I 
balance and we-images in order to captures these dynamics and trace their multi-linear and 
open-ended development. In the book ‘Society of Individuals’, he characterises the concept 
of ‘we-images’ as referring to people’s self-image as individuals and groups. Recovering his 
previous analysis of civilising processes, Elias argues that this image can expand or contract 
to embrace more or less people in accordance with the length and intricacy of the webs of 
human interdependence, with the development of functional democratisation and the 
asymmetries of power between human groups, and with the concomitant development of 
people’s personality structures in a more ‘civilised’ direction implying more even and 
uniform patterns of self-control and the attainment of more detached perspectives of 
themselves and their social relations.574 Elias’s analysis thus points for the existence of a 
mutually reinforcing connection between the growth of the human webs of 
interdependence, the functional democratisation of power asymmetries between human 
groups, and the widening of people perspectives to assume a more cosmopolitan character, 
on the basis of which their we-images come to progressively encompass larger social units 
and groups of interdependent people.575 
 According to Elias, the widening of people’s we-images does not entail the 
elimination of their identification with those social groups at a lower level of integration; 
instead, individuals develop ‘multi-layered’ personality structures that encompass several 
levels of mutual identification with other people, as each individual becomes his or her own 
personal focus of several intermeshing ‘planes of integration’.576 As such, Elias observes that, 
for example, pre-historic hunter-gatherer groups might have had only a single plane of 
integration in their members’ we-images referring to familial bonds. However, as the 
division of labour advances and human interdependence grows, the expression ‘we’ starts to 
have ‘many layers’ and can refer, simultaneously, to family, clan, tribe, state, or other groups 
of interdependent human beings.577 
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 In this context, Elias’s introduces his conception of the ‘we–I balance’, as a way to 
observe the transition of people’s mutual identification through these different planes of 
integration. Both the ‘I’ and the ‘we’ in this concept can refer to different layers of human 
self-images, in accordance with which plane of integration we’re considering. Hence, the ‘I’ 
in this relationship can refer not only to an individual human being, but also to a social unit 
in any plane of integration which is enmeshed in several layers of we-images. It can refer to 
the balance between an individual and his family, a family and a tribe, a tribe and a state, or 
a state and an association of states.578 It is an orientating concept which functions as a ‘tool 
of observation and reflection (…) [and matches] the multi-layered aspect of we-conceptions, 
(…) the plurality of interlocking planes of integration characteristic of human societies at 
their present stage of development’.579  
 By using the notion of a balance Elias refers to the fact that, frequently, one of the 
several layers of we-images interlocking in an individual possesses a certain prominence 
over the others.580 This layer most commonly corresponds to the individual’s membership of 
a particular survival unit, such as a nation-state, which he or she considers the prime unit of 
allegiance and which most predominantly shapes the individual’s self-image and modes of 
attunement towards other people and the world. The notion of a balance captures the 
shifting preponderance of one or other we-image in individual personality structures; a 
balance which changes with the transformation of the patterns of mutual interdependence 
and power between people.581 Hence, for example, Elias observes, with reference to his 
study of the civilising process in Western Europe, that in earlier phases of the formation of 
state monopolies, when the asymmetries of power chances to influence the central 
institutions of the state are still very high and the central monopoly still assumes a 
predominantly private character, the we–I balance in people’s personality structures tends 
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to be significantly tilted towards the we-image of the tribe vis-à-vis the still emerging we-
image of the nation.582 On the other hand, at a later phase in the development of state 
monopolies – when these have undergone a process of socialisation which transforms them 
into public monopolies, and a process of functional democratisation which ensures a more 
even distribution of power chances between different strata of society – people’s we–I 
balance also tilts predominantly towards the we-image of the nation vis-à-vis that of smaller 
tribes integrated in the state.583  
 Once again, it is important to observe that the relation between monopoly 
formation and the development of we-images is not one of cause and effect, nor does it 
express a linear and teleological conception of human development. On the one hand, for 
example, national we-images cannot form without the functional democratisation of the 
central state monopoly but, simultaneously, such democratisation also depends on a 
widening of people’s we-images beyond their particular familial and tribal groups to 
encompass the nation as a source of common identification. On the other hand, these 
processes are not only liable to undergo regressions can but also block each other’s’ 
interdependent development.   
 In this context, Elias argues that it is possible to observe that, frequently, people’s 
most prominent we-images in the we–I balance tend to lag behind the level of integration 
already achieved by their relations of mutual interdependence. He thus talks about the 
‘drag-effect’ of people’s we-images which can block the formation and socialisation of 
monopoly centres at a higher level of integration.584 For example, Elias observes that even 
though the human species has become increasingly interdependent at the global level, still, 
‘it is not an exaggeration to say that, for most people, humankind as a frame of reference for 
we-identity is a blank space on the map of their emotions’.585 People’s perspectives and 
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basic modes of attunement continue to express higher levels of involvement, and remain 
locked to the particularistic and parochial perspectives of the social groups which 
characterise their predominant we-images, with the majority of human beings so far 
remaining unable to attain a more cosmopolitan perspective which matches the conditions 
of global interdependence which are experienced by every member of the species. 
According to Elias, such drag-effects can be found in the development of all planes of 
integration of human interdependence. Hence, in the same manner that we can talk about a 
drag-effect of national we-images vis-à-vis, for example, the continental level of integration 
in the form of the European Union, many contemporary states in Africa and other parts of 
the world also deal with the drag-effect of tribal we-images in the formation of state 
monopolies.586  
 Elias explains these drag-effects by observing the ‘survival function’ that social units 
at different levels of integration provide to human individuals and which produces specific 
types of emotional bond, even when these social units have become increasingly obsolete in 
that function as a result of growing human interdependence.587 This survival function should 
be understood not only in terms of physical security and protection from the violence of 
other human groups, but also refers to the fact that, ‘by virtue of its continued tradition, 
membership in [a particular survival unit] grants the individual a chance of survival beyond 
actual physical existence, survival in the memory of the chain of generations’.588 As such, 
‘the continuity of a survival group, which finds expression in the continuity of its language, 
the passing down of legends, history, music and many other cultural values, is itself one of 
the survival functions of [social units]’.589 More often than not, changes to the prominence 
of we-images expressing a higher plane of integration represent a ‘loss of meaning’ and a 
‘forgetting’ of aspects of the we-images that characterise people’s personality structures at a 
lower level of integration; as can be witnessed in the historical transition from tribal to 
national we-images.590 As such, Elias argues that even if it makes perfect rational sense, 
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given the present phase in the development of human global interdependence, for the 
European states to combine into a continental association, still, the development of 
European we-images represents a loss at the level of national we-images, a loss that many 
human beings ‘cannot cease mourning’.591 
 In this context, we can recall our analysis of Habermas’s work to argue that his 
proposal for the development of dual constitutional subjects in supranational organisations 
at both the regional and the global levels of integration can be understood, from a process 
sociological perspective, as representing an attempt at overcoming the drag-effects of 
national we-images, while not incurring in the unbearable costs – in the form of loss of 
national meaning and identity – associated with the development of supranational we-
images. Furthermore, his observations on constitutional patriotism as a change in people’s 
emotional identification from the nation to the constitutional principles which they 
deliberatively agree to also represents an attempt to conceptualise how people’s we-images 
can be widened to encompass social units at a higher plane of integration.592 Habermas’s 
proposals thus strive to orientate people towards a more adequate involvement–
detachment in their perspectives, on the basis of which they can attune in a more 
cosmopolitan manner to the global web of humanity while preserving their society-specific 
differences and cultural self-expressions.   
 However, Elias can also be understood as opening the way for a more 
comprehensive approach than that of Habermas, Kant or Marx. As seen above, and as we 
argue in greater detail in the next subsection, Elias is able to provide a more adequate 
understanding of how the development of people’s perspectives is intertwined with the 
development of the triad of controls and with social processes at both the intra-societal and 
the inter-societal levels. In particular, his theoretical linkage between the drag-effects 
experienced at the level of people’s we-images, the development of human global 
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interdependence and power asymmetries, and the development of people’s internal 
patterning of self-control in a more or less ‘civilised’ direction can constitutes the basis for a 
sociological analysis of the predominant social processes shaping the development of more 
cosmopolitan and detached perspectives at the level of people’s personality structures 
which, while identified in the critical authors’ works, tend to be conceived by them in a 
linear and teleological manner. As such, Elias’s process sociological approach can help us in 
the production of a more adequate answer to the explanatory dimension of orientation 
which captures the multi-linear and open-ended character of human development and how 
various intermeshing dynamics and social processes shape it in different directions.  
 
1.2. Double-bind processes and monopoly formation 
 
In the book ‘Humana Conditio’, Elias weaves together several threads of his process 
sociological approach in a study of world politics that highlights the interplay between the 
development of people’s modes of attunement and we-images with the different 
dimensions of the triad of basic controls. In particular, Elias observes that the untying of the 
double-bind which some sections of humanity achieved at the level of human relations with 
non-human nature has led to a long-term process of development of human military 
technology and destructive capacity which has fundamental consequences for the conditions 
of existence of the species and the future operation of the monopoly mechanism. Finding its 
most dramatic expression in the nuclear revolution, the development of human 
technological capacity has made elimination contests between states an increasingly 
‘obsolete’ mode of carrying out power struggles and solving conflicts, since such contests 
imply the realistic possibility of escaping human control in a manner that might threaten 
with destruction a considerable part of the world’s population, as well as make large areas of 
the planet inhospitable to life.593  
 Still, Elias argues, the particular pattern of human global interdependence implies 
that world politics continue to be predominantly shaped by social dynamics that push the 
web of humanity in the direction of unplanned and uncontrolled forms of competition and 
elimination contests between survival units. According to Elias, these dynamics can be most 
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adequately understood through the application of his concept of double-bind processes to 
the analysis of inter-societal relations between human survival units.594 By applying the 
concept to the study of world politics, Elias observes that a circular movement can be 
observed shaping the conditions of existence of globalised humanity. The absence of a global 
monopoly of force which ensures the pacification of inter-state relations, together with the 
concomitant sovereign control by several states of highly destructive means of violence, 
implies that the species is still fundamentally locked in a situation in which different survival 
units pose high levels of mutual danger and threat to each other, to which correspond, at 
the level of individual personality structures, highly involved perspectives and modes of 
orientation towards their social relations and the wider web of interdependent humanity.595 
As such, people’s perspectives on world politics exhibit a high level of involvement and their 
explanatory models of inter-state relations and conflicts are characterised by the 
predominance of fantasy-content directed towards the assessment of their meaning from 
the ego-centric point of view of human survival units and their particular interests.  
 According to Elias, while in relations with non-human nature these more involved 
perspectives imply that the question of ‘who is to blame’ for the threats and dangers to 
which human beings are exposed from uncontrolled natural forces is frequently answered 
with reference to the intentional agency of spirits and other supernatural forces, in the 
context of world politics, they frequently lead to collective national narratives that portray 
situations of inter-state conflict as being predominantly the fault of the opposing state.596 
Consequently, when different states are locked together in relations of mutually 
interdependent conflict and competition, their populations tend to assume highly involved 
perspectives of their situation which portray each other as the ‘aggressor’ who’s intentional 
actions produce the threatening and dangerous conditions of existence which they all 
experience.597     
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 The function of these ego-centric and highly involved ‘blame narratives’ as the 
predominant means of orientation of each state’s foreign policy means that aggressive 
international behaviour and posturing, envisioning the containment or defeat of the 
opposing state, frequently appears as an adequate and reasonable way for each survival unit 
to try to acquire a greater degree of control over the social processes in which it is 
enmeshed at the level of world politics.598 However, Elias argues, when observed from a 
more detached perspective, such policies can be understood as actually reinforcing the 
threat that people pose to each other and the tensions to which they are exposed. They lock 
human beings in double-bind processes of increasing mutual danger, greater involvement, 
and concomitant incapacity to produce a more detached understanding of their conditions 
of existence, on the basis of which they might better orientate as to how to achieve a 
greater degree of conscious and collective control over social processes; namely, by taming 
inter-state violent conflicts and elimination contests.599  
 According to Elias, the level of danger and threat that human beings organised as 
states continue to pose to one another means that people’s perspectives and modes of 
orientation in world politics remain predominantly shaped by an involvement–detachment 
balance significantly tilted towards the former. Consequently, human beings continue to be 
predominantly oriented by ‘obsolete modes of thought’ as their we-images remain locked 
to survival units at lower levels of integration, such as the nation-state, which are 
increasingly out of synch with the global character of human interdependence.600 People’s 
more involved perspectives and more restricted we-images thus exercise a drag effect over 
their capacity to attain a more detached and cosmopolitan point of view which recognises 
that the global interconnection of the species means that the ‘chances of survival [have 
come to] depend largely on what happens on the global plane [and that, consequently] it is 
the whole of humanity which now constitutes the last effective survival unit’.601 As such, 
Elias argues that as long as the double-bind in world politics remains, and people are unable 
to bring under greater self-control the fears and tensions caused by the mutual threats they 
pose each other, a more detached perspective of social processes – which explains them by 
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the unplanned dynamics of human interdependent competition rather than by ego-centric 
and highly involved blame narratives – will remain predominantly beyond their reach.602  
 However, Elias also observes that, given the level of destructive capacity attained by 
human technological development, responses to conflicts between human groups through 
the pacification of larger areas by war and the defeat and assimilation of competing social 
units in a larger monopoly of power have effectively reached the ‘end of the road’.603 As 
such, the untying of the double-bind in world politics cannot occur through the development 
of further elimination contests that eventually lead to the formation of a world state. 
Instead, new modes of regulation of the global web of humanity have to be devised, if a 
‘return to the cave’ is to be avoided.604 As Elias notes, in one of his rare comment regarding 
what this new mode of self-regulation might entail, the web of humanity has stretched ‘too 
widely, and the number of states large and small that are accustomed to independence is 
too considerable, to give a single state or a single group of states any real chance of 
establishing a lasting military-economic hegemony over the whole of humanity’.605 
Consequently, Elias argues that, in the absence of a realistic possibility of establishing a 
world state, the ‘development of humanity has reached a (…) period in which human beings 
are confronted, for the first time, with the task of organising themselves globally – that is, as 
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humanity’.606 In keeping with his developmental approach, Elias observes that it is 
impossible to foresee whether the species will live up to such a task, or whether it will 
destroy itself in the preceding struggle, either as a result of large-scale nuclear conflict or 
some other form of collective destruction.607 However, Elias considers that any chance of 
success depends, ultimately, on the human capacity to achieve a more adequate 
involvement–detachment balance in people’s personality structures and a corresponding 
widening of their we-images to assume a more cosmopolitan character that encompasses 
the species as a whole as their effective survival unit. People need to assume a more 
detached perspective of the predominant social processes shaping human global 
interdependence which permits an abandonment of more involved and ego-centric blame 
narratives as the main means of orientation in world politics. In this context, Elias argues 
that the social sciences play a fundamental role in promoting more cosmopolitan means of 
orientation which are capable of attaining a more universal and detached perspective on the 
conditions of existence of globalised humanity, and that orientate human beings as to how – 
in the absence of a hegemonic global monopoly over the means of violence which pacifies 
world politics and reduces the tensions and dangers that human survival units pose to each 
other – they can fulfil ‘the task (…) of contributing gradually to a renunciation of the 
traditional warlike institutions through voluntary self-limitation and (…) submission to the 
arbitration of humanity’.608 
 Our reading of Elias’s engagement with world politics from the perspective of our 
inquiry into the problem of orientation once again confirms our argument regarding how 
process sociology opens the way for a more comprehensive engagement with topics already 
addressed by the critical authors. In particular, Elias is able to provide a more adequate 
understanding of the several interweaving social processes, in all dimension of the triads of 
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controls, that shape not only the globalisation of the species but also the development of 
people’s personality structures in the direction of more cosmopolitan perspectives and 
modes of attunement towards their conditions of existence. Furthermore, and on the 
contrary of the critical authors, Elias is capable of maintaining a constant awareness of how 
the growing global interdependence of the species entails the interweaving between several 
society-specific developmental paths and civilising processes in a manner that avoids an 
understanding of these phenomena on the basis of a linear and teleological model of human 
history. Consequently, we can argue that process sociology effectively points us in the 
direction of the type of approach that is required for the production of a more adequate 
answer to the explanatory dimension of the problem of orientation, on the basis of which a 
means of orientation can be developed which is capable of attaining a more detached 
perspective on the human condition while recognising and preserving human difference, 
thus ensuring a better protection against the reproduction of the type of modernist grand 
narratives that characterise the works of the critical authors.  
 However, as we already noted in the previous chapter, Elias’s argument regarding 
the lack of reliable knowledge about the long-term process of human development means 
that he remains adamantly committed to the production of more detached analyses of the 
history of the species which avoid the production of premature answers regarding how 
human beings might further expand their capacity for self-determination. In Elias’s 
assessment, the detour via detachment which is required before such forms of secondary 
re-involvement are considered is an inter-generational effort given how human beings have 
not even developed the adequate language on the basis of which to study these processes 
and how the majority of people across the world need to first possess a deeper 
understanding of how their global networks of interdependence work before they stand any 
chance of intervening in social processes in a manner that ensures an expansion of human 
conscious control over them without the production of new unplanned processes which 
might reveal themselves a source of even more harmful effects and relations of domination, 
exclusion and violence between people. As such, despite Elias’s argument regarding the 
need for a new mode of self-regulation of humankind at the level of world politics on the 
basis of more voluntary self-restraint, he does not provide a more in-depth engagement 
with the question of how, and under what conditions, this voluntary self-limitation might be 
achieved and how exactly human beings can devise new modes of collective steering of 
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their global interdependence in a manner that unties the double-bind of world politics and 
avoids violent conflicts between survival units. Rather, his analysis – despite some scattered 
excursus into the more involved implications of his model of human development which 
express Elias’s underlying humanism and which we address in the second section of this 
chapter – remains firmly committed to a detached approach, focused on identifying the 
predominant dynamics and social processes shaping human development at the level of 
world politics and in addressing the explanatory dimension of the problem of orientation. 
 In this manner, and from a critical theoretical perspective, it can be said that Elias’s 
process sociological emphasis on detachment only takes us halfway towards the production 
of a more adequate answer to both dimensions of the problem of orientation. Even 
recognising the validity of Elias’s argument regarding the lack of a more reliable fund of 
knowledge about human development, the current conditions of global interdependence of 
the species – and the series of uncontrolled social processes which affect human beings in 
ways that threaten both the maintenance of people’s lives and livelihoods and the future 
maintenance of complex societies or even of the planet’s biosphere – means that we are 
still left with the need for both the critique of more involved and parochial means of 
orientation and for critical reflections on how to promote more cosmopolitan perspectives 
and a widening of people’s we-images. On the basis of which human beings can better 
attune to the consequences of their actions across the long webs of interdependent 
humanity and to the need to develop voluntary practices of self-restraint that enable them 
to at least ameliorate the more harmful unplanned effects of their global interdependence. 
Faced with immediate challenges such as environmental degradation or the continued 
possibility of nuclear conflict, Elias’s process sociology can thus appear, from a critical 
perspective, over-cautious. As such, we argue that rather than fully embracing Elias’s call for 
a detour via detachment and its generational postponement of an engagement with the 
anticipatory dimension of orientation, a more adequate answer to the problem of 
orientation requires a more active interplay between the pursuit for a more detached 
analysis of the long-term process of human development and the more involved assessment 
of its implications, at each historical juncture, for the expansion of the human powers of 
conscious control.609 Such an approach seeks to attain a more adequate involvement–
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detachment balance which recognises that while the degree of reliable knowledge about 
human development is still too limited to allow more definitive and positive statements 
about the most adequate ways of organising peoples’ relations of interdependence at the 
global scale, at the same time, the development of more detached knowledge needs to be 
constantly complemented with a more involved assessment of what it reveals, for each 
period in history, regarding the adequacy of its predominant perspectives and modes of 
orientation. In particular, an assessment is required of what developmental trends appear 
to be leading to the further expansion of human beings’ conscious control over their 
conditions of existence or rather hindering such expansion and people’s capacity to manage 
their emergent level of global integration in ways that contain its unplanned and potentially 
harmful dynamics.  
 In the next section, we argue that the development of a means of orientation 
capable of attaining such an involvement–detachment balance which more adequately 
answers both dimensions of the problem of orientation can be reached through the 
production of a higher synthesis between process sociology and critical theory. A synthesis 
which is capable of combining, on the one hand, a critical theoretical normative 
commitment to the expansion of human self-determination on the basis of a non-
transcendental, materialist and emergentist assessment of the historical conditions for the 
expansion of the human powers of conscious control with, on the other hand, a process 
sociological detached approach to the study of the long-term process of human 
development on the basis of its multi-linear and open-ended model of the species’ history. 
This synthesis, we argue, would permit the development of a more cosmopolitan 
orientating framework regarding the conditions of existence of globalised humanity which 
captures the plurality of the human species and more adequately avoids the reproduction of 
modernist myths.  
 However, it is also necessary to note that the involvement–detachment balance to 
which this synthesis aspires is extremely fragile. In order to fulfil its purpose, social scientists 
engaged in the production of such a synthesis need to be constantly conscious of the ever 
lurking danger of their perspectives being overcome by forms of involvement that 
undermine their capacity to achieve a more detached analysis of human development. As 
such, the production of this synthesis is necessarily a task for a research project involving a 
multi-disciplinary team which is able to constantly shift between the more detached 
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production of orientating frameworks regarding the predominant dynamics and social 
processes shaping human development and the more involved assessment of their 
implications regarding the immanent potential at each historical juncture for the expansion 
of human self-determination. The social scientists engaged in this project thus need to 
achieve a high degree of self-control over their internal drives and impulses in order to 
secure the involvement–detachment balance at the level of their personality structures that 
enables the production of this synthesis.  
 
2. Towards a synthesis 
 
In this section, we carry out a reading of Elias’s work from a critical theoretical perspective 
in order to highlight its more normative implications and open research pathways through 
which a higher synthesis between process sociology and critical theory can be pursued in 
the future.610 This analysis is carried out in three subsections. First, we build our argument 
with reference to Linklater’s work, noticing how it confirms the possibility for such a 
synthetic project. Second, we show how this higher synthesis is capable of overcoming some 
of the classic criticisms of process sociology from a critical perspective, which are here 
exemplified by Honneth and Joas’s engagement with Elias’s theory of civilising processes. 
And third, we argue how a critical theoretical reading of Elias’s work opens the way for the 
recovery of a Marxian non-transcendental answer to the anticipatory dimension of 
orientation which, combined with process sociology’s multi-linear and open-ended 
explanatory model of the species’ history, can constitute the basis for a theoretical 
framework that functions as a more adequate means of orientation regarding how human 
beings might better attune to their conditions of existence and more consciously regulate 
the global networks of their interdependence. 
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2.1. Process sociology and critical theory 
 
Linklater’s reading of Elias is significant for our inquiry given how it supports our argument 
regarding the potential of a higher synthesis between process sociology and critical theory 
as an answer to the problem of orientation. Linklater has been engaged in a project that 
applies process sociology’s theoretical framework to the study of world politics through the 
production a synthesis between Elias’s work – in particular his analysis of civilising processes 
– Martin Wight’s sociology of states-systems, and critical theory.611 His argument regarding 
the need to carry out such a synthesis assumes predominantly the form of an explanatory 
critique of Elias’s work that notices how Elias fails to provide a more detailed account of the 
role that different international societies of states have had in promoting global civilising 
processes. As Linklater argues, Elias ‘does not examine civilising processes in different 
systems of states and is inclined to think that there is little in the way of processes of 
civilisation in international relations’.612 He ignores how global civilising processes have 
historically been responsible for promoting, even in the absence of a global monopoly of 
force, the development of patterns of self-restraint in the conduct of the foreign policy of 
different survival units which perceive themselves as belonging to the same international 
society.613   
 However, Linklater’s critique of Elias can also be read from the anticipatory 
perspective of the problem of orientation as implying that Elias’s emphasis on a detour via 
detachment has moved his analysis away from a consideration of global civilising processes, 
which have not been the prevalent feature of human historical development, to instead 
focus on the more predominant social processes that have hitherto shaped world politics, 
such as double-bind processes, elimination contests or the monopoly mechanism. As 
Linklater observes, his analysis is not informed by a ‘critical theoretical interest’ in 
understanding the ‘potentials for global solidarity, and in supporting a mode of scholarship 
that lends a voice to suffering (…) and enquires into how far potentials for creating 
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cosmopolitan harm conventions can be realized in (…) conditions of international 
anarchy’.614  
 In this context, Linklater strives to overcome the limitations he identifies in Elias’s 
work through a higher synthesis between process sociology, English School and critical 
theory which is able to produce a theoretical framework on the basis of which a ‘critical 
sociology of civilising processes in states-systems’ can be developed.615 According to 
Linklater, this approach should be capable of addressing the long-term process of human 
development from the perspective of how far human communities, in different contexts 
throughout the history of the species, ‘have discovered ways in which they can promote 
their interests without causing violent or non-violent harm (…) and how far such 
achievements are connected with advances in thinking that insiders and outsiders are moral 
equals’.616 Ultimately, Linklater’s synthesis strives to develop a ‘comparative sociological 
inquiry’ at the level of world politics, which ‘investigates what different international 
systems have contributed to a global civilising process’.617  
 Linklater’s engagement with Elias’s process sociology thus shows how it is possible to 
build upon Elias’s work in a manner that highlights the more involved implications of his 
study of the long-term process of human development. By trying to develop a critical 
sociology of global civilising processes, Linklater is effectively striving to achieve an 
involvement–detachment balance in his work which, on the one hand, makes use of Elias’s 
detached, multi-linear and open-ended model of human development to better understand 
the predominant dynamics and social processes shaping the history of the species and, on 
the other hand, combines this analysis with a more involved assessment of its meaning for 
future global civilising processes. 
 Even though Linklater does not engage with the problem of orientation directly, the 
contribution of his work for our current purposes is clear. It points to the possibility of 
building upon Elias’s process sociology through a synthesis with critical theory that achieves 
an involvement–detachment balance that more adequately addresses both dimensions of 
the problem of orientation by fulfilling two main objectives. On the one hand, this synthesis 
would provide a more cosmopolitan perspective on the predominant dynamics and social 
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processes shaping the long-term process of globalisation of the species, while protecting the 
plurality of the human condition by recognising the multi-linear and open-ended character 
of human development. On the other hand, it would provide a more involved understanding 
of the meaning of its explanatory analysis for an anticipatory assessment of the immanent 
historical potential that human development has gathered for the future expansion of 
human beings’ capacity to self-determine their global conditions of existence.   
 
2.2. Civilisation and self-determination 
 
However, any proposal for a synthesis between these two approaches also has to meet the 
predominant criticisms of Elias’s work arising from a critical theoretical perspective. These 
are particularly well summarise by Honneth and Joas who, in the book ‘Social Action and 
Human Nature’, argue that Elias’s process sociology suffers from a lack of engagement with 
the normative implications of its own analysis of human development. Focusing in particular 
on Elias’s ‘On the Process of Civilisation’, Honneth and Joas argue that Elias’s emphasis on a 
detached approach, i.e. his ‘pathos of freedom from valuation’, leads him to ‘hide’ the 
possibility of individual self-determination in the long-term process of human 
development.618 Analysing Elias’s position regarding the development of individual ‘civilised’ 
self-control, they accuse him of simply assuming the possibility of repressing internal drives 
and impulses ‘without consequences in the form of inhibitional energies or neurotic 
disorders’.619 Consequently, they argue, Elias poses a linear conception of civilisation 
entailing the increase of ‘repressive self-control’, which is perceived as a ‘blind automatic 
mechanism of behavioural constraints that are invested with fear’.620 He ignores the 
possibility that these internal self-controls might also be the result of the ‘internalisation of 
norms arising from the recognition of their necessity or utility, and that is flexible and 
accessible to the ego’.621 As such, Elias’s process sociology is blind to the possibility of a 
social order that is more ‘favourably disposed’ to human drives and which requires ‘less self-
restraint’.622 Instead, it puts forward an interpretation of civilisation which supposes a linear 
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decrease in aggression between people, but fails to acknowledge the possibility of a social 
order in which ‘external and ritual means of social integration’ are substituted by ‘discursive 
clarification and settling of intragroup conflict’.623  
 In light of the characterisation of Elias’s work carried out in this and the previous 
chapter, Honneth and Joas’s critique appears hardly convincing or fair. As we emphasised in 
chapter six, and unlike what is argued by Honneth and Joas, Elias does not perceive civilising 
processes as implying the linear growth of blind and automatic self-controls. The 
development of human personality structures in the direction of civilisation cannot be 
characterised in a quantitative manner as entailing an increase in individual self-control. 
Rather, a qualitative characterisation is more adequate, which refers to civilising processes 
as an overall development of people’s personality structures in the direction of more even, 
all-round and uniform patterns of individual self-control over internal drives and affects 
which, furthermore, can assume remarkably different expressions across space and time. 
Such conception is not quantitative, linear or teleological nor does it entail the assumption 
that some human groups lack self-control when compared with others. Instead, it traces the 
multi-linear, open-ended and potentially reversible development of the patterns of 
individual self-restraint – on which human social existence depends – in connection with the 
development of the webs of human interdependence and human beings’ relations with 
non-human nature.  
 Furthermore, in the previous chapter we also noted that the development of 
people’s personality structures in a ‘civilised’ direction is concomitant with their 
internalisation of social standards of behaviour in the form of psychological agencies of self-
control which can assume a more automatic or a more conscious character. There, we 
argued that the more or less conscious self-regulation of individual drives and affects is 
variable in accordance with several factors, such as the development of the networks of 
human interdependence, the asymmetries of power between human groups, and the 
particular place occupied by each individual in the web of humanity. Now, we can return to 
this argument and combine it with Elias’s observations regarding the changes at the level of 
individual personality structures which are concomitant with the development of double-
bind situations at the level of world politics and the asymmetries of power between human 
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groups which are verified in their context. This analysis permits us to recover important 
Kantian and Habermasian themes on the basis of Elias’s multi-linear and open-ended model 
of human development and shows how it is possible to read critical concerns in Elias’s work 
regarding both the costs of civilisation and the historical development of human beings’ 
capacity for self-determination vis-à-vis their internal drives and inclinations.624  
 As Elias notes throughout his work, the internalisation of social standards of 
behavioural expectation frequently comes at a high cost for individual self-expression and 
satisfaction, imposing forms of self-restraint which might not be fundamental for human 
social existence but rather perpetuate power asymmetries between human groups.625 For 
example, at the conclusion of ‘On the Process of Civilisation’, Elias argues that the current 
expression of civilisation in Western European countries can hardly be considered a 
‘pinnacle’ of ‘civilised’ conduct, as it is frequently characterized by those countries we-
images.626 Self-described ‘civilised’ people are rigged through in their personality structures 
by all manners of ‘anxieties’ and ‘tensions’ – many times manifesting themselves in the form 
of neuroses and other psychological disorders – which derive from their internalisation of 
external constraints in the form of automatic self-controls throughout their individual 
processes of education and socialisation.627 As Elias observes, these ‘rules of conduct and 
sentiment’ frequently constitute expressions of the power struggles and tensions between 
human groups enmeshed in unplanned and uncontrolled relations of competitive 
interdependence at both the state and inter-state levels.628 These unplanned social 
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dynamics push people into patterns of asymmetric competition for power and status and 
into double-bind situations to which their personality structures have to correspond through 
the individual internalisation of external constraints that guarantee ‘conformity’ with their 
group’s standards of ‘acceptable’ social behaviour, which ‘have no other function than that 
of reinforcing their [group’s] power chances and status superiority’.629 According to Elias, 
while individual self-control is a condition for group survival and human social existence, this 
automatic internalisation of external constraints can assume the form of highly repressive 
internal agencies of self-restraint, which cause exactly the type of inhibitional and neurotic 
consequences to which Honneth and Joas refer.630  
 In this context, we can make use of one of Elias’s rare statements expressing a more 
normatively committed perspective to highlighting a fundamental critical concern with 
human self-determination in his work. At the end of ‘On the Process of Civilisation’, Elias 
argues that it might be possible for human beings to acquire a greater degree of conscious 
control over the future development of civilising processes and the patterns of internal 
regulation of their personality structures in a manner that reduces the personal costs of 
civilisation and enables people’s self-restraint to be confined to ‘those instructions and 
prohibitions which are necessary in order to keep up a high level of functional 
differentiation and interdependence, without which even the present levels of civilised 
conduct in people’s co-existence with each other could not be maintained’.631 Such future 
and more self-determined pattern of ‘civilised’ self-restraint, however, can only be achieved 
when the unplanned dynamics of human interdependence have been brought under 
greater collective and conscious control by lowering the asymmetries of power between 
human groups and the tensions and fears associated with them. As Elias argues, only when 
the tensions between and within states have been ‘mastered’ can the common pattern of 
individual self-control become more conscious and ‘be confined to those restraints that are 
necessary in order that [people] can live with each other and with themselves with a high 
chance of enjoyment and a low change of fear’.632 Then, it can become the rule that ‘an 
individual person can attain the optimal balance between his or her imperative drives 
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claiming satisfaction and fulfilment and the constraints imposed upon them’.633 A condition 
which, Elias notes, can be variously described as one of greater ‘happiness’ or ‘freedom’.634  
 Elias’s theory of civilising processes can thus be read from a critical theoretical 
perspective which highlights the possibility of tilting the balance between more automatic 
and more conscious patterns of self-restraint in a manner which ensures an expansion of 
people’s capacity for self-determination vis-à-vis internal human nature. In this manner, 
Elias can be understood as recovering, on the basis of his process sociological model of 
human history, some of the main critical concerns of Kant and Habermas regarding under 
what conditions human beings might attain a greater degree of conscious control over their 
more animalic inclinations and more consciously regulate their behaviour in a manner that 
is more individualised and self-determined rather than simply reproducing the behavioural 
expectations of their particular societies. However, Elias can also be argued to provide a 
more comprehensive assessment of these topics than the critical authors by noticing the 
connection between people’s development of more conscious control over their internal 
patterns of self-restraint and the development of the networks of human interdependence 
and the powers asymmetries that structure them. In particular, Elias’s observations 
regarding how the permanence of a double-bind situation in world politics reinforces 
people’s internalisation of social constraints in the form of more automatic self-restraints as 
part of their groups’ survival strategies highlights that the development of more self-
determined personality structures is an emergent feature of the species’ history which only 
manifests itself under particular social conditions. More specifically, it requires a lowering of 
power asymmetries and tensions between human groups and the untying of the double-
bind at the level of world politics. Otherwise, people’s personality structures tend to remain 
predominantly structured by more automatic forms of self-restraint which interiorise the 
social expectations of their societies and lock their perspective and world-views to those of 
their particularistic and self-regarding political communities, blocking their capacity to attain 
a more detached perspective of social relations on the basis of which they might better 
attune to the reality of their global interdependence.  
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2.3. Controlling control 
 
Our critical reading of Elias’s work – which permits to identify a critical concern with human 
self-determination that understands it as an emergent feature of the species’ history – can 
also be further developed to argue that Elias’s materialist and emergentist approach is 
capable of not only producing a multi-linear and open-ended model of human development, 
but can also be built upon in order to recover Marx’s non-transcendental answer to the 
anticipatory dimension of the problem of orientation.  
 As we saw in chapter three, unlike Kant and Habermas, Marx does not seek to 
ascertain the transcendental and ideal conditions of freedom as a normative standpoint 
which orientates human beings as to how they might exercise greater self-determination 
over the course of their historical development. Instead, Marx addresses the anticipatory 
dimension of the problem of orientation by constantly maintaining a processual and 
historically-embedded perspective which conceives of the emergence of human beings’ 
capacity to exercise conscious control over their conditions of existence as an inherent 
aspect of the long-term history of the species, without which the specific human mode of 
life would not be possible. Such perspective serves as Marx’s normative standpoint of 
orientation, from which he develops a form of immanent critique that seeks to identify, at 
each particular historical juncture, the immanent potential that has been gathered for an 
expansion of human beings’ powers of control and how these can be exercised in a more 
conscious manner. As we argued in chapter three, even though Marx himself ultimately fails 
to actualise the potential of his critical approach, still, his engagement with the anticipatory 
dimension of orientation is more adequate than Kant or Habermas’s and is able to avoid the 
dualism between history and morality which is found in their works.  
 Our argument in the present context is that Elias’s materialist and emergentist 
approach opens the way for a recovery of Marx’s non-transcendental answer to the 
anticipatory dimension of orientation, but on the basis of a multi-linear and open-ended 
model of human development which avoids a reproduction of Marx’s linear and teleological 
theory of history and the modernist forms of theorising associated with it. This is particularly 
evidenced not only by Elias’s comments at the end of ‘On the Process of Civilisation’ 
mentioned above, but also in his analysis in books such as ‘Symbol Theory’ and ‘Society of 
Individuals’, with reference to which we can argue that his conception of the long-term 
259 
 
history of the species – in the context of which he identifies humankind emerging out of the 
evolutionary process on Earth and developing a unique capacity to expand its conscious 
control over not only its conditions of existence but also those of all other beings on the 
planet – carries with it inherent normative implications.  
 For example, Elias refers to the ‘responsibility’ for other species which emerges from 
human control over non-human nature in a manner that recalls what in chapter three we 
characterised as the more environmental orientation of Marx’s work.635 According to Elias, 
this responsibility implies that human beings need to develop a greater degree of 
understanding of both the planned and unplanned consequences – to other species and the 
Earth’s environment – arising from their control over the non-human part of the universe in 
order to understand what patterns of self-restraint they need to observe so as to reduce its 
harmful consequences.636 Essentially, Elias’s process sociology can be understood as 
opening the way for a recovery of Marx’s claim about human beings needing to learn how to 
more consciously control their own capacity for control, in order to live up to the 
responsibility which arises from their preponderant position on Earth as the main threat to 
the continued process of evolution on the planet.637 
 Furthermore, Elias also notes that the human capacity for control implies a particular 
form of responsibility of human beings towards themselves. As the only known species on 
the planet capable of informed and planned co-operation, humans are in a single position in 
the process of evolution to take into their own hands the task of making their collective life 
on Earth more pleasant, meaningful and enjoyable than it has been so far.638 This implies 
using their unique capacity for learning in order to develop a better understanding of 
themselves, their historical process of development and how they might come to exercise 
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greater collective and conscious control over it, in a manner that better avoids both its 
unplanned harmful consequences and the emergence of relations of domination, violence 
and humiliation between people. As Elias observes, human beings already know that they 
‘are able to live in a more civilised manner with each other’.639 However, they do not know 
yet how to bring it about, how to curb or eliminate violence, in all its forms, from human 
relations. An analysis of the long-term process of human development appears to indicate 
that part of the answer lies in ‘achieving a better balance between self-restraint and self-
fulfilment, but a stable order that warrants such a balance still eludes [them]’.640 As Elias 
notes, no one can fulfil such a task for human beings, they must do that for themselves.641  
 By providing a more adequate answer to the explanatory dimension of the problem 
of orientation, Elias’s process sociological study of human development can constitute a 
theoretical basis for a more involved consideration of the conditions under which such a 
social order could be achieved. It can be built upon from a more critical perspective to 
address the anticipatory dimension of orientation in a manner which identifies the historical 
trends that either support or block the attainment of a more adequate balance between 
people’s self-restraint and self-fulfilment, and a more conscious control of their 
preponderant position amongst the Earthly species which is compatible with the 
responsibility that accompanies it. 
 For example, Elias’s analysis of the predominant social processes shaping the global 
integration of the species can be used to identify the immanent historical potential that has 
been gathered at the level of world politics for the development, at the level of people’s 
personality structures, of more detached perspectives on the basis of which human beings 
can better attune to the long networks of interdependent humanity and come to more 
adequately find a balance between the self-fulfilment of their drives and impulses – as well 
as the interests and goals of their particular communities – and the self-restraint they need 
to observe in their relations with other people. Essential in this process is a widening of 
people’s we-images to encompass larger groups of human beings and which are ultimately 
oriented to include the whole web of interdependent humankind as the ultimate survival 
unit. In this context, Elias observes that ‘there are already unambiguous signs that people 
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are beginning to identify with something beyond state borders, that their we-group identity 
is moving towards the plane of humanity’.642  
 One of the main signs identified by Elias is the growing importance of the concept of 
human rights which, Elias argues, is starting to impose upon states an awareness regarding 
the need to observe certain self-restraints in their treatment of individual citizens. Elias 
observes that the effect that human rights can have in cultivating self-restraint in the 
behaviour of people organised as states vis-à-vis individual human beings resembles the 
type of changes that the historical formation of states led to occur at the level of familial or 
tribal relations with individual subjects.643 The formation of states enabled individuals to 
release themselves from the bonds and the arbitrary power of the tribe and the family, and 
led these social units to observe greater self-restraint in their behaviour towards individuals. 
With the loosening of the more restricted bonds of the family and the tribe, human beings 
developed more detached and less parochial perspectives of themselves and the world, on 
the basis of which their internal patterns of self-restraint became more consciously 
regulated, individualised and ‘civilised’, in keeping with their integration in wider and more 
multi-layered networks of social interdependence to which corresponded a widening of 
their we-images to encompass the state as their main survival unit. Similarly, the global 
integration of the species can entail a global civilising process in the context of which there 
occurs a widening of people’s we-images and the development of more detached and 
cosmopolitan perspectives which underline the need to observe new and more self-
determined patterns of self-restraint in keeping with the awareness of the consequences of 
their actions across larger networks of interdependent human beings; namely, people might 
come to develop a greater awareness that the ‘freedom from the use and threat of violence, 
(…)  [even if] contrary to the opposing tendencies of states, will have to be asserted for the 
individual in the name of humanity’.644  
 However, Elias’s explanatory model of human development also leads us to observe 
that the actualisation of these historical potentials is also blocked by the maintenance of the 
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double-bind situation at the level of world politics. The mutual threats and fears that human 
beings continue to pose one another reinforce more involved and parochial perspectives 
and patterns of self-restraint which are increasingly less adequate to the reality of human 
interconnection. As such, people’s basic modes of attunement towards each other fail to 
secure the type of more cosmopolitan orientations which are required for a better 
assessment of how to more consciously self-control their own behaviour in a manner that 
reduces the dangers and the lethality of inter-societal relations and which ensures a greater 
degree of collective and conscious control over the networks of interdependent humanity. 
Furthermore, Elias’s analysis of civilising processes also leads us to argue that the possibility 
of a global civilising process which enables people to attune more universally towards their 
social relations and develop forms of mutual identification which encompass larger groups 
of human beings in their we-images also depends on the reduction of power asymmetries 
between human groups. As long as great asymmetries of power continue to be verified 
between different parts of humankind, the double-bind at the level of world politics cannot 
be untied, and human beings’ basic modes of orientation remain locked to the more 
involved, ethnocentric and parochial points of view and interests of their particularistic and 
self-regarding communities. 
 In this context, we can argue that, from the perspective of a higher synthesis 
between critical theory and process sociology, which recovers Marx’s non-transcendental 
answer to the anticipatory dimension of orientation, the normative commitment to the 
expansion of human self-determination involves a historically-embedded critique of social 
processes which block the development of more detached perspectives at the level of 
people’s personality structures and a widening of their we-images. This entails the 
assumption of a political stance against, for example, state behaviour that reinforces the 
double-bind in world politics and the increase of power asymmetries between different 
parts of humankind or the perpetuation, in public and political discourse, of blame 
narratives and other means of orientation towards the conditions of existence of globalised 
humanity that reinforce more parochial and ethnocentric modes of attunement between 
people.  
 Furthermore, this normative commitment also involves a historically-embedded 
support for those social processes and political practices that have historically emerged with 
the development of international society and that appear to hold the immanent potential 
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for the widening of people’s we-images and the development of more detached modes of 
attunement that might underline patterns of self-restraint in people’s behaviour which are 
more in line with the reality of the species’ global interdependence. This entails, for 
example, a political commitment to the further development of historical innovations at the 
level of international society which might reinforce a greater self-restraint of state 
behaviour and thus contribute to untie the double-bind between human survival units; as is 
the case of innovations in the human rights regime that strive to universalise its character as 
representative of a truly species-wide consensus on the modes of self-restraint that human 
beings should observe vis-à-vis one another. In this context, we can also refer to Linklater’s 
observations regarding emerging conceptions and proposals for world, cosmopolitan or 
ecological citizenship and how these can constitute historical innovations that deal with the 
‘disjuncture’ between more involved attachments to nation-states and the ‘need for 
effective worldwide steering mechanisms in the current phase of global social and economic 
integration’.645 According to Linklater, proposals for world citizenship are important means 
of attuning people to the realities of their global interdependence and constitute a 
significant attempt at developing a ‘global ethic of responsibility’ that addresses the 
‘political issues that have emerged with the lengthening and thickening of the webs of 
mutual dependence’.646  
 Moreover, this normative commitment is not limited to the ‘political’ dimension of 
human existence. It also extends to other areas of human activity, such as the capitalist 
global networks of production, trade and consumption. In this context, we can once again 
refer to Elias’s analysis of the monopoly mechanism to observe that the formation of 
transnational capitalist economic monopolies represents an early phase of development of 
the monopoly mechanism at the level of human global economic relations. Predominantly, 
these monopolies assume a private character, with the power chances of control of 
decision-making in their central institutions still being reduced to small managerial elites 
who operate them in their own benefit.647 The power asymmetries between the strata of 
corporate managers and that of the workers who integrate and maintain these global 
networks of capitalist production are still very high. However, in keeping with the 
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development of the monopoly mechanism, it can also be argued that, as the networks of 
human economic interdependence, of which these corporations represent the ruling 
centres, become more complex and lengthier, the capacity of the managerial elites to keep 
all the power chances of control to themselves might also become progressively smaller.648 
Hence, a tendency can emerge for a greater distribution of power chances amongst the 
workers to influence decision-making at the level of the central economic monopoly 
institutions.649 In referring to the potential future development of economic monopolies, 
Elias observes that there might yet emerge a tendency for ‘the unorganised ownership of 
monopolies to be reduced and abolished; [and for a] change in human relationships in 
which control of opportunities gradually ceases to be the hereditary and private preserve of 
an established upper stratum and becomes a function under social and public control’.650 
However, whether or not this ‘curtailing’ of the possibility of private control over economic 
monopolies becomes an actual possibility depends on the overall development of the global 
interdependence of the species and, in particular, of the interplay between social processes 
such as the direction of development of inter-state competitive interdependence and of 
human technological control over non-human nature.651  
 Following these brief observations regarding how an engagement with the 
anticipatory dimension of orientation might look like from the perspective of a higher 
synthesis between process sociology and critical theory, it is important to also note that any 
such engagement can only be very tentative and that it needs to be always coupled with the 
constant awareness that the fund of knowledge about human development is still 
insufficient to advance more comprehensive and positive arguments regarding the 
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immanent potentials for the self-determination of the species and how to actualise them. In 
order to avoid the reproduction of modernist myths such as those that affect the works of 
the critical authors, the assessment of the immanent potential for human self-
determination needs to be constantly accompanied by, and carried out on the basis of, 
more detached analyses of the several society-specific paths of human development that 
are interweaving at the global scale. This implies the need for more detailed analyses of 
different civilising processes outside Western Europe than those that are available at the 
moment, as well as a more in-depth understanding of how these several civilising processes 
have come to influence each other throughout the long-term process of globalisation of the 
species. As such, we can argue that, at the current historical juncture, the assessment of the 
immanent potentials for human self-determination must be focused on the level of analysis 
of international society and on the identification of the resources its historical development 
has gathered for the further widening of people’s we-images and the development of more 
‘civilised’ standards of self-regulation in people’s behaviour, both individually and when 
organised as states. The analytical focus on international society arises from the fact that its 
historical development is itself expressive of the interweaving of various civilising processes 
and of deliberative processes between them envisioning the definition of the patterns of 
self-restraint that human beings should observe in their mutual relations at the various 
levels of human interdependence. As such, only through this analytical focus is it possible to 
guarantee that the anticipatory assessment of the immanent potential for the expansion of 
human self-determination is carried out on the basis of an involvement–detachment 
balance which, simultaneously, strives for a more cosmopolitan perspective that avoids a 
projection of particularistic points of view as universal, and maintains a more involved 
normative commitment to a historically-embedded immanent critique of the conditions of 
human existence and their potential for the expansion of the human powers of control.  
 Our critical engagement with Elias’s work thus shows that by developing a 
materialist and emergentist approach to the study of the long-term process of human 
development, Elias’s process sociology can also be understood as laying the theoretical 
foundations for a recovery of Marx’s non-transcendental answer to the anticipatory 
dimension of orientation. It shows how it is possible to build upon Elias’s work and produce 
a higher synthesis with critical theory which does not require a transcendental and fixed 
standpoint of normative orientation that derives from an a priori commitment to the 
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universal conditions of freedom, as is the case in Kant and Habermas’s critical approaches. 
Instead, from the perspective of this higher synthesis, a more adequate standpoint of 
normative orientation is one which is non-transcendental, processual and historically-
embedded, to the extent that it arises from the analysis of the long-term process of human 
development and the identification it permits of the emergent characteristics of the human 
stage of evolution. This analysis identifies the human capacity for control not only as a 
possibility opened up by the evolutionary process, but as constituting an unavoidable aspect 
of human existence. Consequently, the question that comes to be inevitably posed from the 
perspective of a higher synthesis between process sociology and critical theory is not 
whether control should or not be exercised, but whether it is possible to exercise it in a 
more conscious manner, which avoids its unplanned harmful consequences and enables 
human beings to make more of their history under conditions of their own choosing, while 
recognising that this means different things to different people in different periods and 
areas of the development of their societies, of their personality structures and of the 
networks of human global interdependence.  
 The answer to this question involves an arduous and potentially inter-generational 
effort focused both on the development of more detached analyses of different civilising 
processes and their progressive interweaving throughout the history of the species and on 
the more involved assessment of the constantly changing historical potentials and limits to 
human self-determination. However, as Elias notes, if human beings avoid extinction at 
either their own hands or as a consequence of a natural phenomenon, such as a cosmic 
collision, ‘it is unlikely that they will find, in the few million years left to them, anything 
better to do than to search for just that, for the production of better conditions of life on 
Earth, for themselves and for all those they have chosen as companions on this way’.652  
  
Conclusion 
 
Our argument in this chapter has followed three main steps. First, we have addressed Elias’s 
process sociological approach to the study world politics and shown how it provides a set of 
theoretical resources on the basis of which a more adequate answer to the explanatory 
                                                          
652
 Elias, N. The Symbol Theory, p. 174. 
267 
 
dimension of the problem of orientation can be developed. In particular, we demonstrated 
how it enables the production of a grand narrative that captures the main dynamics and 
social processes shaping the long-term globalisation of the human species, while 
maintaining a fundamental awareness of the multi-linear, open-ended and potentially 
reversible character of human historical development.  
 Second, we also made an argument regarding the limitations of Elias’s detour via 
detachment as an answer to the problem of orientation. We noted how Elias’s emphasis on 
detachment leads him to constantly postpone a secondary re-involvement that assesses the 
normative implications of his study of the long-term process of human development. As 
such, process sociology remains incapable of providing a more adequate answer to the 
anticipatory dimension of orientation, which addresses how human beings might come to 
exercise a greater degree of collective and conscious control over their conditions of 
existence. This observation led us to argue that a higher synthesis between process 
sociology and critical theory is necessary in order to produce a more adequate engagement 
with both dimensions of the problem of orientation. Such a synthesis would produce a 
means of orientation capable of providing an explanatory model of the long-term history of 
the species and an anticipatory assessment of how human beings might make more of their 
history under conditions of their own choosing. 
 This argument led us, third, to carry out a critical theoretical reading of Elias’s work, 
with the purpose of identifying some critical themes in process sociology that can be used to 
build theoretical bridges with critical theory on the basis of which this higher synthesis 
might be achieved in future studies. In particular, we argued that it is possible to address 
Elias’s work from a critical perspective which identifies the normative implications of his 
study of human development in a manner that recovers important Kantian, Marxian and 
Habermasian themes in the context of Elias’s detached, multi-linear and open-ended 
conception of human development. The arguments advanced in this section were highly 
provisional and preliminary, but hopefully open the way for a future higher synthesis 
between process sociology and critical theory which provides a more adequate answer to 
the problem of orientation.  
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Conclusion 
This study has carried out an inquiry regarding how the discipline of International Relations, 
and in particular critical international theory, can more adequately address the implications 
of human global interdependence and provide theoretical frameworks that function as 
means of orientation by helping people better find their bearings when seeking to 
understand themselves, their conditions of existence, and how they might come to exercise 
a greater degree of collective and conscious control over their future development. This 
inquiry was carried out through an engagement with the classical texts of the critical 
authors Kant, Marx and Habermas and the process sociologist Elias, which sought to address 
two main research questions. On the one hand, we considered the role of grand narratives 
in the development of more adequate answers to the problem of orientation posed by the 
global integration of the species. On the other hand, we asked about the possibility of 
recovering grand narratives as a means of orientation which seeks to attain a more 
cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition and overcome more parochial and 
ethnocentric points of view which legitimize society and time bound asymmetric relations of 
power, and their associated practices of domination and exclusion, between different parts 
of humankind. By reading our chosen authors through the lenses of the problem of 
orientation, we produced a novel interpretation of their classical texts and provided a 
ground-clearing exercise on the basis of which a better understanding can be developed of 
how critical international theory can more adequately answer the problem of orientation 
that is posed by the global web of interdependent humanity.  
 As we argued throughout our inquiry, the need for orientation has been at the 
centre of the collective challenges that the human species has faced throughout its long-
term history on the planet. The fact that the balance between genetically determined and 
learning oriented behaviour has tilted significantly towards the latter throughout the 
process of humanization, means that human beings have a fundamental and universal need 
to learn, from a very early age, standards of behaviour and judgement from the societies in 
which they grow in order to orientate themselves in the world. The contemporary and 
unprecedented levels of global interdependence of the species, and the challenges that 
emerge from the largely unplanned process of human development and that threaten the 
future maintenance of complex human societies or even of the planet’s biosphere – such as 
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those posed by environmental change and the possibility of nuclear conflict – make society 
and time bound perspectives on the human condition appear increasingly less adequate as 
frameworks of orientation. Expressive of the drag effects of loyalties to older survival units, 
these more involved and parochial modes of attunement – which find their most radical 
expression in nationalist reactions to the globalisation of human interdependence and the 
phenomena that accompany it, such as the mass movement of migrant populations – 
represent modern forms of myth; incantations that fulfil the role of emotionally comforting 
narratives in the context of social processes that, for their complexity and global character, 
appear to be spiralling out of control to the human beings integrated in them. By preventing 
human groups from attaining a more comprehensive and species-encompassing perspective 
on their conditions of existence, and of how their particular actions are necessarily 
enmeshed in wider interconnected networks whose interweaving produces unintended 
consequences that drag people into patterns of interaction and interdependence which 
they cannot fully understand nor control, these modes of orientation actually fulfil a 
disorientating function that frequently reinforces the double-binds in which people find 
themselves and the unplanned and threatening character of their social relations. 
Increasingly then, the need becomes apparent for the development of orientating 
frameworks that are better attuned to the global interdependence of humankind, that strive 
to address the human condition from the perspective of the species as a whole, and which 
are not limited by points of view bound to particular social groups, societies, or time 
periods. Only more cosmopolitan perspectives can serve as adequate means of orientation, 
on the basis of which human beings might more consciously understand themselves, their 
history and navigate their collective future on the planet.  
 The problem of orientation, as it is posed under conditions of human global 
interdependence, arises from the combination of the need to develop more cosmopolitan 
perspectives coupled with the recognition of the difficulty of doing just that. It implies the 
challenge of maintaining a constant tension between, on the one hand, striving for a more 
cosmopolitan point of view and, on the other hand, the observance that all perspectives are 
themselves part of the historical process of human development. As such, the main danger 
implied in the problem of orientation is that of falling into the belief that a particular 
perspective is truly universal. This would imply transforming it into a form of myth, through 
the lenses of which the whole history of the species, and its contemporary conditions of 
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existence, are interpreted in a manner that frequently legitimatizes the assumptions and 
relations of power, domination and exclusion which are associated with the time period and 
the cultural context in which that particular perspective is developed, and that become 
hidden under the cover of its supposed cosmopolitanism. Such a danger is clearly expressed 
in modernist eighteenth and nineteenth century grand narratives and the manner in which 
these legitimized practices of exclusion and domination connected with Western 
imperialism and colonialism. The problem of orientation thus raises the question of how 
exactly we can prevent against the reproduction of such myths, while still attempting to 
produce theoretical frameworks that enable a more cosmopolitan perspective on the 
human condition.  
 As seen in the first chapter of this study, the ever-lurking danger of falling into new 
forms of myth has led much of contemporary critical international theory to carry out a 
retreat into the present and to concentrate its analysis on contemporary topics, without 
framing them in a wider conception of the historical development of the species. However, 
this ‘presentism’ – characterized by a focus on a multiplicity of particular narratives in the 
hope that, through the recognition of their diversity, it is possible to avoid the dangers of 
grand narratives – does not offer an adequate solution to the problem of orientation. 
Instead, it blocks the capacity to achieve a more cosmopolitan perspective, which detaches 
itself from particularistic society and time bound points of view and that can serve as a more 
adequate means of orientation in a period of human history characterized by high levels of 
global interweaving. As such, the contemporary focus of critical international theory rather 
than a solution to the problem of orientation was identified as posing the condition for 
higher levels of disorientation. 
 Alternatively, the present study has argued that a more adequate answer to the 
problem of orientation consists in embracing the tension and the danger inherent in it. It 
consists in striving to combine the more focused analyses of contemporary critical 
international theory with the production of theoretical frameworks that aspire to provide a 
more detached and cosmopolitan perspective, while being aware and preventing against 
the danger of becoming themselves new forms of myth. In this context, a case has been 
made regarding the role of grand narratives. It has been argued that very long-term 
accounts of the process of development of the human species – which perceive themselves 
as part of that process – provide the most adequate theoretical framework on the basis of 
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which the tension inherent in the problem of orientation can be maintained. On the one 
hand, by framing the contemporary conditions of human existence in the long-term process 
of human development, they are better able to step back from existent society and time 
bound particularistic perspectives, and thus help achieve a more detached point of view. On 
the other hand, by understanding themselves as part of that process, they might also be 
capable of guarding against the assumption that they represent a true and final universal 
standpoint. The question has thus been posed as to what extent it is possible to recover 
grand narratives, while preventing the reproduction of their modernist shortcomings, in 
critical international theory in order to reinforce its role as a means of orientation to human 
beings by helping them better understand and control their conditions of globally 
interdependent existence. 
 In order to answer this question, this study has analysed the manner in which the 
grand narratives of the critical authors Kant, Marx and Habermas, and the process 
sociologist Elias, can be read as providing different answers to the problem of orientation. 
Framed by the thematic relation established between ‘orientation’, ‘cosmopolitanism’, 
‘grand narratives’, ‘involvement–detachment balance’ and ‘triad of controls’, we have 
strived to understand the extent to which the main insights, as well as the main 
shortcomings, of these authors’ works can provide us with important clues regarding how a 
recovery of grand narratives can occur in critical international theory which provides a more 
adequate approach to both the explanatory and the anticipatory dimensions of the problem 
of orientation.  
 In this context, we used the image of an inter-generational dialogue between these 
authors in order to highlight how each of them has developed his own approach on the 
basis of the work left behind by those who preceded him, and strove to reach a more 
cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition than his predecessors. As such, we 
followed Kant’s attempt at developing a universal history from a cosmopolitan perspective 
while also noting how his transcendental ascertainment of the conditions of human 
freedom, and his interpretation of human development through a dualism between history 
and morality, leads him to a linear and teleological model of the species’ history. Such 
transcendental, linear and teleological answer to the problem of orientation is ultimately 
found inadequate and to reproduce a form of modernist myth which, under the assumption 
that it expresses a truly universal perspective, advances a Western-centric understanding of 
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the long-term process of human development which legitimizes practices of domination and 
exclusion between different parts of humanity. Then, we observed how Marx’s materialist 
and emergentist approach enables him to overcome Kant’s dualisms and provides a non-
transcendental engagement with the problem of orientation that holds the potential to 
capture the multi-linear and open-ended character of human development. However, Marx 
fails in actualizing this potential and also falls in the trap of modernist theorising through a 
one-sided emphasis on human control over nature and relations of production. Marx’s 
attribution of causal primacy to only one of the three dimensions of the triad of basic 
controls ultimately leads him to a linear and teleological conception of human development 
which, coupled with a dismissal of the role of social processes such as the development of 
social norms, state formation and world politics in the history of the species, implies a 
failure to theoretical capture the fundamental condition of plurality of humankind.   
 We then followed Habermas’s attempt to build upon the work of Kant and Marx 
through a reconstruction of Marx’s critical approach that strives to overcome his 
shortcomings by recovering Kantian themes in the context of a theory of social evolution 
which relies on a theoretical distinction between the logic and the dynamics of human 
development. Habermas’s work is particularly instructive for our purposes to the extent that 
he is distinguishable from other thinkers in the critical tradition as one of the only post-war 
theorists that maintains a commitment to the production of grand narratives on the human 
condition and keeps faith with the idea of a universal history from a cosmopolitan 
perspective that might provide orientation to human beings caught up in global networks of 
interdependence regarding how they might better understand and control them. As we 
observed, Habermas’s critical approach provides a more comprehensive understanding of 
the role of the interplay of the triad of controls in human development, and recovers an 
analysis of the importance of linguistic communication, the state and inter-societal relations 
in the history of the species. However, Habermas’s theoretical division between the logic 
and the dynamics of human development also leads him to fall again in a trap similar to 
Kant’s, and to not only pose a conception of human development which is linear and 
teleological, but also recover a form of transcendental engagement with the anticipatory 
dimension of orientation which reinstates a dualism between morality and history and 
implies a set of modernist assumptions regarding the human condition and its historical 
development.  
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 Consequently, all three critical authors were found to produce grand narratives 
which are inadequate as an answer to the problem of orientation. By re-reading the 
shortcomings of their works in light of Elias’s notion of the involvement–detachment 
balance, we argued that their focus on the normative goal of orientating political agency 
towards human emancipation led them to remain locked in the particularistic perspectives 
of their own societies and time periods, and thus to reproduce modernist forms of 
theorising which interpret the whole course of human history from the perspective of their 
more involved, society and time bound, wishes, fears and concerns, and which not only 
undermined the function of their grand narratives as a means of orientation regarding the 
history and globalisation of the species, but also hid from their view the forms of 
domination and exclusion that are inherent in their own theoretical and historical positions. 
However, our analysis of the critical authors’ works also led us to a clearer understanding of 
the conditions that a more adequate means of orientation would have to fulfil. Two main 
conditions were identified in this context. First, it would have to recover and further develop 
Marx’s non-transcendental engagement with the anticipatory dimension of orientation. And 
second, it would have to answer the explanatory dimension of orientation through a multi-
linear and open-ended model of human development which recognises the diversity of 
humankind and captures the role of the developmental interplay between all three 
dimensions of the human powers of control in the history of the species. Such a theoretical 
framework, we argued, would constitute a more adequate answer to the problem of 
orientation, capable of attaining an involvement–detachment balance which simultaneously 
captures the main dynamics and social processes shaping human historical development 
and helps human beings better understand how they might collectively and more 
consciously regulate the globe spanning webs of interdependent humankind.  
 In the last two chapters of this study we advanced the argument that this theoretical 
framework can be found through a higher synthesis between process sociology and critical 
theory, and we tried to provide the initial theoretical steps through which this synthesis 
might be accomplished in critical international theory. We started by reading Elias’s process 
sociology as an answer to the problem of orientation. In this context, we argued that Elias 
can be characterised as being in the same intellectual trajectory as the critical authors, 
sharing their awareness of the role that social processes such as symbolic communication, 
the development of social norms or inter-state relations have in shaping the long-term 
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development of the species and that of the human powers of control. Furthermore, we also 
observed that, like the critical authors, Elias is engaged in the search for a more 
cosmopolitan perspective on the human condition on the basis of which new human self-
images might be developed that promote a universalisation of people’s perspectives and 
the constitution of new modes of orientation that are better attuned to the conditions of 
existence of the global web of humanity. Following our analysis of Elias’s work, a case was 
made that his detour via detachment – by postponing an engagement with the normative 
implications of the long-term process of human development and their associated questions 
of political agency – enables the process sociologist to step back from his own society and 
time bound point of view to a greater extent than the critical authors, and to develop an 
approach to the production of grand narratives which is more adequate as an explanatory 
means of orientation. This approach consists in abandoning the narrative form of analysis of 
the long-term process of human development to instead provide a materialist and 
emergentist approach that captures what Elias describes as universal social processes of 
human development, which are common to all human societies and inescapable features of 
human existence. At the same time that he identifies these universal social processes, he 
traces their developmental dynamics and how these affect their development in different 
directions and in society-specific ways throughout the history of the species, thus capturing 
the multi-linear, open-ended and potentially regressive character of the long-term process 
of human development and the way it is constituted by the interweaving of society-specific 
developmental processes. Expressing these universal social processes and their 
developmental dynamics through concepts such as symbol emancipation, civilising 
processes, the monopoly mechanism, functional democratization, double-bind processes, 
changes in we-images, the we–I balance or the involvement–detachment balance, Elias 
produces a theoretical framework that more adequately addresses the explanatory 
dimension of orientation and that provides a more comprehensive understanding of some 
of the main themes the critical authors addressed in their studies of the history of the 
species. In this manner, Elias advances an explanatory grand narrative of the long-term 
process of human development which expresses a more cosmopolitan – in the sense of 
species-encompassing – perspective on the human condition, which is better able to detach 
from more particularistic time and society bound points of view, and which is thus more 
successful in guarding against the reproduction of the modernist shortcomings which affect 
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the grand narratives of the critical authors. Elias’s approach thus show how grand narratives 
can be recovered in critical international theory in a way that improves its role as a means of 
orientation, enabling human beings to more adequately understand their conditions of 
existence and how these have developed throughout the species’ history. This conclusion 
supported our argument regarding the indispensability of Elias’s process sociology for the 
development of a more adequate answer to the problem of orientation.  
 However, we also noted that process sociology’s commitment to detached 
sociological analysis, while providing very important insights on how a more adequate 
answer to the explanatory dimension of orientation might be developed, is never 
complemented by Elias’s envisioned secondary re-involvement. Consequently, process 
sociology does not engage in any particular depth with the anticipatory dimension of 
orientation and with the question of what forms of political agency might enable human 
beings to expand their capacity for self-determination by acquiring a greater degree of 
conscious and collective control over their conditions of existence and future development. 
As such, the argument has been made that a more adequate answer to both dimensions of 
the problem of orientation requires a higher synthesis between process sociology and 
critical theory. In this context, some preliminary thoughts were advanced regarding how this 
synthesis can be achieved by identifying what forms of secondary re-involvement are 
implied in Elias’s work, and how his materialist and emergentist approach to human 
development enables a recovery of Marx’s non-transcendental answer to the anticipatory 
dimension of orientation.  
 In particular, we highlighted how Elias’s work permits a non-transcendental 
assessment of the social conditions in which human beings might develop a greater degree 
of conscious control over the internal patterning of their personality structures on the basis 
of which they can attain a more detached and cosmopolitan perspective on their conditions 
of existence and ensure a better balance between the self-fulfilment of their drives and the 
self-restraints they need to observe in their relations with other people and with non-
human nature given the global interdependence of the species. This analysis led us to argue 
that a higher synthesis between process sociology and critical theory would carry out, on 
the basis of its explanatory model of human development, an anticipatory assessment of 
how the human powers of self-determination can be expanded which orientates human 
political agency, on the one hand, to a historically-embedded critique of forms of political 
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activity and discourse which reinforce the double-bind in world politics and its associated 
parochial and ethnocentric world-views and, on the other hand, to the support for the 
constitution and further development of innovations at the level of international society 
such as global institutions that promote more cosmopolitan modes of attunement and 
mutual identification between people. In this context, we referred to the historical 
emergence of the human rights regime as one such global institution, whose further 
development might lead to a species-wide consensus regarding the patterns of self-restraint 
that human beings and their political communities need to observe in their mutual dealings. 
Together with proposals for ecological citizenship, the human rights regime points to the 
possibility for the historical emergence of more cosmopolitan modes of orientation that 
might contribute to untie the double-bind in world politics, reduce the tensions and dangers 
that people pose to each other and to non-human nature, and cultivate more detached 
world-views on the basis of which they might better attune to the reality of their global 
interconnection. These changes imply active political support for the development of 
collective learning process, through processes of deliberative consensualization at the level 
of international society, regarding how human beings might more consciously control their 
own capacity for control, and thus achieve a more adequate balance between the 
satisfaction of their drives and the forms of self-restrain they need to observe in order to 
collectively bring under greater control the unplanned processes that shape their conditions 
of existence at all three levels of human experience, i.e. people’s internal human nature, 
their relations with external non-human nature, and the social networks of interdependent 
humanity. 
 However, we also argued that the still insufficient fund of knowledge about human 
development blocks the possibility of more positive answers about how the human 
networks of interdependence should to be organised without opening themselves up to the 
reproduction of modernist myths. As such, all engagements with the anticipatory dimension 
of orientation need to be highly tentative and always coupled with the further development 
of more detached analyses of the several paths of human development and their long-term 
global interweaving. This observation led us to conclude that a higher synthesis between 
process sociology and critical theory should be carried out by multi-disciplinary teams of 
social scientists which clearly divide amongst their members the pursuit of two 
interconnected objectives. First, the production of more detached and explanatory analyses 
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of different, society-specific, developmental processes and their intertwinement in longer 
and more complex global webs of human interdependence in the context of an 
international society which now encompasses the species as a whole. And second, given 
that international society is the main expression of the interweaving of human 
developmental processes and the main site of their deliberative consensualization of the 
patterns of self-restraint that should be observed between people, this higher synthesis 
must focus the anticipatory study of the immanent historical potential for the expansion of 
human self-determination on this level of analysis. This focus is fundamental in order to 
achieve a more adequate involvement–detachment capable of simultaneously avoiding a 
projection of more parochial points of view as universal, while maintaining a more involved 
normative commitment to forms of political agency that actualise the potential for the 
expansion of the human powers of control which has been gathered at each particular 
historical juncture.  
  Our inquiry into the problem of orientation has thus led us to argue that an effort 
must be made to produce more comprehensive grand narratives on human development 
which are capable of providing a more detached and cosmopolitan perspective on the 
history of the species and its contemporary conditions of existence, while recognising and 
protecting human diversity and thus guarding against the danger of becoming themselves 
new forms of myth. Furthermore, this study contributed to the future attainment of this 
goal through an exploration of both critical theory and process sociology’s role in the 
production of theoretical frameworks that might better sustain the tension inherent in the 
problem of orientation in the current phase of human development. Finally, it provided a 
basic groundwork of how critical international theory can be further developed through a 
greater engagement with process sociology, which enables it to address more adequately 
the implications of human global interdependence and provide orientation to human beings 
in a manner that helps them better understand the conditions of existence of the global 
web of humankind and how they might come to make more of their history under 
conditions of their own choosing.   
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